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NORTH CAROLINA'S ANNEXATION WARS:
WHYS, WHEREFORES, AND WHAT NEXT'
JUDITH WELCH WEGNER*

North Carolina has long been viewed by those around the
country as having very beneficial state municipal annexation
laws. Many other states have envied North Carolina's
provisions for "satellite" annexation (a means for bringing
areasat a distancefrom existing municipal boundarieswithin
municipal jurisdiction based on voluntary petitions) and
"involuntary" annexation (a means for municipalities to
initiate steps to bring contiguous areas within municipal
their "urban character"
boundaries based on
notwithstanding property owners' disinclination to be
annexed).
In the past few years, North Carolina has witnessed
significant "annexation wars," by which property owners
have tried to encourage the General Assembly to gut the
state's involuntary annexation laws and sharply limit the
viability of "forced" municipal annexation. During the 2011
and 2012 legislative sessions, private parties opposed to prior
involuntary annexation laws prevailed in persuading the
General Assembly to significantly curb the ability of the
state's municipalities to annex contiguous areas without the
agreement of affected property owners, notwithstanding
efforts by the state's municipalitiesto oppose such changes.
This Article initiallyproposes an approach to understanding
municipal annexation that is rooted in an appreciationfor
local government ecology (including the powers and
relationshipsof counties, municipalities, special districts,and
homeowners' associations), rather than simply treating
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annexation as a matter of municipal boundary change. The
Article then explicates the historical understandings of the
law of municipal annexation in North Carolinaand pressure
points for change over the last decade.
The Article next analyzes statutory changes in North
Carolina's municipal annexation law that occurred during
the 2011 and 2012 sessions of the state's GeneralAssembly. It
then turns to key questions raised by these statutory revisions
and explores possible ambiguities regarding delivery of
public water and sewer services, growth management, and
land use regulation.
The Article then identifies three areas in which the recent
annexation changes may implicate local government ecology
in North Carolina:possible tensions between "old" and "new
towns" and relatedfragmentationof localgovernment; towncounty tensions; and relationships between general purpose
governments and specialized serviceproviders.
The Article concludes by suggesting areas worthy of attention
in the future, including changes in the state's annexation law
that may affect delivery of public water and sewer services by
municipalities, implications for land use regulation and
growth management, and potentialshifts in local government
ecology (including fragmentation of local government
power, increasing tensions between towns and cities, and
growth in special districts and other alternative service
providers).
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INTRODUCTION

North Carolina has long been touted as one of the nation's
most progressive states in terms of providing municipal
governments with opportunities to extend their corporate
boundaries.' Because North Carolina has historically allowed
"involuntary" annexation at the discretion of local municipalities,
such municipalities have been able to expand their territories,
gain favorable debt finance ratings, and enhance their tax bases
more readily than many municipalities in other parts of the
country.2
In the last few years, North Carolina citizens affected by
involuntary annexation initiatives have risen in protest and
brought a number of lawsuits to challenge these municipal
actions.' They have also engaged in grassroots organizing and
voiced their displeasure to the North Carolina General
1. See DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS: A CENSUS 2000 UPDATE 1722 (3rd ed. 2003).
2. See DAVID RUSK, ANNEXATION AND THE FISCAL FATE OF CITIES 11, 16-20
(2006).
3. For collected information on efforts to bar involuntary annexation in North
Carolina, see generally Annexation News, STOP NC ANNEXATION COALITION,
http://www.stopncannexation.com/annexation.news.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
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Assembly.' The General Assembly in turn created a Special
Legislative Study Committee on Municipal Annexation that met
and held hearings from 2008-2009.1 During the 2009 and 2010
legislative sessions, the General Assembly considered related
recommendations and numerous bills. In 2010, a substantial
annexation reform bill passed the House but died in a Senate
committee.' Thus, the stage was set for North Carolina's
''annexation wars," a contentious showdown between
municipalities and their supporters, who sought to preserve the
option for municipalities to initiate annexations of contiguous
land with "urban" character, and individual property owners and
rural supporters, who sought to restrict municipal expansion by
substantially curbing cities' longstanding annexation powers.
In 2011, the North Carolina General Assembly adopted
significant changes in North Carolina's longstanding annexation

4. Id.
5. Studies Act of 2008, ch. 181, § 46.1, 2008 N.C. Sess. Laws 723, 752. The Joint
Legislative Study Commission on Municipal Annexation was directed to examine
issues relating to:
(1) State law governing involuntary annexation, voluntary annexation by
petition, and voluntary satellite annexation;
(2) Municipal compliance with current annexation procedural standards;
(3) Provision of services to persons in areas subject to annexation;
(4) The effect of creation of an independent review procedure for municipal
annexation decisions;
(5) Current standards for judicial review and appeal of municipal annexation
decisions;
(6) The impact of current annexation law on municipalities and the State as a
whole;
(7) Whether the State's current annexation law should be amended; and
(8) Any other issue related to annexation deemed relevant by the
Commission.
Id. § 46.3,2008 N.C. Sess. Laws at 753. The Commission was directed to report to the
General Assembly's 2009 legislative session. The author of this Article served as a
member of the Special Committee and the Joint Commission.
6. See H.B. 524, 2009 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2009). The bill was passed
by the House on July 23, 2009, and was then delivered to Senate which referred it to
the Senate Finance committee on May 12, 2010. The bill was then re-referred to
Senate Committee on Rules on May 17, 2010. See House Bill 524, N.C. GEN.
http://www.ncleg.net/gascripts/BillLookUp/BillLookUp.pl?Session=
ASSEMBLY,
2009&BiIIID=h524&submitButton=Go (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) [hereinafter
House Bill 524 History].
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laws.7 Notwithstanding firm opposition by the North Carolina
League of Municipalities, 8 the General Assembly effectively
eviscerated longstanding statutory provisions that allowed
municipalities to engage in involuntary annexation of contiguous
property.9 The General Assembly also adopted legislation
designed to "roll back" annexation provisions that had been
adopted prior to the recent statutory change,' 0 resulting in
substantial costs to municipalities that had proceeded with steps
to implement prior annexation decisions and successful litigation
by those municipalities, which challenged the legislation on state
constitutional grounds." During the 2012 legislative session, the
General Assembly responded by expressly de-annexing the
affected territories and prohibiting their reannexation for a period
of at least twelve years.12 In addition, the General Assembly
further curbed involuntary annexation by substituting a
referendum process for the remonstrance process that it had
adopted in 2011.13
These changes in North Carolina's annexation laws are
important for several reasons. They reflect a substantial shift in
the balance of influence in the General Assembly, as municipal
7. Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649 (codified as
amended at scattered sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 160A (2011)).
8. Issue: Annexation, N.C. LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES, http://www.nclm.org
/SiteCollectionDocuments/Legislative/2012%2OIssue%20Sheets%20and%20MAG/
Annexation%20Issue%20Brief%202012.pdf. (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (detailing
opposition to the 2011 changes). The NCLM endeavored to guide legislation toward
procedural reforms, but was unsuccessful. See Annexation Keeps North Carolina
Moving Forward, Fairly, N.C. LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES, http://www.ncim.org
/SiteCollectionDocuments/Legislative/AnnexationFactSheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 16,
2012) (discussing the NCLM's position on annexation); Memorandum Re: Additional
Major Changes to the Annexation Laws, N.C. LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES, http://
www.nclm.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/Legislative/2012%20Legislative%20Memos
/2012%20--%20Annexation.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (detailing the most recent
changes to annexation legislation). The author of this Article expressed views
regarding annexation policy and legislative strategies in connection with the NCLM's
efforts at advocacy, but did not necessarily agree with all positions taken by the
NCLM's leadership.
9. See Act of June 18, 2011, ch. 173, §§ 1-2, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 668, 668-69,
repealed by Act of May 30, 2012, ch. 3, §5, 2012-1 Adv. Legis. Serv. 5, 5 (LexisNexis);
Act of June 18, 2011, ch. 177, §§ 1, 3, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 680, 680-82, repealed by
Act of May 30, 2012, ch. 3, § 5, 2012-1 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 5, 5 (LexisNexis).
10. See infra notes 241-67 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 242-50 and accompanying text.
12. See Act of May 30, 2012, ch. 3, §§ 2-4, 2012-1 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 5, 5
(LexisNexis).
13. See Act of May 30, 2012, ch. 11, § 1, 2012-1 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 25
(LexisNexis).
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concerns were put aside in favor of those of individual property
owners.14 They also significantly curtail a major tool that has kept
North Carolina municipalities in good financial health when those
in other states have flagged. Finally, they pose critical questions
for the future regarding the provision of water and sewer services,
growth management, and local government ecology. This Article
accordingly provides a case study of the changing balance of
influence and endeavors to identify and address questions that are
likely to arise in the future as a result of the recent statutory
changes.
The Article contends that, although annexation (the process
of expanding municipal corporate boundaries) is often addressed
in isolation, the process is better understood as but one dynamic
within the ecology of local governmental and quasi-governmental
activities. The Article therefore rejects the recent view that
annexation should primarily be viewed as a quid pro quo through
which municipal services are delivered in return for the payment
of municipal property taxes. Viewing annexation in this kind of
ecological context opens up a more neutral inquiry and permits a
more clear-eyed view of related dynamics that includes municipal
incorporation, the use of extraterritorial planning jurisdiction
strategies, the creation and management of special districts,
alternative means of service delivery, and the role of gated
communities, all of which are touched on below.
Part I explains traditional views of annexation and the role of
annexation within the ecology of local government in order to lay
the groundwork for understanding the consequences of significant
cutbacks in North Carolina's involuntary annexation authority.
Part II then traces the history of North Carolina's annexation law,
articulates themes evident from recent case law, and highlights
the important provisions of the 2011 and 2012 annexation
legislation. Part III turns to the implications of these legislative
changes, focusing on the way ahead for local water and sewer
infrastructure extensions, land use regulation, and local
government fragmentation.
This Article contends that North Carolina's recent legislation
will make involuntary annexation much more difficult, resulting
14. See Ann O'M. Bowman & Richard C. Kearney, Are U.S. Cities Losing Power
and Authority? Perceptions of Local Government Actors, 48 URB. AFF. REv. 528,
539-41 (2012) (documenting perceptions of city managers about loss of cities' powers
and contrasting views of state legislators).
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in new pressures relating to provision of public water and sewer
services that will likely be felt most by the state's smaller
communities and their residents, who will potentially face higher
rates. Voluntary annexation will likely increase as municipalities
condition water and sewer extensions on agreements to accept
annexation. This Article also suggests that greater attention
should be given to linking land use regulation to annexation
policies and advocates more widespread use of intergovernmental
agreements relating to growth management. Finally, the Article
suggests that the recent changes are likely to result in greater
fragmentation in the delivery of governmental and quasigovernmental services, a matter deserving further study.
I. CONCEPTUALIZING ANNEXATION
This Part provides an overview of the role of annexation and
the different frameworks for evaluating legal systems relating to
annexation. It first discusses conventional understandings of
annexation as municipal "boundary change" and then proposes a
more comprehensive approach that treats annexation as one
dynamic within the ecology of local governance (encompassing
counties, municipalities, special purposes entities, and quasiprivate entities such as homeowners' associations).
A.

Annexation as Boundary Change
Often, annexation is considered in isolation as a system of
boundary change that operates within certain standard
parameters (i.e., which municipalities can annex, what criteria
apply, what consequences result, what standards guide decisionmaking, and what procedural protections apply). These questions
are indeed important ones that are reflected in statutory regimes
in North Carolina and elsewhere. This conventional approach to
annexation is an appropriate place to begin in order to
understand the recent changes in North Carolina law.
Traditionally, annexation has been understood as a system
for changing governmental boundaries." Such extensions bring
associated territory within the corporate limits of the
municipality. In some states, including North Carolina prior to the
2011 amendments, different criteria or procedures for annexation
have applied depending on the population or other characteristics
15. See Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in
MetropolitanAreas, 48 STAN. L. REV 1115, 1117 (1996).

2012]

NORTH CAROLINA'S ANNEXATION WARS

173

of the involved municipalities." Typically, two major types of
policy justifications have driven annexation decisions and related
statutory provisions governing such decisions insofar as they
relate to municipalities.
On one hand, municipal annexation is designed to allow local
governments to expand their boundaries to include "urbanized"
or "urbanizing" areas, either because there is an expressed desire
to bring land within those boundaries (typically by virtue of a
voluntary petition by a developer or other landowners) or
because there is a perceived need for more extensive services
typically desired by urban populations (often allowing a
municipality itself to be the judge by virtue of statutory criteria
defining "urbanization" or "urban characteristics")."
On the other hand, municipalities are often authorized to
annex "contiguous" territory. Often, it is presumed that there is a
"community of interest" that connects adjacent territory with
areas already falling within municipal jurisdiction. It is also best to
avoid fragmentation in the delivery of governmental services or
governmental regulation among nearby territories in order to
assure efficiency and consistency." Moreover, those living or
working in areas that are adjacent to existing municipalities are
often thought to benefit from municipal services in associated
areas or to burden municipal areas by tapping into municipal
services even without living or working there.19 In addition,
policymakers often conclude that areas adjacent to existing
municipalities represent territory that is appropriately subject to
municipal regulation (in order to assure consistent and coherent
land use planning).2 0 They may also conclude that nearby areas
16. Compare Act of Sept. 22, 1998, ch. 150, § 6, 1998 N.C. Sess. Laws 432,435-36
(relating to character of area to be annexed for cities under 5,000 in population),
repealed by Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649, with Act of
Sept. 22, 1998, ch. 150, § 14, 1998 N.C. Sess. Laws 432,446-48 (relating to character of
area to be annexed for cities with population of 5,000 or greater), repealedby Act of
June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649.
17. See Laurie Reynolds, Rethinking Municipal Annexation Powers, 24 URB.
LAW. 247, 276-78 (1992). For a review of recent patterns of urbanization in mid-sized
cities and related annexation issues, see Christopher Tyson, Annexation and the MidSize Metropolis: New Insights in the Age of Mobile Capital, 74 Pirr. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript on file with the North CarolinaLaw Review).
18. For a discussion of the contiguity requirement, see Clayton P. Gillette,
Expropriationand InstitutionalDesign in State and Local Government Law, 80 VA. L.
REv. 625, 672-86 (1994).
19. See Reynolds, supra note 17, at 253-54.
20. Id. at 252-53.
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should rightly be expected to contribute to the financial health of
an adjacent municipality, based on the understanding that such
areas at the city margin generally have access to and benefit from
their close proximity to municipal services. Typically, both "urban
character" and "contiguity" standards are incorporated into
municipal annexation standards, as is the case in the North
Carolina annexation statutes described below.2
It is important, nevertheless, to recognize that these two
rationales are conceptually distinct and can play out very
differently depending on the kinds of annexation policies state
and local governments adopt. Once annexation has occurred,
those living in the annexed area become part of the municipal
electorate, are eligible to receive city services, are required to
comply with municipal regulations, and are subject to municipal
taxes."2 Not surprisingly, those subject to annexation may have
different reactions to being annexed, depending on whether they
have asked for their property to be reclassified in order to receive
municipal services, or dislike affiliation with the city and the
associated obligations to comply with municipal requirements and
contribute taxes to municipal coffers.2 3 If annexation does not
occur, then the local ecology may become more complex and
fragmented if alternative approaches are needed to provide
desired services or planning oversight in smaller pockets lacking
in general government oversight.
In 1960, Frank Sengstock, of the University of Michigan,
authored what is perhaps the most widely known framework for
comparing annexation decision-making protocols and associated
procedures.24 He distinguished between five major methods:
Legislative determination, in which the state legislature
reviews each proposed annexation;
* Popular determination, in which annexation results from
referendum or petition;
* Municipal determination, in which the local government
acts unilaterally to decide on annexation;
*

21. See infra notes 122-30 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-58.3, -58.56 (2011).
23. For background on the most prominent group that opposed municipally
initiated annexation in North Carolina, see STOP N.C. ANNEXATION COALITION,
http://www.stopncannexation.com/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (featuring reporting on
activities of an anti-annexation coalition).
24. FRANK S. SENGSTOCK, ANNEXATION: A SOLUTION TO THE
METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEM 9-41 (1960).
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* Judicial determination, in which the courts determine
whether the annexation can proceed; and
* Quasi-legislative or administrative determination, in which
an independent non-judicial entity decides.25
Sengstock's approach has framed many more recent debates
about the desirability of differing annexation systems, but has also
confounded those debates because many states have multifaceted annexation policies that employ several of these different
approaches.16
Scholars who have analyzed legal issues relating to
annexation have brought a variety of lenses to bear in
characterizing annexation, underlying policy considerations, and
issues posed by varying statutory schemes. Specialized attention
has been devoted to questions of voting rights for those
annexed,27 boundary problems in metropolitan settings,' and the
problem of "municipal underbounding" (when poor and minority
communities are not brought within municipal boundaries and
thus lack important services).' Still others have addressed the
specifics of individual states' statutes and case law. 0
The leading comprehensive analysis of annexation laws has
treated annexation as a means for effectuating boundary changes,
focusing on problems and statutory solutions of nearly two
decades ago." Through that lens, involuntary annexation served
25. Id.
26. See Rex L. Facer II, Annexation Activity and State Law in the United States,
41 URB. AFF. REV. 697,698 (2012).
27. See generally Clayton P. Gillette, Voting with Your Hands: Direct Democracy
in Annexation, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 835 (2005) (discussing various schemes whereby
annexees and annexors could participate in annexation elections).
28. See Briffault, supra note 15, at 1136-37 (describing how "affluent localities
can .. . use their regulatory authority to maintain their preferred fiscal position").
29. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race, Poverty, and
Exclusion at the Urban Fringe, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1113, 1159 (2008) (defining
"underbounding" and advocating "state legal reforms that increase territorial
outsiders' ability to initiate annexation"). See generally Michelle Wilde Anderson,
Mapped Out of Local Democracy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 931 (2010) (discussing municipal
underbounding and possible remedies that might be available by giving counties
more substantial powers).
30. See, e.g., Wesley E. Henderson, Annexation in South Carolina, 17
SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 235, 242-44 (2008); Richard D. Zeinemann,
Overlooked Linkages Between Municipal Incorporation and Annexation Laws: An
In-Depth Look at Wisconsin's Experience, 39 URB. LAW. 257,315-17 (2007).
31. See generally Reynolds, supra note 17. Among other things, Professor
Reynolds distinguished between situations in which two municipalities compete to
annex land located between them, and situations in which a single municipality seeks
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the important purpose of maintaining municipalities as the
principal providers of urban services, while counties instead
served to provide services needed and used by all county
residents.3 2 Any other approach would have confounded the
distribution of financial responsibilities between counties and
cities and led to a creeping increase in the powers and
government services available through counties." Thus, for
example, if counties began to expand the range of services
provided to pockets of urbanized growth within more rural, nonmunicipal territory, the costs of service delivery would be
increased, efficiency would be lost, and municipal residents would
end up subsidizing services to non-municipal residents through
increased county property tax levies. 4 At the time of this 1992
study, many aspects of North Carolina's annexation statutes were
regarded as models to be emulated by other states.3 s In particular,
North Carolina's comprehensive involuntary municipal
annexation power, with associated obligations to plan for and
deliver urban serves to contiguous land with urban characteristics,
seemed fair and efficient. 6 The desire of residents in annexed
areas to exercise "self-determination" seemed insufficient to
outweigh the greater good.

to annex nearby land. Professor Reynolds effectively described the competing
interests voiced in instances of involuntary (municipally-initiated) annexation. Id. at
253. For municipalities, there is a desire to provide services, accommodate population
increases, regulate adjacent development, and "confirm the reality that [adjacent
development is] already a functional part of the city " so that residents should pay
their fair share of city expenses. Id. For other governmental units, annexation may
result in overlapping jurisdiction but may also affect the division of sales tax
revenues. Id. at 254-55. For landowners being annexed, Professor Reynolds contends
that services should be provided on an equitable basis and assessment practices
should be fair and even-handed. Id. at 257-58. In her view, however, involuntarily
annexed residents should not be given a vote that could constitute a veto. Id. at 26667.
32. Id. at 258-59.
33. Id.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 273-76, 286-87.
36. Id. at 286. She would also give residents in contiguous areas with urban
characteristics the power to force annexation by adjacent municipalities. Such a
scheme would address the problem of lower-income communities that are left behind
when municipalities fail to use their involuntary annexation powers because the
service needs that would accompany absorption of those contiguous areas may be
more expensive than the property taxes they would yield. Id. at 270-71.
37. Id. at 256-58, 266-67.
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Annexation as Local Government EcologicalAdjustment

This Article endeavors to treat annexation within the more
complex governmental and quasi-governmental ecological
systems that have developed over the past two decades. It
attempts to frame key questions that have driven annexation
policy in the past in more neutral terms. It views annexation as
one tool (but not the only tool) for delivering urban services of
various sorts, addressing the fiscal health of municipalities and
counties, adopting equitable tax policies, and dealing with the
accountability and character of fragmented local governmental or
quasi-governmental entities. Thus, for present purposes,
"annexation as boundary change" is treated as only one of the
possible choices to be made in connection with adjusting
jurisdictional and territorial relationships in the ways just noted. It
is important to understand the ecological niche within which
annexation takes place before evaluating possible approaches to
municipal annexation in that context.
1. Overview: The Ecology of Regulation and Service
Delivery at the Local Level
Annexation occurs against the backdrop of systems that
encompass several types of local government or quasigovernmental entities. Such systems differ in nuance from state to
state, but several key dimensions are common. It is therefore
critical to understand the differences between counties (general
purpose entities with residuary state powers), municipalities
(general purpose entities with heightened obligations for delivery
of urban services), special purpose entities (narrowly defined
entities with focused responsibilities), and quasi-governmental
entities such as homeowners' associations (with growing powers
to deliver services and regulate private conduct). It is important
to appreciate the roles and powers of these diverse entities, as
well as their interaction, in order to understand the tensions and
policy choices associated with annexation.
2. Ecological Niches: How Do They Differ, and Why Does it
Matter?
a. Counties
Counties are territorial subdivisions generally regarded as
governmental arms of the state, often with responsibilities for
performing certain state-mandated functions (such as those
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relating to courts, public health, delivery of social services, and
limited public safety assistance) within their designated
boundaries." They therefore exist, as creatures of the state, to
serve state administrative objectives, and are not the result of
local decisions (such as those involved in establishing
municipalities)."

In North Carolina, counties have traditionally been expected
to provide health, education, and welfare services to those living
across their whole territorial expanse.40 Such services include
those relating to public health, medical coroners, registers of
deeds, soil and water considerations, public schools, and social
services.41 Counties in North Carolina are composed of
incorporated areas (incorporated municipalities) as well as
unincorporated areas (the remainder of the territory).
Municipalities thus remain parts of counties, rather than being
treated as separate territories that are removed from county
jurisdiction, insofar as key services are delivered. As a result of
this system, all citizens of a given county pay county property
taxes (those living in rural unincorporated areas as well as those
living within municipal boundaries). As indicated below, however,
those living in municipalities pay additional municipal property
taxes to cover costs associated with more intensive municipal
services.
In important respects, the overlapping territorial relationship
between counties and municipalities in North Carolina
differentiates the state's local government ecology from ecologies
in many other states. North Carolina has long been a rural state,
and as a result, its citizens often identify themselves in terms of
38. For a recent review essay discussing challenges currently facing counties, see
generally J. Edwin Benton et al., Service Challenges and Governance Issues
Confronting American Counties in the 21st Century: An Overview, 40 STATE & LOC.
GOV'T REV. 54 (2008).
39. For more background on the history of counties and differences between the
states, see generally 1 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS §§ 1:26-:30 (3d ed., rev. vol. 2010). See also TOM DANIELS, WHEN
CITY AND COUNTRY COLLIDE: MANAGING GROWTH IN THE METROPOLITAN
FRINGE 46 (1999) (noting that counties control land use planning and zoning, court

administration, road maintenance, and social welfare programs).
40. See A. Fleming Bell, II, An Overview of Local Government, in COUNTY AND
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT IN NORTH CAROLINA 1, 12 (2007) (stating that the

county has responsibility for "[a] number of major services and functions, especially
health, education, and welfare").
41. See id. at 14 (providing a table that shows the functions that counties and
cities perform separately and together).
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their county rather than necessarily in terms of towns or cities.42
Treatise writers have noted the significant differences in the role
of counties across the country. One treatise, for example,
contrasted New England and southern states in the following
terms:
In this country, the designation county is applied to
units of government with widely varying degrees of scope
and function from the New England region in which the
county was subordinate to the town and confined to
primarily judicial and recordkeeping tasks to the Southern
region in which the county is often the most important
unit of general purpose government, especially in rural
areas .... Because of the proliferation of special legislation,
powers exercisable at a county's option, and minutely
differentiated categories of classification according to
population, the titles of county officers, the duties
performed by county government, and the structure of
county government have presented a bewildering
kaleidoscope of form and function, even in one state
jurisdiction.4 3
The responsibilities and powers of counties thus vary from
place to place. Some jurisdictions specify core powers of counties
while giving those counties discretion to tap other powers to a
limited extent (for example, by opting to zone certain areas of a
county but not others),44 while others have offered counties more

42. As of 2000, North Carolina ranked fortieth among the states in proportion of
population classified as urban, and, as of 2010, ranked twenty-seventh among the
states in terms of proportion of population living in metropolitan areas. N.C. OFFICE
OF STATE BUDGET & MGMT., How NORTH CAROLINA RANKS 3 (2012), http://
data.osbm.state.nc.us/staterank/state-rankings.pdf. As of 2010, the state has a total of
48,617.905 square miles, 44,636.357 square miles (91.81%) of which are classified as
non-municipal and 3,981.548 square miles (8.19%) of which are classified as
municipal. 2010 County Municipal Totals, N.C. OFF. ST. BUDGET & MGMT. (last
updated Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.osbm.state.nc.us/ncosbm/factsandjigures
/socioeconomicjdatalpopulation estimates/demog/muninonmunilabypercent_2010.ht
ml. Only ten of the state's 100 counties had more than twenty percent of their land
falling within municipal boundaries, while eighty counties had less than ten percent of
their acreage falling within municipal boundaries. Id.
43. 1 JOHN MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 2:13, at 55 (2012).
44. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-342(d) (2011) (authorizing counties to
zone portions of the county's jurisdiction smaller than the county's entire territorial

jurisdiction).
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expansive authority to incorporate and claim "home rule"
powers.
North Carolina falls somewhere in between these poles. The
powers of counties have been expanded substantially to include
many of those originally accorded to cities, such as engaging in
land use planning, community development, recreational services,
library operation, and more.' As counties have claimed such
powers, there has, at least in some places, been a blurring of prior
distinctions between county and city roles. This blurring has in
turn contributed to the annexation wars.
b. Municipalities
Municipalities are legally created through the process of
incorporation at the initiative of local citizens, either pursuant to
general statutory schemes or by legislative action contingent upon
local referenda. 47 They are generally described as having both a
governmental and private (corporate) character and typically
engage in both governmental and proprietary activities (for
example, they may deliver electrical, water or sewer services).48
45. "Home rule" has been defined as a method (through state constitutional
provisions or statutes) that provides a local government with substantial autonomy
and self-government capability. "Used in this way, home rule involves two
components: (i) the power of local governments to manage 'local' affairs; and, (ii) the
ability of local government to avoid interference from the state." Jesse J. Richardson,
Jr., Dillon's Rule Is from Mars, Home Rule Is from Venus: Local Government
Autonomy and the Rules of Statutory Construction, 41 PUBLIUS: THE J. OF
FEDERALISM 662, 670 (2011); see also Frayda Bluestein, Do North Carolina Local
Governments Need Home Rule?, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1983, 1990 (2006) (defining home
rule as "lt]he power of local self-government, or the power of local governments to
deal with matters of local concern without having to turn to the state legislature for
approval, as long as their actions do not contravene already defined state policies")
(alteration in original). While it is more common for municipalities to have home rule
authority, counties in some jurisdictions can also be accorded home rule powers. See
1 MCOUILLIN, supra note 39, § 1:31 ("In some jurisdictions, constitutional home rule
for counties exists.").
46. See Bell, supra note 40, at 14 (listing forty-four areas of overlapping authority
between counties and cities).
47. For a discussion of incorporation practices in North Carolina, see generally
N.C. GEN. ASSEMB., JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMM'N ON MUN. INCORPORATIONS,
SUMMARY OF MUNICIPAL INCORPORATION PROCEDURES IN NORTH CAROLINA,

at
available
www.ncleg.net/documentsites/legislativepublications/Bill%2ODrafting%20Division/S
ummary%20of%20Municipal%20Incorporation%20Procedure.pdf. For a discussion
of more general practices see 1 MCQUILLIN, supra note 39, § 3:35 (discussing the
power of the state legislature in creating municipal corporations).
48. For a discussion of governmental and proprietary functions, see 2A
MCQUILLIN, supra note 39, § 10:25.
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Depending on the jurisdiction, municipal corporations may be
referred to as "cities," "towns," or "villages." 4 9 States vary in the
constraints they impose on municipal incorporation, but often
specify how physically proximate a newly incorporated
municipality may be to municipalities that predate the proposed
new incorporation.so
Once a municipality has been incorporated, its operation is
governed by provisions of its charter relating to elected officials,
administrative personnel, powers, responsibilities, and its
financial base." Municipal responsibilities and powers are also
addressed in state statutes applicable to all municipalities or to
defined classes related to size, location, or other characteristics.52
Pursuant to state constitutions and state statutes, many states also
authorize at least some of their municipalities to invoke "home
rule" powers with regard to "local" or "municipal" affairs, or to
respond more comprehensively to matters of local concern so
long as not preempted by state legislation.53
State constitutions may also limit the extent to which state
legislatures can encroach on certain kinds of municipal decision
making, at least when "special" rather than "general" legislation
is employed to address certain sorts of peculiarly local subject

49. See Bell, supra note 40, at 2 (noting that a municipality in North Carolina
may be called a city, town, or village, but that there is no legal distinction between the
terms); 1 MCQUILLIN, supra note 39, § 2:58 (discussing nomenclature including
"town" and "village," and the significance of those words in different jurisdictions).
50. See, e.g., N.C. CONsT. art. VII, § 1 (limiting new incorporations to no closer
than one mile from the corporate limits of cities of 5,000 or more under the most
recent census, no closer than three miles from the corporate limits of cities of 10,000
or more, no closer than four miles from cities of 25,000 or more, and no closer than
five miles from cities with populations of 50,000 or more, unless approved by vote of
three-fifths of all members of each house of the General Assembly).
51. For a discussion of municipal charters in general, see 2A MCQUILLIN, Supra
note 39, §§ 9:1-:36.
52. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-3 (2011) (listing when general laws may be
used to supplement municipal charters and providing that general laws supersede the
charter when the two are in conflict); id. §§ 160A-11 to -12 (granting corporate power
to municipal corporations and permitting municipal corporations to exercise
corporate power as a municipality). See generally 1 MCQUILLIN, supra note 39, § 3:13
(discussing other states' schemes for creating different classes of cities based on
population or other criteria).
53. For a discussion of home rule charter provisions, see generally I
MCQUILLIN, supra note 39, §§ 3:43-:47. For a more detailed discussion of home rule
powers, see Bluestein, supra note 45, 1988-2003 (discussing the authority that local
governments have in home rule states).
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matter.54 In other respects, it is generally recognized that state
legislatures possess plenary authority (within the constraints of
state and federal constitutions), including authority to specify how
municipal governments may be organized, reorganized, and
operated.ss The United States Supreme Court has been clear that
individuals who object to state legislative decisions regarding the
organization and operation of local governments are unlikely to
find protection from the federal courts when asserting federal
constitutional objections, whether because of substantive
understandings about the operation of the due process clause, or
because of separation of powers considerations.56
In North Carolina, article VII, section 1 of the state
constitution addresses the authority of the General Assembly
with regard to local governments in the following terms:
The General Assembly shall provide for the organization
and government and the fixing of boundaries of counties,
cities and towns, and other governmental subdivisions, and,
except as otherwise prohibited by this Constitution, may
give such powers and duties to counties, cities and towns,
and other governmental subdivisions as it may deem
advisable. 7
The state constitution also limits where incorporations can take
place by proximity to pre-existing cities or towns. 1
North Carolina has also been reticent to give its
municipalities or other local governments broad powers. It has
not adopted "home rule" provisions common in many other
states." Moreover, North Carolina has long been recognized as a
"Dillon's Rule" jurisdiction, meaning that statutory authority
accorded to local governments has historically been interpreted
54. See, e.g., N.C. CONST. art. II, § 24(1) (prohibiting the General Assembly from
adopting special legislation on a number of specific topics, including health and
sanitation, and changes in town names, among others); id. § 24(4) (permitting the
General Assembly to adopt general legislation to address the topics in section 24(1)).
For a definition of general laws, see id. art. XIV, §3. For a discussion of special
versus general legislation, see generally 2 MCQUILLIN, supra note 39, §§ 4:31-:54.
55. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907).
56. See id. at 179 (stating that there is no remedy for inhabitants who have been
harmed by the state's actions); id. at 180 (stating that the city's property was not
taken without due process).
57. N.C. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
58. See supra note 50.
59. See Bluestein, supra note 45, at 1983 (noting that North Carolina is a
"Dillon's Rule" jurisdiction).
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narrowly.6 0 Although more recent statutory provisions suggest
that the authority of both municipalities and counties should be
interpreted more broadly,6 ' at least when interpreting local
government authority to impose financial obligations on private
parties,62 North Carolina courts tend to interpret such authority
narrowly. As is true in many other jurisdictions, the North
Carolina Constitution requires the General Assembly to enact
"general laws uniformly applicable in every county, city and town,
and other unit of local government," while at the same time
allowing enactment of "general laws" applicable to classes
"defined by population or other criteria."' "Local" or "special"
legislation in certain areas is nonetheless prohibited.'
Municipalities in North Carolina have authority to engage in
land use regulation and zoning within their jurisdictions.6 5 The
municipalities
accorded
has also
Assembly
General
"extraterritorial" planning jurisdiction over land within close
proximity to their municipal boundaries.6 6 In effect, the
60. See David Owens, Local Government Authority to Implement Smart Growth
Programs:Dillon's Rule, Legislative Reform, and the Current State of Affairs in North
Carolina,35 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 671, 679-80 (2000) (noting the legislature's call
for a narrow interpretation from 1868 to 1971, which has resulted in a judiciary trying
to reconcile that century of precedent with a legislative call for broad interpretation
beginning in 1971).
61. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-4 (2011) ("It is the policy of the General
Assembly that the cities of this State should have adequate authority to execute the
powers, duties, privileges, and immunities conferred upon them by law. To this end,
the provisions of this Chapter and of city charters shall be broadly construed and
grants of power shall be construed to include any additional and supplementary
powers that are reasonably necessary or expedient to carry them into execution and
effect: Provided, that the exercise of such additional or supplementary powers shall
not be contrary to State or federal law or to the public policy of this State."); id.
§ 153A-4 (including parallel language for counties).
62. See, e.g., Smith Chapel Baptist Church v. City of Durham, 350 N.C. 805, 815,
517 S.E.2d 874, 881 (1999) (adopting a narrow interpretation of power to impose
storm water fees).
63. N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 3.
64. See id art. II, § 24(1) (prohibiting local or special legislation "[r]elating to
health, sanitation, and the abatement of nuisances;" "[cihanging the names of cities,
towns, and townships;" "[a]uthorizing the laying out, opening, altering maintaining,
or discontinuing of highways, streets, or alleys;" or "regulating labor, trade, mining,
or manufacturing" among other matters).
65. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-360 (2011) (authorizing the planning and
regulation of development for any municipality within its limits).
66. All North Carolina cities may assert extraterritorial jurisdiction within one
mile of their primary corporate limits. See id. § 160A-360(a). Cities between 10,000
and 25,000 in population can extend extraterritorial jurisdiction for up to two miles
with approval by the county in which they are situated while those with populations
of more than 25,000 can extend their jurisdiction up to three miles with the approval
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recognition of extraterritorial jurisdiction reflects an appreciation
of overlapping interests between municipalities and countiessomething that might be better addressed in annexation policy as
discussed below. 67
Municipalities in North Carolina also possess a number of
other powers not accorded to counties, including those relating to
public streets, operation of local electric systems, and provision of
cable television.' As noted above, however, there has
increasingly been a blurring of lines regarding city and county
powers.69 Moreover, cities and counties in some ways compete for
property tax dollars, since the county levels property tax to cover
county functions, while the city imposes additional municipal
of the county. Id. A city cannot assert extraterritorial jurisdiction where counties are
enforcing zoning, subdivision and building code requirements, unless the city and
county have agreed otherwise. See id. § 160A-360(e); see also Town of Green Level v.
Alamance Cnty., 184 N.C. App. 665, 675, 646 S.E.2d 851, 857 (2007) (rejecting
county's contention that its water supply watershed qualified as a "zoning ordinance"
and concluding that county's effort to implement a "rural community district"
represented an arbitrary action by the county designed to block town's effort to
extend extraterritorial jurisdiction). In all instances, the city must have designated its
proposed extraterritorial jurisdiction area in light of "existing or projected urban
development and areas of critical concern to the city, as evidenced by officially
adopted plans for its development." § 160A-360(b); DAVID W. OWENS, LAND USE
LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA 32-33 (2d ed. 2011) (discussing the requirement listed in
§ 160A-360(b)) [hereinafter OWENS, LAND USE]. They must also have prepared
adequate maps, given notice, held a public hearing, and recorded the relevant limits.
See § 160A-360. In areas where extraterritorial jurisdiction authority is accorded to
municipalities, such powers are limited to those relating to land use planning and do
not extend to the authority to enforce other sorts of police power regulations. See
DAVID W. OWENS, THE NORTH CAROLINA EXPERIENCE WITH MUNICIPAL
EXTRATERRITORIAL PLANNING JURISDICTION 5 (2006) [hereinafter OWENS, ETJ].
Despite this legislative framework, many smaller municipalities have not sought to
assert extraterritorial jurisdiction. Professor Owens reported that, based on a 2006
survey, cities of under 1,000 tend not to report their practices or tend not to assert
extraterritorial jurisdiction, with only approximately one-third of responding small
municipalities indicating that they had asserted extraterritorial jurisdiction, while
more than eighty-five percent of municipalities with populations of more than 10,000
had done so. See id. at 9. Moreover, approximately half of the cities with populations
over 10,000 that use extraterritorial jurisdiction do not assert such jurisdiction to the
full extent possible. See id. at 10 (stating that twenty-nine out of sixty cities with
populations over 10,000 asserted extraterritorial jurisdiction beyond one mile). For
more in-depth discussion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in North Carolina, see
OWENS, LAND USE, supra,at 30-31.
67. See infra notes 371-89 and accompanying text.
68. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-296 (2011) (allowing municipalities to establish
and control the streets within the municipality's corporate limits); id. §§ 160A-311 to
-312 (authorizing municipalities to operate public enterprises, including electrical
systems, cable television, and wastewater collection, among other things).
69. See, e.g., id. § 153A-340(a) (granting zoning authority to counties).
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property taxes that fund the higher level of services expected
within municipal bounds. 0 The result is that city taxpayers fund
their own police services, but also, for example, support the
sheriff's office at the county level. In addition, cities and counties
split certain sales tax revenues (including optional county-level
sales tax increments) according to legislative directive." Here,
too, there are pulls and tugs that have contributed to the
annexation wars.
c. Special Purpose Entities
Among the most important recent trends in local government
ecology is the development of special purpose entities with
governmental or quasi-governmental responsibilities." Such
entities include "special districts" and "authorities" with
particularized responsibilities for delivering specialized services or
assuming specific regulatory responsibilities.
The range of special purpose entities includes districts or
authorities responsible for public schools, community colleges,
utilities (power, sewer, water, or solid waste), business
improvement efforts, agriculture (or soil conservation), irrigation,
historic preservation, and libraries, among others." Generally,
70. See id. § 160A-209 (describing purposes for which cities may impose property
tax); id. § 153A-149 (describing purposes for which counties may impose property
tax).
71. See, e.g., id. § 105-481 (providing authority for counties to assess an
additional 1.5% sales tax to meet city and county needs and reduce reliance on
property tax). For a more extensive discussion of the ways that different sales tax
options are allocated between cities and counties, see DAVID M. LAWRENCE &
KARA A. MILLONZI, REVENUES: COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT IN
NORTH CAROLINA 6 (2009), available at http://sogpubs.unc.edulcmg/cmgl309.pdf

(discussing local option sales tax revenues and an option for county commissioners to
distribute based on per capita or ad valorem (property) tax formulas).
72. For discussion of special districts, see generally D. Andrew Austin, A Positive
Model of Special District Formation, 28 REGIONAL SC. & URB. ECON. 103 (1998)
(discussing the relationship between annexation authority and special district
creation); Nicholas Bauroth, Buyer's Remorse: The Relationship Between Local
Economic Circumstances and Special District Policies, 35 POL. & POL'Y 366 (2007)
(discussing the size and characteristics of special districts by state); Jered B. Carr,
Local Government Autonomy and State Reliance on Special District Governments: A
Reassessment, 59 POL. RES. Q. 481 (2006) (questioning earlier empirical analysis of
local government autonomy and special district creation); Janice C. Griffith, Special
Tax Districts to Finance Residential Infrastructure, 39 URB. LAW. 959 (2007)
(discussing experiences in Florida and Georgia with privatized infrastructure systems
designed to foster residential development).
73. For a discussion of special districts and their forms, see generally Robert P.
Yehl, More than Little Boxes: Producing and Providing Local Services in
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such districts or authorities have specialized responsibilities for
providing a relatively narrow range of services. They often have
unique financial structures (tied to the types of services being
delivered) and governance structures (in some instances with
governing board representation tied to property ownership or
representation inconsistent with proportional representation
according to "one-person-one-vote" principles).74
Academic and policy researchers have noted that many
special districts and authorities lack the level of accountability
associated with general purpose governmental entities such as
counties and municipalities. 7s Such entities are typically governed
by boards whose members are either appointed by governmental
or other constituent entities, or elected from stakeholders with
associated interests (such as property owners or benefited
parties). 6 Recent research suggests that special districts and
Metropolitan America (May 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Houston) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (comparing experience of
Houston and Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas). See also 1 MCQUILLIN, supra note 39, § 2:33
("In a given state, a variety of special purpose units may be created to deal with a
single general area of concern, such as water usage or control, with separate units
dealing with irrigation, flood control, levee, reclamation, water, water conservation,
protection and storm water, storm drain maintenance, and drainage and drainage
improvement."); KATHRYN A. FOSTER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SPECIALPURPOSE GOVERNMENT 12-13 (Barry Rabe & John Tierney eds., 1997) (discussing
types of special districts); Barbara Coyle McCabe, Special-DistrictFormationAmong
the States, 32 ST. & LOC. GOv'T REV. 121, 124 (2000) (listing "water supply,
sanitation, and sewerage or housing and community development," "soil
conservation and mosquito abatement," "[c]emeteries," "[h]ealth or [h]ospital,"
"[p]arks," and "[flire" amongst the types of special districts that have been created).
74. For a discussion of varying financial structures, see MEGAN MULLIN,
GOVERNING THE TAP: SPECIAL DISTRICT GOVERNANCE AND THE NEW LOCAL
POLITICS OF WATER ch. 3-4 (2009). For a discussion of principles affecting
governance of special districts, see, e.g., Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 355-57 (1981)
(holding that allowing only property owners to elect the directors of a special district
governing water and electricity operations did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 5154 (1970) (holding that the appointment of junior college trustees not in proportion
to district population violated the principle of "one man, one vote"); Sailors v. Bd. of
Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 106-08 (1967) (discussing the election of county school board
members by delegated local school board members, as opposed to direct election by
county residents); see also Camille Pannu, Drinking Water and Exclusion: A Case
Study from California's Central Valley, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 223, 245-60 (2012)
(discussing governance structures of water districts in California).
75. See I.M. BARLOW, METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT 7 (Michael Bradford ed.,
1991) (concluding that special districts enable functions to be distanced from the
political arena and reduce accountability).
76. See Nicholas Bauroth, The Effect of Limiting Participationin Special District
Elections to Property Owners: A Research Note, PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., Summer
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authorities are less accountable to stakeholders than generalpurpose local governments with elected governing boards, and
that costs associated with disaggregated special purpose entities
often exceed those associated with general purpose
governments."
In North Carolina, state statutes authorize a range of special
purpose entities, including water, sewage, mass transit, soil and
water conservation, electric, solid waste management, and airport
districts." For example, water and wastewater services can be
provided through a variety of systems: municipal water systems,
county water systems, county water and sewer systems, water and
sewer authorities, intergovernmental agreement, sanitary district,
or metropolitan water and sewer authorities.79 In the end, special
districts play important roles in providing specialized services in a
flexible fashion that need not correspond with county or
municipal boundaries. They remain public in character. In
contrast, homeowners' associations governing gated communities
approach service delivery from a private point of view.o
Private Entities with Quasi-Governmental
Responsibilities
Large subdivisions and associated homeowners' associations
have become an increasingly important part of the American
social and legal landscape.8" Often, developers of large-scale
d.

2007, at 71-77 (analyzing how special district revenue sources vary by whether the
special district is governed by elected officials or appointed officials).
77. Larita Killian, The Continuing Problem of Special Districts in American
Government, 11 Accr. & THE PUB. INT. 57-58 (2011) (discussing higher costs
associated with special districts).
78. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 63-78 to -89 (2011) (airport authorities); § 139-5 (soil
and water conservation districts); §§ 160A-311 to -312 (authority to operate public
enterprises including electric, gas, storm water, and other activities); §§ 160A-575 to
-577 (public transportation authorities); §§ 162A-1 to -3 (water and sewer
authorities).
79. For a discussion of water and sewage system options, see JEFFREY A.
HUGHES & DAVID M. LAWRENCE,
WASTEWATER ENTERPRISES 5-6 (2007).

LOCAL

GOVERNMENT

WATER

AND

80. For a thoughtful discussion comparing and contrasting the role of
homeowners' associations and local governments, see generally Robert C. Ellickson,
Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519 (1982).
81. For an overview of the shapes, characteristics, and history of common
interest communities, see generally GRAZIA BRUNETTA & STEFANO MORONI,
CONTRACTUAL COMMUNITIES IN THE SELF-ORGANISING CITY: FREEDOM,
CREATIVITY, SUBSIDIARITY (2012); EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER
ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 1-78, 122-
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subdivisions seek voluntary annexation into nearby municipalities
in order to ensure that residential buyers receive core urban
services including water, sewer, solid waste removal, and police
and fire protection.' On the other hand, an increasing number of
residential subdivisions function as gated communities that are
deliberately established outside of municipalities with privatized
arrangements for water, sewer, solid waste removal and security
services arranged by contract between the homeowners'
organization and private providers.' When gated communities
are deliberately established outside of municipal boundaries,
purchasers of associated residential properties often assume
(correctly or incorrectly) that they will pay only county property
taxes, and expect to cover utility and security costs, by virtue of
private contracts, at a lesser cost than would be the case if they
were also required to pay municipal property taxes.84
Controversies relating to the operation of homeowners'
associations have emerged with growing frequency in recent
years." Such controversies suggest that homeowners' associations
74 (1994); DONALD R. STABILE, COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: THE EMERGENCE
AND ACCEPTANCE OF A QUIET INNOVATION IN HOUSING 1-64 (2000).
82. For discussion of the high proportion of voluntary annexation compared to
involuntary annexation in North Carolina, see infra notes 376-85 and accompanying
text.
83. For a recent empirical analysis of the incidence of gated communities,
segregation, and regional differences, see generally Elena Vesselinov, Members Only:
Gated Communities and Residential Segregation in the Metropolitan United States, 23
SOC. F. 536 (2008). For an earlier, thoroughgoing study, see generally EDWARD J.
BLAKELY & MARY GAIL SNYDER, FORTRESS AMERICA: GATED COMMUNITIES IN
THE UNITED STATES (1997).
84. For an in-depth study of various sorts of gated communities in the Denver
area, see Christine Richter & Andrew R. Goetz, Gated Communities in the DenverBoulder Metropolitan Area: Characteristics, Spatial Distribution, and Residents'
Motivations, 18 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATES 535, 548-53 (2007) (finding that
"maintenance" is an important factor in decisions to move to a gated community).
There is growing evidence of problems facing homeowners' associations in commoninterest communities faced with substantial numbers of foreclosures. See James L.
Winokur, Critical Assessment: The Financial Role of Community Associations, 38
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1135, 1151-54 (1998); Casey Perkins, Note, Privatopia in
Distress: The Impact of the ForeclosureCrisis on Homeowners' Associations, 10 NEV.
L.J. 561, 561-62, 572-73 (2010).
85. See, e.g., TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST
AMENDMENT LIBERTIES INPUBLIC PLACES 159-61 (2009) (discussing free speech in
"gated communities"); Wayne Batchis, Free Speech in the Suburban and Exurban
Frontier:Shopping Malls, Subdivisions, New Urbanism, and the First Amendment, 21
S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 301, 333-51 (2012) (discussing free speech in context of
residential subdivisions); Mark Cantora, Increasing Freedom by Restricting Speech:
Why the First Amendment Does Not and Should Not Apply in Common Interest
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increasingly function in quasi-governmental roles with powers
over expression of political views, aesthetics, land use, service
provision, security arrangements, access to facilities, and more.
North Carolina, like other states, has modified its statutes
relating to the powers and responsibilities of homeowners'
associations and their governing boards in recent years.' Other
states, such as Florida, have had more extensive experience with
bankruptcies and foreclosures, resulting from developers
defaulting on loans, which have left major subdivisions in dire
financial straits without provision of promised infrastructure and
services." Ultimately, however, in many jurisdictions there has
been a growing reliance on homeowners' associations in
residential subdivisions to provide core infrastructure and services
in areas outside of municipal boundaries and core service areas. 9
The implications of these developments have yet to be plumbed.
As discussed below, gated communities and incorporated areas
that provide very limited services have each played a role in
North Carolina's annexation wars. 0

Communities, 39 REAL EST. L.J. 409, 422-29 (2011) (arguing that common interest
communities should be allowed to limit otherwise protected free speech).
86. For a summary of recent litigation arising from a variety of disputes in
common interest communities, see 8 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 54A.05 (2012)
(discussing disputes about pets, motor vehicles, parking, visitors, discrimination,
finance, property injuries, and so on).
87. See generally North Carolina Planned Community Act, ch. 199, § 1, 1998 N.C.
Sess. Law. 674 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 47F (2011)); Patrick
Hetrick, Of "Private Governments" and the Regulation of Neighborhoods: The North
Carolina Planned Community Act, 22 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1 (1999) (discussing the
North Carolina Planned Community Act); Patrick Hetrick, Wise v. Harrington
Grove Community Association, Inc.: A Pickwickian Critique, 27 CAMPBELL L. REV.
139 (2005) (discussing subsequent developments regarding the North Carolina
Planned Community Act).
88. See Griffith, supra note 72, at 979-80. A possible solution to this situation is
to establish a system of special "infrastructure development districts" that can be
established at the request of municipalities or property owners in order to cover costs
of infrastructure for particular developments, using tax exempt bonds. See generally
id. (discussing Florida's and Georgia's systems, and explaining the benefits and
drawbacks of such systems that avoid generally applicable property tax increases but
may create difficulties regarding consumer disclosure and estimation of associated tax
burdens).
89. See David L. Callies & Adrienne 1. Suarez, Privatizationand the Providingof
Public Facilities through Private Means, 21 J.L. & POL. 477, 477-79, 492-503 (2005)
(discussing privatization in Hawaii and elsewhere).
90. See infra notes 176-201 and accompanying text.
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3. Analyzing Annexation in an Ecological Context
Treating annexation within this overall ecology of local
regulation and service delivery provides a more flexible approach
designed to help illuminate the choices that will likely be
presented in the future as a result of recent statutory changes in
North Carolina and that are already being addressed in
jurisdictions that have not allowed involuntary annexation in
recent years.91 This approach is also designed to move beyond the
roadblocks that have arisen when key policy choices are framed in
terms of raw political power, as was true in North Carolina's
recent legislative debates.
The difficulty in moving forward to address crucial questions
without expanding the inquiry to the dynamic forces at play
within this ecological niche is illustrated by experiences in
Georgia." Researchers at the University of Georgia developed a

91. Many jurisdictions that had not allowed involuntary annexation in recent
years have begun to address this issue. However, it is difficult to provide a simple
tally of states that have disallowed or allowed involuntary annexation because, in
many instances, provisions regarding involuntary annexation may be targeted toward
narrow circumstances (such as the need to annex "islands" located within municipal
jurisdictions that are completely surrounded by a municipality yet do not pay
municipal property taxes or receive municipal services). See, e.g., Bryan H. Babb &
Stephen C. Unger, Setting the Annexation Record Straight: The Myth Underlying
Annexation Reform in Indiana, 51 RES GESTAE 36, 36-39 (2008) (providing analysis
demonstrating that, contrary to statements by annexation opponents, there were at
that time more than six states that allowed involuntary annexation).
92. See generally PAULA E. STEINBAUER, BETTY J. HUDSON, HARRY W.
HAYES & REX L. FACER II, AN ASSESSMENT OF MUNICIPAL ANNEXATION IN
GEORGIA AND THE UNITED STATES: A SEARCH FOR POLICY GUIDANCE (2002). In
2002, during a period in which annexation policy was under review, scholars affiliated
with the Carl Vinson Institute of Government at the University of Georgia sought to
assist policymakers by evaluating different states' approaches to annexation. See id.
at 6-7. Their analysis relied on earlier fiscal impact studies conducted for several
Georgia municipalities and a comparison of land use and annexation policy in three
states. See id. at 28, 35-39. Most importantly for present purposes, they sought to
develop a "stakeholder" approach to classifying state annexation laws as representing
the interests of the state, counties, municipalities, residents of annexed areas, and
universal benefits. Id. at 16-24. Under this approach, the authors regarded use of
"boundary commissions," legislative annexation, and judicial review mechanisms as
primarily benefiting the state. Id. at 16-19. Contiguity requirements, impact plans,
prohibition on un-annexed "islands," and county approval were deemed to benefit
counties. Id. at 21-22. Municipalities were benefited when noncontiguity was allowed,
municipal land was subject to easy annexation, "islands" could be readily annexed,
annexation could occur across county lines, annexation elections took place in the
city, or municipalities could annex through local ordinance. Id. at 19-21. Residents of
annexed areas were benefited if service plans were required, they participated in an
annexation election, and if annexation could take place by petition. Id. at 22-23.
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"stakeholder" approach that classified state annexation laws as
reflecting interests states, counties, municipalities, residents of
annexed areas, and universal benefits.' While the study was an
interesting one, it ultimately proved ineffective in advancing
policy choices because it appeared focused on positions rather
than articulating potentially shared underlying interests (for
example, creating a cost-effective system for water and sewer

infrastructure). 94
The most recent empirical scholarship has moved away from
merely classifying annexation structures and has instead
documented and analyzed the more complex ecological
relationships that link annexation policies with on-the-ground
social effects. For example, David Rusk, the noted author of
Cities Without Suburbs,95 found that a close review of the 2000
census data revealed that "elastic cities" that could expand their
limits through annexation had less poverty, more integrated
schools, and stronger economies than their "inelastic"
counterparts.9 6 Rex Facer reviewed data from forty-two states
between 1990 and 1998 and concluded that laws designed to
facilitate annexation tended to stimulate annexation, but those
designed to constrain annexation were unlikely to have
substantial impact.97 Professor Mary Edwards, one of the nation's
most insightful scholars of annexation, has recently completed
several path-breaking studies in which she looks closely at the
"Universal benefit" was found if health and safety problems had to be abated, public
hearings were required, and judicial appeals were allowed. Id. at 24.
93. See id. at 16-24.
94. In 2007 the National Association of Counties issued a report on annexation
laws. See NAT'L ASS'N OF CNTYS., A LOOK AT ANNEXATION LAWS: A STATE BY
STATE REPORT (2007). This report did not purport to evaluate different states'
approaches, but instead summarized key provisions of each state's statutes,
highlighting key provisions such as annexation by petition or election, use of local
boundary commissions, criteria for annexation, judicial review provisions, and
challenges available to affected property owners. See generally id. (highlighting the
affected stakeholders with regard to annexation laws). In 2008, this study was
referenced in connection with proposals for changes in Indiana's annexation law, and
some of its findings (particularly as to the number of jurisdictions that allowed
"involuntary annexation") were questioned following efforts to verify the associated
summaries. See Babb & Unger, supra note 91, at 36,40 n.10
95. RUSK, supra note 1.
96. Id. at 25-30. He argued that "inelastic cities" contribute to suburban growth
and lose population, while elastic cities capture that growth and gain population.
Rusk conducted an additional study in 2006 in which he concluded that cities'
abilities to annex land is a primary determinant of their fiscal health and results in
higher bond rating scores. RUSK, supra note 2, at 1.
97. Facer, supranote 26, at 697, 706.
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localized impacts of differing annexation policies." In a
comprehensive 2011 study,99 she found that high-density cities and
cities with larger populations and growth rates annexed more
frequently, as did cities with more undeveloped nearby land.o
Cities with relatively low median incomes tended to annex more
frequently, suggesting a fiscal imperative for annexation. 0 She
also found that cities that could annex noncontiguous areas were
likely to annex more frequently, as were cities in states that
limited municipal incorporation based on minimum population,
minimum density, and minimum distance from existing
municipalities. 102
Thus, empirical research is making it increasingly clear that
state boundary-change policies do not necessarily result in simple
or expected outcomes. As the work of these and other scholars

98. In a 2009 study, Professor Edwards and a colleague considered the relation
between annexation, density, and local government spending and concluded that
annexations of higher density land resulted in more efficient service delivery (as
measured by lesser increases in per capita spending levels), while levels of spending
associated with annexation of lower density areas depended on changes in land area
relative to density. Mary M. Edwards & Yu Xiao, Annexation, Local Government
Spending, and the ComplicatingRole of Density, 45 URB. AFF. REv. 147, 147, 163-64
(2009).
99. Mary M. Edwards, Municipal Annexation: Does State Policy Matter?, 28
LAND USE POL'Y 325 (2011). This study involved close analysis of a sample of 952
cities with populations of at least 10,000 for the period of 1990-1999, using a complex
array of variables that have been thought to facilitate or constrain annexation. Id. at
329. The variables treated as constraints included requirements of public hearings,
informational requirements, boundary agencies, judicial involvement, and elections.
Id. at 330. The facilitators of annexation were petition processes, annexation of
noncontinguous property, legislative authority, involuntary annexation, and
incorporation requirements. Id. In addition to the major findings cited in the text,
Edwards found that policies requiring impact analysis and service plans,
requirements for local elections, and the existence of boundary agencies (all deemed
to be "constraints") were, in fact, associated with a larger number of annexations. Id.
at 331. On the other hand, where a state required impact analysis, service plans, and
public hearings, there were fewer annexations. Id. Edwards likewise found that cities
that could annex noncontiguous areas were likely to annex more frequently, as were
cities in states that limited municipal incorporation based on minimum population,
minimum density, and minimum distance from existing municipalities. Id. She also
found that the use of a boundary agency and judicial review requirements were
linked to lower acreage growth through annexation, perhaps once again because
cities annexed smaller acreage on a more frequent basis. Id. Annexation of more
acreage is associated with systems that allow cities to annex involuntarily. Id. Larger
but less frequent annexations were found in states that required public hearings,
fiscal impact analysis and service plans prior to annexation. Id.
100. Id. at 331.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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clearly shows, statutory policies on annexation may have differing
results depending on the characteristics of communities involved.
These policies may ultimately result in differing practices
regarding the frequency of municipal annexation and the creation
of special districts, and significantly impact cities' financial
viability.
Part II now turns to North Carolina's experience more
specifically, looking first to history and pre-2011 annexation
provisions, then at lessons taught by recent annexation case law,
and finally, at the important statutory changes implemented in
2011 and 2012.
II. ANNEXATION IN NORTH CAROLINA: HISTORY, RECENT
EXPERIENCE, AND LEGISLATIVE REFORM

This Part provides more in-depth information regarding
annexation and related practices in North Carolina. In particular,
it summarizes the history of annexation legislation prior to recent
changes, recent appellate case law, and key features of new
annexation legislation adopted in 2011 and 2012.103
A.

History and Pre-2011 Annexation Policy in North Carolina

North Carolina has had a clear and thoughtful history
regarding state annexation policy.104 Prior to 1947, all annexations

103. For earlier law journal discussions of North Carolina's annexation laws, see,
e.g., Tyson, supra note 17 (considering pre-reform annexation law in North Carolina
and comparing it to Mississippi and Tennessee); Elizabeth R. Connolly, Comment,
Bargain Basement Annexation: How Municipalities Subvert the Intent of North
CarolinaAnnexation Laws, 29 N.C. CENT. L.J. 77 (2006) (criticizing problems with
annexation laws that have resulted in municipal underbounding); Julia Sullivan
Hooten, Note, "Caught Between a Rock and a Hard Place:" Fringe Landowners
"Can't Get No Satisfaction." Is It Time to Re-Think Annexation Policy in North
Carolina?,24 CAMPBELL L. REV. 317 (2002) (discussing types of annexation disputes
typically encountered in North Carolina); Karen Ubell, Recent Development,
Consent Not Required: Municipal Annexation in North Carolina, 83 N.C. L. REV.
1634 (2005) (arguing for the continuation of involuntary annexation provisions). The
foremost study of annexation is the three-volume treatise by Professor David
Lawrence of the UNC School of Government. See infra note 104.
104. The University of North Carolina School of Government offers a brief
history of the development of annexation law in North Carolina on its website. See
The History of Annexation Legislation, UNC SCH. OF Gov'T, http://www.sog.unc.edu
/node/347 (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). Details of judicial interpretation prior to the
2011 legislative amendments are addressed in Professor David Lawrence's threevolume treatise. See 1 DAVID LAWRENCE, ANNEXATION LAW IN NORTH
CAROLINA (2d ed. 2007); 2 id. (1st ed. 2004); 3 id. (1st ed. 2007).
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were initiated by legislative action."'s In 1947, the General
Assembly authorized annexation of contiguous property by cities
(the forbearer of involuntary annexation as it came to exist in
later years).10 6 In that same year, both voluntary annexation and
involuntary annexation of contiguous property were permitted."o
In 1959, the state legislature set particular "urban character" and
service requirements with regard to involuntary (municipally
initiated) annexation, differentiating between cities with
populations of 5,000 or more and those of lesser population. 0s
Immediately prior to the 2011 legislative amendments, key
features of North Carolina's annexation law included the
following provisions.
1. Annexation by Petition
Annexation by petition could be accomplished in two distinct
situations.

105. See 1 LAWRENCE, supra note 104, § 1.01-.04 (discussing legislative
annexation). Legislative annexation has remained an option and continues to be in
the aftermath of the 2011 and 2012 amendments. This form of annexation is not
subject to statutory standards. The Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld
legislative annexation authority in an early case, Lutterloh v. City of Fayetteville, 149
N.C. 65, 69, 62 S.E. 758, 760 (1908) ("In the absence of constitutional restriction, the
extent to which such legislation shall be enacted, both with respect to the terms and
circumstances under which the annexation may be had, and the manner in which it
may be made, rests entirely in the discretion of the Legislature. With its wisdom,
propriety or justice we have naught to do."). See also Abbot v. Town of Highlands, 52
N.C. App. 69, 77-78, 277 S.E.2d 820, 826 (1981) (upholding legislative annexation
notwithstanding the Town's failure to provide sewer service or include a golf course
within the municipal boundaries, based on the court's conclusion that absent
constitutionally impermissible reasons, legislative judgment should control); Jones v.
Jeanette, 34 N.C. App. 526, 531, 239 S.E.2d 293, 296 (1977) (upholding legislative
annexation against claim that it was constitutionally unreasonable).
106. See Act of April 3, 1947, ch. 725, § 8, 1947 N.C. Sess. Laws 989 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-30 to -31 (2011)) (granting authority for a
municipality to engage in involuntary annexation and providing that if fifteen percent
of the qualified voters in the area to be annexed petitioned against the annexation,
the governing board could initiate a referendum of those affected and at its discretion
could also call for a referendum by the voters within the existing municipality; if a
majority of both sets of voters voted for the annexation, it could proceed).
107. Id. The legislation further provided that territory containing fewer than
twenty-five legal residents eligible to register and vote could not be annexed unless
all property owners agreed to the annexation. Id. at 992.
108. See 3 LAWRENCE, supra note 104, § 2.01-.06, at 2-1 to 2-10 (discussing
differences by size of community).
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a. Contiguous Property
Owners of contiguous property could (and still can) petition
a town to annex their property.109 The petition must have been
signed by all property owners of all parcels within the area
proposed for annexation, and accordingly was often used for new
subdivisions or small areas."o The town council had discretion to
approve such proposals so long as the area was contiguous,
signatures of all lot-owners were included in the petition, the
town council provided notice, conducted a hearing, and ultimately
concluded that the annexation was desirable."'
b. Satellite Annexation
North Carolina was also one of the first states to allow
annexation by petition of noncontiguous satellite areas, beginning
in 1967 by local act, and more generally beginning in 1974.112
North Carolina's satellite annexation statutes, which remain
largely unchanged by recent legislation, limited the circumstances
in which eligible cities' could pursue satellite annexation.
Petitions must have been signed by all property owners other than
non-profit and certain other entities generally exempt from
property taxation.114 Several standards applied. The nearest point
of the satellite area's boundaries could be no more than three
miles from the annexing city and no point in the annexed area
could be closer to another city than to the annexing city."'
In addition, the area of the satellite could be no more than
ten percent of the total area of the city, and the city must have
been able to provide a full range of services to the satellite area
being annexed."' If the annexing city sought to annex a portion of
a residential subdivision, it had to annex the whole of the

109. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-31 (2011).
110. Id. § 160A-31(a).
111. Id. § 160A-31(b) (providing for annexation by petition procedures).
112. See Act of April 5, 1974, ch. 1173, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 277 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-58 to -58.8 (2011)).
113. Cities eligible to pursue satellite annexation include those eligible to receive
gasoline tax revenues under section 136-41.1 of the General Statutes of North
Carolina. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-58 to -58.1 (2011). In addition, the statutes
prohibit satellite annexation by a substantial number of listed cities. See id. § 160A58.1.
114. Id. § 160A-58.1(a).
115. Id. § 160A-58.1(b).
116. See id.
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subdivision, not just part of it."' The standard of review for cities
electing to annex noncontiguous areas was constrained, limiting
review by the governing board to a determination that "the public
health, safety and welfare of the inhabitants of the city and the
area proposed for annexation will be best served by the
annexation."11 8
Cities were also authorized to enter into annexation
agreements with other cities regarding areas of anticipated future
development, specifying the areas that each could annex."'
Annexing cities were allowed to regulate land use and abate
public health nuisances in satellite areas just as they could in their
primary corporate areas, but satellite areas were not considered
to be part of the primary corporate limits for purposes of
extraterritorial jurisdiction over land use or abatement of public
health nuisances. 120 Cities annexing satellite areas could also
charge higher levels of fees for services (such as water and sewer)
than they would otherwise charge those living in their primary
corporate areas. 121
2. Involuntary Annexation
North Carolina statutes have historically limited the areas
that may be subjected to involuntary annexation. Only areas
contiguous1 22 to an annexing city could be subject to forced
117. Id.
118. See id. § 160A-58.2 (providing that those residing in or owning property in
the area proposed for annexation and residents of the city may appear and be heard
on questions regarding the "sufficiency of the petition and the desirability of the
annexation" and that the city council may approve the petition if otherwise valid,
based on the stated criteria, that is, whether the petition is otherwise valid and "the
public health, safety and welfare of the inhabitants of the city and of the area
proposed for annexation will be best served by the annexation, the council may adopt
an ordinance annexing the area described in the petition").
119. See id. § 160A-58.1(b)(2); id. §§ 160A-58.21 to -58.28 (relating to annexation
agreements).
120. See id. § 160A-58.4 (describing extraterritorial powers).
121. See id. § 160A-58.5 ("For the purposes of G.S. 160A-314, provision of public
enterprise services within satellite corporate limits shall be considered provision of
service for special classes of service distinct from the classes of service provided
within the primary corporate limits of the city, and the city may fix and enforce
schedules of rents, rates, fees, charges and penalties in excess of those fixed and
enforced within the primary corporate limits. A city providing enterprise services
within satellite corporate limits shall annually review the cost thereof, and shall take
such steps as may be necessary to insure that the current operating costs of such
services, excluding debt service on bonds issued to finance services within satellite
corporate limits, does not exceed revenues realized therefrom.").
122. "Contiguous area" is defined as
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annexation, at least one-eighth of the external boundary of the
annexed area had to coincide with the boundary of the annexing
city, and no part of the annexed area could fall within the
boundary of another municipality. 12 In addition, the annexed
area must have been developed for "urban purposes"124 at the
time that a mandatory annexation report was filed. The
annexation report detailed the location of the annexation,
satisfaction of statutory standards, plans for providing municipal
services, the impact of the annexation on any rural fire
department, and the impact of the annexation on city finances
and services.5
Traditionally, there were (and continue to be) several
alternative ways in which the "urban purposes" requirement
could be satisfied. 126 Prior to the 2011 statutory amendments, two
options were available to both small towns (with populations
under 5,000)127 and larger ones (with populations of 5,000 or
more).128 The annexing city could apply the "use and subdivision"
test, which requires that a minimum of sixty percent of the lots

any area which, at the time annexation procedures are initiated, either abuts
directly on the municipal boundary or is separated from the municipal
boundary by a street or street right-of-way, a creek or river, the right-of-way
of a railroad or other public service corporation, lands owned by the city or
some other political subdivision, or lands owned by the State of North
Carolina.
Id. § 160A-58.54.
123. Id.
124. Id. As discussed at notes 134-36, infra, cities with populations of 5,000 or
more could also annex both areas "developed for urban purposes" and "land
bridges" (areas lying between the municipal boundaries and areas developed for
urban purposes) subject to certain limitations. As discussed below, the 2011 revisions
abolished prior differences based on population. See infra note 227 and
accompanying text.
125. § 160A-58.54.
126. For towns with populations under 5,000, the definition of urban purposes was
found in former section 160A-36, while for those with populations of 5,000 or more
the definition of urban purposes was found in former section 160A-48. NC. GEN.
STAT. §§ 160A-36, -48 (2009), repealed by Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C.
Sess. Laws 1649. The 2011 annexation legislation made the standards applicable to
larger towns applicable to all towns and recodified the relevant provisions at new
section 160A-58.50. Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, § 9, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649,
1649-50 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT § 160A-58.50 (2011)).
127. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-34 (2009) (referring to municipalities with
populations of 5,000 or more persons), repealed by Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011
N.C. Sess. Laws 1649.
128. Id. § 160A-46 (referring to municipalities with populations of 5,000 or more
persons), repealed by Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649.
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and tracts in the area are used for specified urban purposes
or
institutional
industrial,
(residential, 2 9 commercial,
governmental) and that at least sixty percent of the acreage be
subdivided into lots or tracts of three acres or less.1 0 It could, in
the alternative, use the standard that focused on nonresidential
use (requiring every lot in the subdivided area to be used for
governmental
or
institutional,
industrial,
commercial,
purposes)."' Two additional options were available for cities with
5,000 or more population, both focusing on density, but in slightly
different ways. An area could be subject to involuntary
annexation if it had a density of 2.3 people per acre ("density
standard")," 2 or if it had a population density of at least one
person per acre and the area was also subdivided in a particular
way ("population and density standard"). 1 "
Historically, there was another important difference between
the rules applicable to small and larger towns. Larger towns with
more than 5,000 residents were able to annex areas that did not
qualify under the "urban purposes" standard in conjunction with
areas that did satisfy such standards under certain limited
circumstances. So-called "land bridge" areas (referred to as
"necessary land connections" in the statute) were, and still are,
those that
[lie] between the municipal boundary and an area
developed for urban purposes so that the area developed
for urban purposes is either not adjacent to the municipal
boundary or cannot be served by the municipality without
129. "Used for residential purposes" was (and still is) defined as "any lot or tract
five acres or less in size on which is constructed a habitable dwelling unit." Id.
§ 160A-41(2) (regaiding municipalities with populations of less than 5,000 persons),
repealed by Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649 (current version
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.51 (2011)); id. § 160A-53(2) (regarding municipalities
with populations of 5,000 or more persons), repealed by Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396,
2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.51 (2011)).
130. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-48(c)(3) (2009), repealed by Act of June 17,
2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A58.54 (2011)).
131. Id. § 160A-48(c)(5), repealed by Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C. Sess.
Laws 1649.
132. See id. § 160A-48(c)(1), repealed by Act of June 17, ch. 396, 2011 N.C. Sess.
Laws 1649.
133. See id. § 160A-48(c)(2), repealed by Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C.
Sess. Laws 1649. Under this standard, sixty percent of the acreage to be annexed
must be subdivided into lots or tracts of three acres or less, and at least sixty-five
percent of the number of lots or tracts must be one acre or less in size. See id.
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extending services and/or water and/or sewer lines through
such sparsely developed area [s].13 4
In addition, at least sixty percent of the external boundaries of
such a "land bridge" area must have been adjacent to any
combination of the municipal boundary and the boundary of an
area or areas "developed for urban purposes."3 5 Land bridge
areas could not exceed twenty-five percent of the total area to be
annexed." 6

A myriad of procedural requirements have also long
governed the involuntary annexation process. 17 The annexation
process itself proceeded through multiple steps, starting with a
"notice of consideration," followed no sooner than a year later by
a "notice of intent," then a mailed notice of a public hearing
(explaining details of the proposed annexation and property
owners' rights), the adoption of the annexation report, a public
information meeting, the public hearing itself, and the passage of
the annexation ordinance." Appeals could be taken to superior
court by property owners in the affected area within sixty days of
the passage of the annexation ordinance. 39 Grounds for appeal
134. See id. § 160A-48(d), repealed by Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C.
Sess. Laws 1649 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.54(a)(4)(b) (2011)).
135. See id. § 160A-48(d)(2), repealed by Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C.
Sess. Laws 1649 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.54(a)(4)(b) (2011)).
136. See id. § 160A-48(d). The statute specifically explained the purpose of the
land bridge provisions in the following terms:
The purpose of this subsection is to permit municipal governing boards to
extend corporate limits to include all nearby areas developed for urban
purposes and where necessary to include areas which at the time of
annexation are not yet developed for urban purposes but which constitute
necessary land connections between the municipality and areas developed for
urban purposes or between two or more areas developed for urban purposes.
See id.
137. See id. § 160A-37 (regarding municipalities with populations of less than
5,000 persons), repealed by Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649
(current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.55 (2011)); id. § 160A-49 (regarding
municipalities with populations of 5,000 or more persons), repealed by Act of June
17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 160A-58.55 (2011)).
138. Id. § 160A-37(a)-(e), repealed by Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C.
Sess. Laws 1649 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.55 (2011)); id.
§ 160A-49(a)-(e), repealed by Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws
1649 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.55 (2011)).
139. Id. § 160A-38(a) (regarding municipalities with populations of less than 5,000
persons), repealed by Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649
(current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.60 (2011)); id. § 160A-50(a)
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prior to the 2011 amendments were limited to "failure of the
municipal governing board to comply with the procedure set forth
in the Part" or to meet the requirements set forth by statute as to
the character of the area to be annexed, as discussed above. 140
Remedies included remanding the ordinance "for further
proceedings if procedural irregularities were found to have
materially prejudiced the substantive rights of any of the
petitioners," remanding to correct boundaries to conform with
substantive criteria for annexation, remanding for amendment of
plans to provide services, or declaring the ordinance null and

void.141
The statutes also provided for remedies in the event that
services are not provided as required and as set forth in the
annexation plan. As of the effective date of the annexation,
police, fire, waste collection, and street maintenance services had
to be provided to the annexed area on substantially the same
basis as they are within the existing municipality, although the
annexing municipality could satisfy the fire protection
requirement by contracting with a rural fire department and the
waste collection requirement by contracting with a private firm.142
Prior to the 2011 amendments, municipalities with
populations of 5,000 or more were required to extend "major
trunk water mains and sewer outfall lines" 43 So that newly
(regarding municipalities with populations of 5,000 or more persons), repealed by Act
of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649 (current version at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 160A-58.60 (2011)).
140. See id. § 160A-38(a) (regarding municipalities with populations of less than
5,000 persons), repealed by Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649;
id. § 160A-50(a) (regarding municipalities with populations of 5,000 or more
persons), repealedby Act of June 17,2011, ch. 396,2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649.
141. Id. § 160A-38(g) (regarding municipalities with populations of less than 5,000
persons), repealed by Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649
(current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.60 (2011)); id. § 160A-50(g)
(regarding municipalities with populations of 5,000 or more persons), repealed by Act
of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649 (current version at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 160A-58.60 (2011)).
142. Id. § 160A-35(3)(a) (regarding municipalities with populations of less than
5,000 persons), repealedby Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649
(current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.53 (2011)); id. § 160A-47(3)(a)
(regarding municipalities with populations of 5,000 or more persons), repealed by Act
of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649 (current version at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 160A-58.53 (2011)).
143. This language has been defined in judicial decisions, with one court
concluding that "major" mains and lines vary in size depending on the size of the
municipality and number of users. See In re Annexation Ordinance, 303 N.C. 220,
225, 278 S.E.2d 224, 228 (1981). Courts have also held that, under the earlier statute,
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annexed areas "[would] be able to secure public water and sewer
services according to the policies in effect in such municipality for
extending water and sewer lines to individual lots or
subdivisions."" Smaller municipalities had similar obligations,
though stated in slightly different terms.'45 Owners of "an
occupied dwelling unit or an operating commercial or industrial
property" in areas annexed by larger municipalities were also
given an opportunity to request extension of water and sewer
lines to individual lots or subdivisions provided that they signed
an acknowledgment that such extensions were to be made
"according to the current financial policies of the municipality for
making such extensions" and provided that they submitted their
requests within five days after the public hearing.'46 These
municipalities were then required to amend their service plans
(and the annexation report) accordingly.147 If extension of trunk
lines into the area was required, in smaller cities, contracts had to
be let within one year of the effective date of the ordinance.148 For
larger cities, the construction of main water and sewer lines had to
be completed within two years.149 For all cities, if "installation of
sewers was not economically feasible due to the unique
cities or water and sewer districts could require customers to pay the costs of
extending lines if this practice was consistent with the policies applicable within
existing city limits. See Wallace v. Town of Chapel Hill, 93 N.C. App. 422, 428-29, 378
S.E.2d 225, 228-29 (1989) (upholding a policy requiring a customer payment for
extension of twelve-inch water lines, subject to subsequent reimbursement if others
tapped onto such lines). Historically, North Carolina cities have employed a variety
of extension policies (including requiring that a specified percentage of property
owners petition for line extension before undertaking such an extension; requiring
affected properties to pay some or all of the associated costs of extending services to
individual properties; or subsidizing some costs). See 3 LAWRENCE, supra note 104,
§ 6.07(c), at 6-38.
144. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-47(3)(b) (2009) (regarding municipalities with
populations of 5,000 or more persons), repealed by Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011
N.C. Sess. Laws 1649 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.53 (2011)).
145. See id. § 160A-35(3)(b) (requiring that municipalities with populations of less
than 5,000 persons "[p]rovide for extension of water mains and sewer lines"),
repealed by Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649 (current version
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.53 (2011)).
146. See id. § 160A-47(3)(b) (regarding municipalities with populations of 5,000 or
more persons), repealed by Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649
(current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.53 (2011)).
147. See id.
148. See id. § 160A-35(3)(b) (regarding municipalities with populations of less
than 5,000 persons), repealedby Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws
1649.
149. See id. § 160A-47(3)(c) (regarding municipalities with populations of 5,000 or
more persons), repealed by Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649.
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topography of the area, the municipality could agree to provide
septic system maintenance and repair service until such time as
sewer service was provided to properties similarly situated."so
Municipal failures to comply with these important
requirements could be challenged in superior court by seeking a
writ of mandamus."s' If the municipality failed to comply with
required steps for extending water or sewer service, the superior
court could order the city to proceed with construction.' Under
these provisions, the court could also order the municipality to
pay costs of litigation and attorney's fees."s' On their own behalf,
property owners could seek relief from tax obligations by
petitioning the Local Government Commission for abatement of
taxes if police and fire protection, solid waste services, and street
maintenance services had not been provided within sixty days by
either small or larger towns.'54 Property owners could also seek
relief from larger towns that failed to extend water or sewer
services in a timely manner.15
150. See id. § 160A-35(3)(b) (regarding municipalities with populations of less
than 5,000 persons); § 160A-47(3)(b) (regarding municipalities with populations of
5,000 or more persons).
151. Id. § 160A-37(h) (regarding municipalities with populations of less than 5,000
persons), repealed by Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649
(current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.55 (2011)); id. § 160A-49(h)
(regarding municipalities with populations of 5,000 or more persons), repealedby Act
of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649 (current version at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 160A-58.55 (2011)). Mandamus was available if the municipality had not
provided services set forth in its annexation plan on substantially the same basis and
in the same manner as such services were provided within the rest of the municipality
prior to the effective date of the plan and if services were still being provided on
substantially the same basis and in the same manner as on the date of annexation. Id.
§ 160A-37(h), -49(h).
152. Id. § 160A-37(h) (regarding municipalities with populations of less than 5,000
persons), repealed by Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649; id.
§ 160A-49(h) (regarding municipalities with populations of 5,000 or more persons),
repealedby Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649.
153. Id. § 160A-37(h) (regarding municipalities with populations of less than 5,000
persons), repealed by Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649; id
§ 160A-49(h) (regarding municipalities with populations of 5,000 or more persons),
repealedby Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649.
154. See id. § 160A-37(k) (regarding municipalities with populations of less than
5,000 persons), repealed by Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649
(current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.55 (2011)); § 160A-49(k) (regarding
municipalities with populations of 5,000 or more persons), repealed by Act of June
17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 160A-58.55 (2011)).
155. See id. § 160A-49(l) (regarding municipalities with populations of 5,000 or
more persons), repealed by Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649
(current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.55 (2011)).
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As discussed above, North Carolina's annexation provisions
prior to 2011 provided more flexible options for voluntary
"satellite" annexation and involuntary annexation initiated by
municipalities than was the norm elsewhere in the country. 5 6 A
number of procedural protections were accorded those subject to
involuntary annexation, including requirements that cities
prepare service plans and deliver promised services in a timely
manner or face roll-back of taxes. The annexation procedures
employed a multi-phase process with several opportunities for
discussion and debate, as well as judicial review. As the next
Section illustrates, however, these provisions provided the
framework for a variety of small skirmishes in the courts before
the ultimate outbreak of North Carolina's annexation wars
between property rights advocates and municipal leaders,
resulting in legislative changes in 2011 and 2012.
B.

North Carolina'sRecent Experience: Litigation and Its
Lessons (2000-2011)

A review of appellate case law over the past decade reveals
hard-fought battles regarding annexation in North Carolina. If the
results of appellate litigation can be viewed as an indication of
municipalities' compliance with applicable annexation ground
rules, then in the vast bulk of cases, municipalities were doing a
good job. The cases fall into several major categories, touching on
six important topics: (1) constitutional provisions; (2) compliance
with substantive standards set by statute; (3) compliance with
statutory procedural requirements; (4) technical issues relating to
litigation; (5) provision of urban services; and (6) evolving forms
of quasi-government. A review of this recent history provides a
helpful template for appreciating the changes made in annexation
legislation in 2011.
Barefoot v. City of Wilmington,15 decided by the Fourth

Circuit in 2002, provides a particularly thorough analysis of
constitutional claims, including challenges based on the Due
Process, Equal Protection, Takings, and Privileges and

156. For discussion of satellite annexation in North Carolina, see discussion supra
Part I.A.1.b. For comparison to annexation in other parts of the country, see
Reynolds, supra note 17.
157. 306 F.3d 113 (4th Cir. 2002).
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15
Immunities Clauses of the United States Constitution.s
In
Barefoot, residents of Wilmington challenged the city's decision
to annex their property.5 9 The court rejected their Equal
Protection and Due Process claims, citing classic United States
Supreme Court precedent, Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh,' decided
nearly a century earlier. Likewise, the court rejected the plaintiffs'
takings claim, stating that there was no proof of any physical
taking and that annexation did not result in a singling out of those
annexed to bear burdens that should have been borne by the
public as a whole.'6 1 Finally, the Privileges and Immunities Clause
was inapposite insofar as it protected citizens of one state from
being unfairly denied rights by another state, rather than
establishing some sort of inherent natural rights arising from state
citizenship. 162
A handful of cases considered substantive standards set by
the annexation statutes. For example, municipal annexations were
rejected as to land that was not yet commercially developed
(where "urban character" is statutorily defined as referring to use
at the time of annexation).163 Similarly, governmental use had to
be substantial in order to justify annexation." The municipality
was required to apply the use test strictly, calculating use by tract
or parcel, not by acreage.' 5 "Shoestring" annexations were held

158. Id. at 118; see also Adams v. Vill. of Wesley Chapel, 259 F. App'x 545, 548,
550-51 (4th Cir. 2007) (rejecting due process, equal protection, and takings
challenges).
159. Barefoot, 306 F.3d at 118.
160. 207 U.S. 161 (1907). Hunter rejected assertions by citizens that
Pennsylvania's scheme for city consolidation violated their rights. Id. at 178-79. The
Court stressed the expansive discretion of the state legislature to establish its
preferred regime for municipal configuration without running afoul of the Federal
Constitution. See id. Thus, the action of one city in effectively annexing and
absorbing another triggered no underlying constitutional right of citizens to vote and
did not deprive those affected of due process. See id. In effect, the legislature was
entitled under its plenary power to choose how to organize subsidiary units of
government, and the legislative process itself was the only process required in order
to avoid problems with separation of powers. Id.
161. See Barefoot, 306 F.3d at 125.
162. Id. at 125-26.
163. See Hughes v. Town of Oak Island, 158 N.C. App. 175, 178-79, 580 S.E.2d
704, 706-07, affd, 357 N.C. 653, 588 S.E.2d 467 (2003).
164. See Arquilla v. City of Salisbury, 136 N.C. App. 24, 34-35, 523 S.E.2d 155,
163 (1999), superseded by statute as recognized in Fix v. City of Eden, 175 N.C. App.
1, 18-19, 622 S.E.2d. 647, 658 (2005).
165. See Hayes v. Town of Fairmont, 167 N.C. App. 522, 529, 605 S.E.2d 717, 722
(2004).
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impermissible when inconsistent with the "contiguousness"
standard.1 6
Procedural issues were also raised, most often to limited
effect. For example, appellate decisions rejected assertions that
resolutions of consideration required prior to annexation, related
informational meetings, or public hearings were inadequate. 6 7
Courts also found no flaw in methods used by municipalities in
setting proposed annexation boundaries. For example, use of tax
maps was upheld,'6 as was use of metes and bounds
descriptions,169 and use of parcel identification numbers from tax
maps. 170
A range of technical issues also tended to curb litigation
brought by parties unhappy with municipal annexation decisions.
For example, the courts found that standing problems barred suits
by a nearby municipality that sought to challenge a neighboring
municipality's voluntary annexation."' Individuals who did not
own property within an area being involuntarily annexed similarly
17
Likewise,
had no standing to challenge the municipal decision."
7
efforts to take interlocutory appeals 1 or to seek relief in federal
court after unsuccessful state litigation were rejected.174
Individuals seeking to intervene after a city had reached a courtapproved settlement to delay the annexation of a nearby
subdivision were found ineligible to do so when they had not

166. See Hughes, 158 N.C. App. at 183-84, 580 S.E.2d at 709-10.
167. See Arnold v. City of Asheville, 186 N.C. App. 542, 551-52,625 S.E.2d 40, 48
(2007) (quoting Chapel Hill Country Club, Inc. v. Chapel Hill, 97 N.C. App. 171, 188,
388 S.E.2d 168, 178 (1990)); Anthony v. City of Shelby, 152 N.C. App. 144, 147-49,
567 S.E.2d 222, 225-26 (2002).
168. Brown v. City of Winston-Salem, 176 N.C. App. 497, 507,626 S.E.2d 747,754
(2006).
169. Hall v. City of Asheville, No. COAO7-1520, 2008 WL 2970059, at *3 (N.C. Ct.
App. Aug. 5,2008).
170. Ashley v. City of Lexington,

N.C. App. _,

,

704 S.E.2d 529, 537 (2011).

171. Town of Ayden v. Town of Winterville, 143 N.C. App. 136, 544 S.E.2d 821
(2001) (finding no standing and no justiciability).
172. Burnette v. City of Goldsboro, No. COA05-1277, 2006 WL 2129718, at *2
(N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2006) ("[Olur Courts have repeatedly held that ownership of
property within the annexed area, as required by statute, is necessary to have
standing to challenge an annexation ordinance." (citations omitted)).
173. Arnold v. City of Asheville, 169 N.C. App. 451, 453, 610 S.E.2d 280, 282
(2005) ("[T]here is no right to immediate appeal from an interlocutory order."
(quoting Evans v. Evans, 158 N.C. App. 533, 534-34,581 S.E.2d 464, 465 (2003))).
174. See Barefoot v. City of Wilmington, 306 F.3d 113, 120-21 (4th Cir. 2002).
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proceeded in a timely manner.17 s Assertions that the Service
Members Civil Relief Act should delay municipal annexations
also proved unavailing.176

The last two thematic categories-relating to the provision of
urban services and evolving forms of quasi-government-reflect
significant shifts in the framing of core annexation debates. The
two themes are closely intertwined. The bellwether case
illustrating both themes is Nolan v. Village of Marvin."' The
Village of Marvin case involved efforts to annex 320 lots located
in Union County.17 s The Village had a modest population, and
accordingly fell within the statutory provisions regarding
municipalities of less than 5,000 residents.'7 9 The Supreme Court
of North Carolina rejected the Village's involuntary annexation
efforts on grounds that the Village had not provided a
"meaningful" extension of public services to affected
properties. 80 The court found that the Village had only extended
one out of nine possible types of public services ("administrative
services") and that the remainder of services were provided by
the county, state, volunteer organizations, or not at all.' The
Village had estimated that following the annexation, it would
have more than $80,000 in additional revenues, and that it might
have approximately $14,000 in additional costs, resulting in a net
revenue gain of at least $60,000.182
The Supreme Court of North Carolina concluded that
[tihe primary purpose of involuntary annexation, as
regulated by these statutes, is to promote "sound urban
development" through the organized extension of
municipal services to fringe geographical areas. These
services must provide a meaningful benefit to newly
annexed property owners and residents, who are now
municipal taxpayers, and must also be extended in a
nondiscriminatory fashion.'
175. See Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Fayetteville, 170 N.C. App. 625, 630-31,
613 S.E.2d 521, 525-26 (2005).
176. See Kegley v. City of Fayetteville, 170 N.C. App. 656, 658, 613 S.E.2d 696,
697 (2005).
177. 360 N.C. 256,624 S.E.2d 305 (2006).
178. Id. at 256, 624 S.E.2d. at 305.
179. See id. at 256-57, 624 S.E.2d. at 306.
180. See id. at 261-62, 624 S.E.2d at 308-09.
181. Id. at 258, 624 S.E.2d at 306-07.
182. Id. at 259, 624 S.E.2d at 307.
183. Id. at 261, 624 S.E.2d at 308.

2012]

NORTH CAROLINA'S ANNEXATION WARS

207

At the same time, the court cautioned that "[o]ur decision does
not require an annexing municipality to provide all categories of
public services listed in N.C.G.S. § 160A-35(3)."'" Dissenting,
Justice Edmunds and Chief Justice Parker stated a differing view,
concluding that the court lacked authority to add additional
requirements to the involuntary annexation statute where its
language was clear on its face. 181
Subsequently, a number of cases were brought challenging
the extent of urban services and related benefits made available in
the aftermath of annexation. The core standard applied related to
provision of "some meaningful benefit" and judicial inquiries did
not probe deeply into the details."' The appellate courts found
that providing police protection to annexed areas qualified as the
provision of a meaningful benefit. 87 The approach taken in
reviewing types of services should be "quantitative, not
qualitative" so that the number of incidents triggering police
involvement in the newly annexed area was not of concern to the
court."s8 Those living in annexed areas were, at times, skeptical as
to whether they would actually gain enhanced services following
annexation. 8 9 A North Carolina court demurred, however, saying
that "[t]he law does not require a municipality to add employees
or equipment in order to provide a meaningful extension of
services," 190 and rejecting suspicions of insufficient service based
184. Id. at 261-62, 624 S.E.2d at 308.
185. Id. at 263, 624 S.E.2d at 309.
186. The public policy requirement that annexation must provide some
meaningful benefit was satisfied where there were findings of fact that residents of
the annexed area would receive various benefits. See Burnette v. City of Goldsboro,
No. COA06-1672, 2008 WL 132045, at *5 (N.C. Ct. App. Jan. 15,2008).
187. See Nolan v. Town of Weddington, 182 N.C. App. 486, 491-92, 642 S.E.2d
261, 265 (2007) ("The 'Declaration of Policy,' instructs '[t]hat municipal boundaries
should be extended in accordance with legislative standards applicable throughout
the State[,]' and that annexation should be governed by 'uniform legislative
standards[.]' ... [Tihe [annexation] statute expressly contemplates that one type of
service an annexing town may extend to an annexed area is 'police protection.'"
(first, second, third, and seventh alterations in original) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 160A-45(3), -45(5), -47(3)(a) (2005), repealed by Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396,
2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649))).
188. Norwood v. Vill. of Sugar Mountain, 193 N.C. App. 293, 312, 667 S.E.2d 524,
536 (2008) ("[O]ur inquiry into what types of services are provided is quantitative,
not qualitative. Hence, it is not the number of incidents that the police will be
involved in that concerns this Court, but rather the category of service provided.").
189. See id. at 311, 667 S.E.2d at 536.
190. Gates Four Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Fayetteville, No. COA10-60,
2010 WL 5135579, at *6 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2010) (concluding that there was a
meaningful extension of services where the respondents promised to extend in the
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on mere speculation.' 9' The city could expand sewer services
according to its existing policies regarding payment and did not
have to respond to a newly annexed resident's counteroffer
suggesting differing terms.19 2 Courts were also, unwilling to revisit
a city's analysis of costs and benefits associated with extending
sewer service to annexed areas. 93
Pinewild Project, Ltd. Partnership v. Village of Pinehurst94
provides a bookend that drives home the important evolution of
government and quasi-governmental entities raised in the Village
of Marvin case discussed above and the closely related issues of
providing urban services. Pinewild is a gated community located
near the city of Pinehurst.' 5 It deliberately established private
streets and provided its own basic services."' Pinewild contended
that Pinehurst's annexation plan was flawed because the gated
community could deny access to police officers, firefighters, and
waste collectors who sought to provide services following the

annexation report the exact category of services required by former section 160A47(3)(a)), disc. rev. denied, 365 N.C. 329, 717 S.E.2d 395 (2011).
191. With respect to water service, a city need not provide identical service preand post-annexation. Rather, the service must be substantially the same. Speculation
as to grievances and feared injury is insufficient to show that a city has failed to meet
a statutory requirement. See Hall v. City of Asheville, No. COA07-1520, 2008 WL
2970059, at *2 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2008) (finding that where a city decided to
cease providing water through a joint regional venture and instead operated its own
water supply system, the provision of services was substantially the same because the
reservoir was still owned and operated by the city).
192. See Ashley v. City of Lexington,

-

N.C. App. _,

,

704 S.E.2d 529, 539,

disc. rev. denied, 365 N.C. 347, 718 S.E.2d 377 (2011) ("Pursuant to its existing [sewer
service] policy, Respondent was not required to pay to extend sewer service to
Petitioners. According to Respondent's policy, '[Respondent] shall be entitle to
consider and implement one of the following options[:]' either (1), deny a petition
outright, or (2), negotiate a mutually acceptable cost-sharing agreement with any
petitioner. Though Respondent's mass mailing of the form agreement did not invite
counteroffers, nothing in the relevant policy indicated that Respondent was required
to consider any counteroffers." (alterations in original)).
193. With respect to financing of extension of services, the court of appeals held
that where annexation did not actually take place in 2010, petitioners' argument that
the City violated former section 160A-47 by failing to project cost for that year was
moot. Additionally, the accuracy of the City's prediction of the system development
charges and sales tax revenues associated with annexation was beyond the scope of
the court's appellate review. Royal Palms MHP, LLC v. City of Wilmington, No.
COA10-1259, 2011 WL 2206801, at *1 (N.C. Ct. App. June 7, 2011), disc. rev. denied,
N.C.

-,

718 S.E.2d 632 (2011).

194. 198 N.C. App. 347,679 S.E.2d 424 (2009).
195. Id. at 349, 679 S.E.2d at 426.
196. Id. at 352, 679 S.E.2d at 427.
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annexation, with the result that the community would get no
benefits from the annexation.197
The North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected Pinewild's
argument. It concluded that Pinehurst planned to maintain streets
on the same basis in Pinewild as in other parts of Pinehurst's
jurisdiction that had private streets.19 Alternatively, Pinewild
could offer its streets to the town for public dedication and have
them maintained as was done for the town's pre-existing public
streets."'9 Moreover, Pinewild had the option to dedicate the
streets and receive police and waste collection services, or to
continue as it had by providing such services by private
contract.2 00 The court accordingly found that the Village of
Marvin case did not control because Pinehurst, in all respects,
proposed to extend an array of meaningful services (police, street
maintenance, solid waste collection) rather than only the type of
minimal "administrative" services (part-time tax collection and
zoning) offered by the Village of Marvin.2 01 The court also
declined to review the annexation on public policy grounds,
holding that to do so would contravene the statutory review
standards.20 2 In perhaps its most pointed statement regarding the
core questions posed by the case, the court stated:
Were we to adopt Petitioners' argument, a gated
community-and theoretically any community with
restrictions on access to its private roads-could not be
annexed by a municipality if its residents simply refused to
allow police, firefighters, waste collection workers,
administrative officials or certain other municipal
employees access to their private streets. We do not believe
the General Assembly intended N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 160A-47(3) to provide private communities with an
avenue to defeat annexation by denying access to municipal
employees, when all other requirements of that statute are
met. This would create unacceptable inequities between the

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 355, 679 S.E.2d at 429.
Id. at 352-54,679 S.E.2d at 427-29.
Id. at 353-54, 679 S.E.2d at 428-29.
Id. at 353-54, 679 S.E.2d at 428.
Id. at 355, 679 S.E.2d at 429.
Id. at 356, 679 S.E.2d at 430.
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rights of citizens in private communities and those living on
public roads. 203
Experience gained through the most recent decade of
litigation in North Carolina's appellate courts suggests some basic
lessons that animated the debate about statutory reform that
played out during the 2009-2011 period in the state legislature.
Clearly, constitutional claims provided no relief to those
unhappy with involuntary annexation; North Carolina courts have
repeatedly rejected them. The arguments in Pinewild had a
different thrust, insofar as they focused on assertions about the
legitimacy of private versus public governance and the extent to
which individuals' and entities' desires for autonomy could be
accommodated within pre-existing annexation law. Not
surprisingly, the courts concluded that policy assertions about
autonomy did not present a cognizable legal claim. The case law
also suggested that, by and large, North Carolina's municipalities
had played by the rules set by existing annexation statutes, with
only occasional failures to comply with substantive standards.
Procedural challenges against municipal annexation were also
generally unsuccessful, and technical problems that impeded
successful litigation arose fairly often.
A focus on the level and adequacy of urban services provided
following annexation gained limited traction, but only in settings
where virtually no meaningful benefits or services were provided
following annexation. The courts were clearly reluctant to dig
deeply into details. Efforts to block involuntary annexation on the
basis that no urban services were needed or wanted likewise
proved ineffectual.
The stage was therefore set for a substantial confrontation
between angry residents who had no wish for affiliation with
municipalities, and municipalities that claimed that they were

203. Id. at 353, 679 S.E.2d at 428. The court's analysis tracked the views earlier
expressed by Professor David Lawrence, who concluded in his 2007 treatise on
involuntary annexation in North Carolina that gated communities' "gate[s] should
have no effect at all on some of the major municipal services" (such as police and fire
protection since emergency access can be arranged), and that gates absolve a city of
its responsibility to maintain street systems (since there is no public authority to
maintain private streets or driveways), but could prove problematic for water and
solid waste collection services (water lines may need to be placed on rights-of-way of
public streets; solid waste collection may be impossible if streets are too narrow for
collection trucks to navigate). 3 LAWRENCE, supra note 104, § 6.02(h), at 6-12 to
6-13.
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playing by longstanding rules that had assured municipal health
and a fair trade of services for tax dollars over the years.
Changingthe PlayingField: North Carolina's2011 and 2012
Annexation Legislation
The development of North Carolina's new annexation
provisions played out over a number of years and reflected a good
deal of pulling and tugging between advocates for property
owners and advocates for municipalities. The public process
began through the work of a House special study committee that
was created in 2007 and held a number of hearings around the
state. 20 In 2008, the membership of the group was broadened to
include Senate members as well. 205 The study committee's report
was subsequently submitted for consideration by substantive
House committees where a number of alterations were made.,0
In revised form, annexation revisions passed the House of
Representatives and moved to the Senate. The Senate's
leadership buried the bill in committee through the end of the
session.207
The 2010 election brought substantial changes to the General
Assembly, with Republicans claiming majority control in both
houses and new leadership and many new members in both
houses eager to make their mark. 208 A number of annexation bills
were submitted shortly after the General Assembly convened,
including provisions that would have called for a moratorium on
C.

204. See Studies Act of 2008, ch. 181, § 46,2008 N.C. Sess. Laws 723,752-53.
205. Id.
206. The principal reform bill co-sponsored by the House co-chairs of the Joint
Legislative Study Committee during the 2009-2010 legislative session was House Bill
524 (co-sponsored by Rep. Goforth and Rep. Luebke, among others). H.B. 524, Gen.
Assemb., 2009-2010 Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2009).
207. See House Bill 524 History, supra note 6.
208. Both the North Carolina House and the Senate had Republican majorities
and leadership, for the first time in many years. See House Leadership, N.C. GEN.
ASSEMBLY, http://www.ncleg.net/House/houseleadership.html (last visited Nov. 16,
2012); Senate Leadership, N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.ncleg.net/Senate
/senateleadership.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). The House went from sixty-eight
Democrats and fifty-two Republicans before the 2010 election to fifty-two
Democrats, sixty-seven Republicans, and one Independent afterward, while the
Senate went from thirty Democrats and twenty Republicans to nineteen Democrats
and thirty-one Republicans afterward. See State Legislative Election Results, 2010,
http://ballotpedia.org/wikilindex.php
BALLOTPEDIA.ORG,
/Statejegislativeelectionsresults,..2010#NorthCarolina (last modified June 6,
2011).

212

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

involuntary annexation. 2' The North Carolina League of
Municipalities countered by presenting a detailed plan that
offered up possible changes in substantive and procedural
provisions, 210 while annexation opponents continued their
demands for a referendum vote on involuntary annexation
proposals.21 ' In the end, the anti-annexation forces carried the
day, in two major and three .minor respects. Low-income
populations were also given new opportunities to seek annexation
that had not previously existed. Finally, the legislature, in
separate bills, sought to roll back involuntary annexation plans
that were already nearing implementation in a number of
communities. Although involuntary annexation is still technically
available, only the largest cities are likely to be able to employ
this technique going forward, in view of the substantial new costs
that all municipalities are required to incur.
1. Changes Relating to Involuntary Annexation
The most significant changes resulting from the new
legislation concern requirements for extension of municipal water
and sewer service and provisions for those affected to block
involuntary annexations.
a. Water and Sewer Services
Under prior legislation, cities were required to extend water
and sewer services to areas subject to involuntary annexation as
discussed above.2 12 Their obligations involved only extension of
main trunk lines, and extension of service to individual lots on a

209. A search of the North Carolina General Assembly's website reveals that
more than sixty bills relating to annexation were introduced during the 2009-2010
legislative session, and more than forty bills relating to annexation were filed during
the 2011 session. See Simple Bill Inquiry, NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

http://www.ncleg.net/gascripts/SimpleBilllnquiry/SimpleBilllnquiry.pl (select "20092010 Session" from drop-down menu, select "Next," then select "Keyword," and
again select "Next," then select "Annexation" and select "Search"; then, repeat the
same process for "2011-2012 Session") (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
210. The North Carolina League of Municipalities issued a twenty-point proposal
that sought to make numerous technical improvements in the state's annexation law.
KELLI H. KUKURA & KIM S. HIBBARD, N.C. LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES, A
PROPOSAL TO THE JOINT SENATE AND HOUSE STUDY COMMISSION ON MUNICIPAL
ANNEXATION (2008).
COALITION, http://www.
211. See generally STOP N.C. ANNEXATION

stopncannexation.com (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (providing information on the
efforts of annexation opponents).
212. See supra notes 144-51 and accompanying text.
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comparable basis as specified with regard to lots in the existing
municipality.213 Those seeking actual hook-ups to lot lines were
often expected to cover costs of connecting their homes to these
major facilities.214
The new legislation implemented two major changes, each of
which imposes significant costs and other burdens on
municipalities seeking to annex involuntarily. If a city provides or
contracts to provide such services, it must provide owners of
property to be annexed with notice and must provide them with
services at no cost other than payment of user fees if a majority of
affected property owners request such services within the
statutory timeframe.2 15 If less than a majority petition for such
services, the municipality must pay a proportional share of costs
for those seeking such services with the proportion dropping over
a five-year period in which services can still be requested. 1 6 Thus,
although the existing practice for current municipal residents has
generally been to require them to pay for the cost of lines
connecting their homes to main trunk lines, those henceforth
subject to involuntary annexation would have such costs covered
by the municipality. While this latter requirement seems clear, it
is less clear whether entities that contract with municipalities for
the delivery of water and sewer services can be expected to cover
associated costs of such extensions, or whether the annexing
municipality would be obligated to cross-subsidize such extension
under these circumstances, as discussed below."
In addition, water and sewer service construction must now
be completed within three and a half years of the effective date of
the annexation.2 1 While the process of annexation has been
lengthened as a result of procedural changes, it may still be
difficult for municipalities to be assured of completing extensions
during this timeline because they may face engineeritig issues as
they move from trunk line to local line construction. The upshot
of this change is that municipalities will likely undertake

213. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
215. Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, § 8, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649, 1659-60
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.56(b)(3) (2011)).
216. Id., 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1660 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A58.56(b)(4) (2011)).
217. See infra notes 304-15 and accompanying text.
218. Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, § 8, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649, 1651 (codified
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.53(3)(b) (2011)).
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annexations and line extensions on a smaller scale and on a more
fragmented basis. Smaller and more fragmented involuntary
annexations may result in less wide-spread opposition, but may
also result in less favorable economies of scale in municipal
planning and borrowing. It remains unclear how such changes will
affect the costs of borrowing for construction of water and sewer
infrastructure.
The implications of these changes are significant, since they
appear to link authority to engage in involuntary annexation very
directly to provision of one type of urban service (water and
sewer) and the availability of related infrastructure that carries
substantial cost. Several possible outcomes were not discussed or
perhaps foreseen during the process of legislative debate, but they
are now more evident. One possible result is that larger cities with
affiliated water and sewer authorities will be able to continue with
involuntary annexation because they can absorb related costs and
spread them across a larger municipal population. Another
possibility, explored below, is that municipalities may feel obliged
to shed their past role as water and sewer providers, and instead
divest themselves of these responsibilities by contracting for
services from quasi-governmental or private providers. Finally,
cities (typically smaller cities) that do not currently directly
provide water and sewer services will not try to do so, but will be
able to continue their efforts to engage in involuntary annexation
if they are able to provide other sorts of urban services (such as
police protection and waste collection), provided that they are not
blocked from doing so as a result of the new referendum
requirement. In any event, the statutory changes may result in a
more fragmented and less accountable system of providing water
and sewer infrastructure, at a time when climate change and
population growth have made the provision of well-organized,
well-managed, and interconnected water and sewer infrastructure
more important than ever.
It is also notable that the 2011 legislative changes did not
attempt to address the number and types of other urban services
offered to involuntarily annexed areas. During the 2010 legislative
debate, there had been considerable interest on the part of some
leading legislators to address these issues in the wake of the
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Village of Marvin decision.219 Proponents of this approach
believed that municipalities should be obliged to provide more
numerous or higher levels of services to newly annexed areas than
those areas had previously received in order to justify the
payment of additional municipal taxes. In the end, however, this
approach to equating more substantial services with legitimate
claims for higher taxes did not resurface during the 2011
legislative session given the changes in legislative power. 220 The
2011 legislation instead focused directly on the highest-priced
service (public water and sewer) and shifted the equation of
municipal costs and property owner benefits in overpowering
ways as explained above.
Blocking Involuntary Annexation: Anti-Annexation
Petitions and Referenda
The 2011 legislation included a second major impediment to
involuntary annexation: the creation of a remonstrance
mechanism by which affected property owners could, by petition,
block such annexations. An added provision was also included in
the statutory statement of purpose, indicating that it is "essential"
for citizens to have an effective voice in annexations initiated by
municipalities.2 21 The 2011 legislation guaranteed such voice by
b.

219. Senator Daniel Clodfelter of Charlotte was a proponent of that approach.
See S.B. 711 (1st Ed.), Gen. Assemb., 2009-2010 Sess. (N.C. 2009) (focusing on
specifying the number and meaningful level of services).
220. See House Leadership, supra note 208.
221. Prior to the 2011 legislation the following statements of policy applied to
cities with populations of 5,000 or more:
It is hereby declared as a matter of State policy:
(1) That sound urban development is essential to the continued economic
development of North Carolina;
(2) That municipalities are created to provide the governmental services
essential for sound urban development and for the protection of health,
safety and welfare in areas being intensively used for residential, commercial,
industrial, institutional and governmental purposes or in areas undergoing
such development;
(3) That municipal boundaries should be extended in accordance with
legislative standards applicable throughout the State, to include such areas
and to provide the high quality of governmental services needed therein for
the public health, safety and welfare;
(4) That new urban development in and around municipalities having a
population of 5,000 or more persons is more scattered than in and around
smaller municipalities, and that such larger municipalities have greater
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requiring that property owners in areas subject to an involuntary
annexation receive clear notice of their rights to invoke the
petition option.2 22 Under this remonstrance provision, the county
tax assessor was required to develop a list of property owners
based on tax listings and the board of elections was required to
mail preprinted petitions to those on this list with costs borne by
the municipality. 223 If petitions from sixty percent of the property
owners 224 were returned reflecting opposition to the proposed
annexation, the annexation was blocked for a minimum of three

years. 225
As is discussed in more detail below, the General Assembly
modified these provisions yet again in 2012, substituting a
referendum requirement that allows all residents of an area
proposed for involuntary annexation (and only those residents,

difficulty in expanding municipal utility systems and other service facilities to
serve such scattered development, so that the legislative standards governing
annexation by larger municipalities must take these facts into account if the
objectives set forth in this section are to be attained;
(5) That areas annexed to municipalities in accordance with such uniform
legislative standards should receive the services provided by the annexing
municipality in accordance with G.S. 160A-47(3).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A45 (2009), repealed by Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011
N.C. Sess. Laws 1649. The 2011 legislation modified paragraphs (4) and (5) and
added a new paragraph (6) to read as follows:
(4) That areas annexed by municipalities in accordance with such uniform
legislative standards should receive the services provided by the annexing
municipality.
(5) That the provision of services to protect the health, safety and welfare is
a public purpose.
(6) That it is essential for citizens to have an effective voice in annexations
initiated by municipalities.
Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, § 8, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649, 1649-50 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.50 (2011)).
222. See Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, § 8, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649, 1657-58,
amended by Act of May 30, 2012, ch. 11, § 2, 2012-1 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 25, 28-29
(LexisNexis) (to be codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.55(i)).
223. Id.
224. "Property owner" is defined as "any person having a freehold interest in real
property." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.51(4) (2011).
225. Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, § 8, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649, 1657-58,
amended by Act of May 30, 2012, ch. 11, § 2, 2012-1 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 25, 28-29
(LexisNexis) (to be codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.55(i)).
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not the residents of the annexing municipality) to vote on whether
to allow the annexation to proceed.2 26
c. Other Changes
Several other more modest changes are worth highlighting.
The 2011 legislation abolished differences in annexation policy
between municipalities with fewer or more than 5,000 residents.227
This change was unfortunately made without any empirical
examination of differences between smaller and larger
municipalities, even though patterns of development may vary in
significant respects depending on the size and location of
municipalities, in particular whether they fall within the path of
regional growth. The incidence of annexation in North Carolina
appears to have differed significantly depending upon such
considerations as discussed below,2 28 and a more nuanced set of
annexation policies might have been developed to take into
account size and regional differences.
During the extended period of legislative debate, a number
of proposals surfaced to change the definition of "urban
character" that had provided the cornerstone criteria for
involuntary annexation in the past. 22 9 In the end, however,
requirements regarding development for urban purposes and the
contiguity requirement were both slightly revised to include a new
definition of residential use and to prohibit "spaghetti strings"
that connected outlying parcels along public roads.230 Land bridge
226. See Act of May 30, 2012, ch. 11, §§ 1, 2, 2012-1 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 25
(LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-58.55(i), -58.64) (modifying
section 160A-58.55 and establishing the referendum requirement in section
160A-58.64, which eliminates the petition process created as part of the 2011
amendments).
227. The legislation eliminated Parts 2 and 3 of Chapter 160A and instead
established a new Part 7 governing all annexation by North Carolina municipalities.
See Act of June 17,2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649.
228. See infra notes 384-97 and accompanying text.
229. See, e.g., H.B. 524, 2009 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C.).
230. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.51(1) (2011). This statute defines
"contiguous area" as
[a]ny area which, at the time annexation procedures are initiated, either abuts
directly on the municipal boundary or is separated from the municipal
boundary by a street or street right-of-way, a creek or river, the right-of-way
of a railroad or other public service corporation, lands owned by the
municipality or some other political subdivision, or lands owned by the State
of North Carolina. A connecting corridor consisting solely of the length of a
street or street right-of-way may not be used to establish contiguity.
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areas ("necessary land connections") also continue to be eligible
for annexation. 231 "Doughnut holes" and "islands" are now
specifically designated as areas subject to involuntary annexation,
and procedures otherwise applicable to areas subject to
involuntary annexation do not apply in such contexts.2 32
Changes were also made in procedural provisions. The time
horizon for involuntary annexation was elongated by requiring
municipalities to devote a full year to planning following the
adoption of a resolution of consideration, to be followed by a
resolution of intent and associated procedural requirements
including the development and distribution to property owners of
a detailed annexation report.234 Additional notice requirements
were added, with more detailed information to be distributed as
part of required notice.235 Effective dates for involuntary
annexations were standardized so that they now fall at the end of
the fiscal year.236 Municipalities are now required to report in
more detail to the Local Government Commission about their
progress in offering urban services.' Timing and standards for

Id.; see also id. § 160A-58.51(5). This section defines "used for residential purposes"
as
[a]ny lot or tract five acres or less in size on which is constructed a habitable
dwelling unit. The term also includes any lot or tract that is used in common
for social or recreational purposes by either owners of lots with habitable
dwelling units or owners of lots intended for occupation by dwelling units and
the lot owners have a real property interest in the commonly used property
that attaches to or is appurtenant to the owners' lots.
Id. Additional legislation also prohibited municipalities from petitioning themselves
for voluntary annexation of state-maintained streets unless the municipality owned
the underlying fee and not just an easement. See Act of Apr. 28, 2011, ch. 57, § 3,
2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 75,77 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-31(i) (2011)).
231. See Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, § 8, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649, 1652
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.54(a)(4) (2011)).
232. See id., 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1653 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 160A-58.54(a)(4)(c) (2011)).
233. See id., 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1654 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 160A-58.55(c) (2011)).
234. See id., 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1654-55 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 160A-58.55(c)-(d) (2011)).
235. See id., 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1653-55 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 160A-58.55(b), (d) (2011)).
236. See id., 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1656 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 160A-58.55(h)(5) (2011)).
237. See id., 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1658 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT, § 160A58.55(o) (2011)).
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judicial review were also changed.2 38 Now, the petition process
provides an initial avenue to block an involuntary annexation, and
appeals may be filed within sixty days of the end of the 130-day
petition period.239 When challenges to involuntary annexations
are brought in superior court, the relevant standard is no longer
whether the annexation was conducted in "substantial
compliance" with statutory requirements, but rather whether
"procedural irregularities are found to have materially prejudiced
the substantive rights of any of the petitioners."2 4 0 Property
owners who prevail in such litigation are also entitled to receive
awards of attorneys' fees and court costs.241
Finally, additional provisions clarified the meaning of "bona
fide farm" and re-emphasized legislative intent to keep bona fide
farms from facing involuntary annexation.2 42 The definition of
"farm" was loosened by removing references to farming tied to a
"domestic or foreign market" and instead providing that evidence
from state and federal tax information could suffice to establish
"bona fide farm" status.243 Annexation of bona fide farms is now
disallowed without the consent of the property owner.2 The
likely result will be to create "doughnut hole" areas within
municipal boundaries that are immune from annexation until the
property is no longer used for farming purposes. In addition, bona
fide farms at the margins of municipalities were made exempt
from municipal extraterritorial jurisdiction for purposes of land
use planning and regulation.245

238. See id., 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1664 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 160A-58.60 (2011)).
239. Id.
240. See id., 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1665 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A5
8.60(g)(1) (2011).
241. See id. § 8, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1666 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 160A-58.60(n) (2011)).
242. Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 363, § 3.1, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1504, 1505 (codified
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.54(c) (2011)).
243. Id. § 1, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1504-05 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 153A-340(b)(2) (2011)).
244. See id. § 3.1, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1505 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 160A-58.54(c) (2011)) (clarifying definition of "bona fide farm" purposes and
prohibiting annexation without written consent).
245. See id. § 4, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1505 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 160A-360(k) (2011)).
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2. Changes Affecting Low-Income Areas
Previously Not Readily Annexed
Municipal underbounding24 6 is an important issue that
received considerable attention during the recent legislative
debate in North Carolina. Prior to the recent statutory changes, it
was often the case that poor (and commonly minority) enclaves
were not able to qualify for voluntary annexation either because
there was fragmented property ownership and difficulty in gaining
the 100% approval needed for a successful petition, or because
the municipality was not willing to take in an area where
providing services would exceed anticipated tax revenues.247
Likewise, involuntary annexation was often unavailable because
the level of development did not satisfy the "urban character"
requirements relating to population density, subdivision, parcel
size, or established uses.248
Statutory revisions targeted the problem of underbounding
in two distinct ways. Both new provisions pertain to poor
community enclaves where the income of fifty-one percent of
households equals two hundred percent or less of the poverty
threshold.249 Under the first new provision, the focus is on the
desires of property owners in such areas. If seventy-five percent
of affected property owners petition for annexation, a
municipality must annex a qualifying area, provided the
population of the area is less than or equal to ten percent of the
municipality's total population and one-eighth of the area's
aggregated external boundaries are contiguous with the
municipality.250 Only one such annexation is required of a
municipality in a three-year period, and exemptions are available
from the annexation requirement if associated requirements to
extend water and sewer services would push the municipality's
annual debt service payments beyond acceptable bounds.2 '

246. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
247. UNC

CTR.

FOR

CIVIL

RIGHTS,

INVISIBLE

FENCES:

MUNICIPAL

UNDERBOUNDING IN SOUTHERN MOORE COUNTY 14, 24 (2006), http://www.1aw
.unc.edu/documents/civilrights/briefs/invisiblefencesreport.pdf.
248. See supra notes 124-33 and accompanying text.
249. See Act of June 17,2011, ch. 396, § 10, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649, 1667, 1669
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. 160A-31(bl), (j) (2011)).
250. Id., 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1667 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. 160A-31(bl)
(2011)).
251. Id., 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1668 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A31(d2)(1) (2011)).
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The second approach focuses on residents of such enclaves
rather than property owners. Under this approach, a petition for
voluntary annexation may be submitted by two-thirds of the
resident households in the area (based on having at least one
adult resident in each of the petitioning households sign such a
request). 25 2 Such area must also be contiguous. 2 3 In such cases,
the municipality is permitted but not required to annex.254 Thus, a
new option is created for a less-than-one-hundred percent
voluntary annexation petition at least for areas characterized by
low socio-economic indicators.
3. Rolling Back Recent Annexations: A Drama in Three Acts
Much of the fury that spurred the 2011 and 2012 annexation
reforms was voiced by citizens who had themselves recently been
subjected to involuntary annexation. It was therefore not
surprising that the General Assembly sought to redress their
grievances during the first act of the recent annexation drama by
rolling back involuntary annexations that had been in the pipeline
for some time but had not yet taken effect. The General
Assembly accordingly adopted separate legislation that
suspended certain pending involuntary annexations that were
nearing completion or that had already become effective, and
directed local boards of elections in those areas to consider
petitions that would seek to block the annexations
permanently.25
Act II of the drama occurred when several of the affected
municipalities, along with named individuals in the annexation
areas, filed suit in superior court to overturn the legislation.256 The
complaints recited in detail the expenditures that they had
already made in reliance upon the annexation law in effect at the
time they had commenced work on the referenced involuntary
252. Id., 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1669 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-31(j)
(2011)).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See Act of June 18, 2011, ch. 173, §§ 1-2, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 668, 668-69
(affecting areas in the process of annexation in Kinston, Lexington, Rocky Mount,
Wilmington [Monkey Junction], Asheville/Biltmore Lake, Marvin, Southport, and
Fayetteville [Gates Four]); Act of June 18, 2011, ch. 177, §§ 2-3,2011 N.C. Sess. Laws
680, 681 (including Goldsboro, whose annexation ordinance had already become
final).
256. Verified Complaint, City of Goldsboro v. State, 11-CVS-18230, 2012 WL
1440446 (Wake Cnty. Super. Ct. Mar. 27,2012).
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annexations, and challenged the roll-back provisions on a number
of grounds.257 The municipalities then challenged the 2011
petition-veto provisions on the basis that these provisions allowed
only property owners, not other residents, to vote, allegedly
the
violating state constitutional provisions prohibiting'
imposition of property qualifications on the right to vote,"' the
2 1
and "exclusive emoluments" clauses, 261 and
equal protections
of local
oversight
legislative
authorizing
provisions
26 2 The City of Goldsboro and a property owner in
governments.
the area annexed also asserted claims under the takings clause
based on vested rights in contracts and expenditures to provide
water and sewer services and the disruption of plans for house
construction by the property owners.263 Meanwhile, property
owners who believed they benefited from the statutory changes
intervened on the side of the state.M While the use of a petitionveto (often referred to as a "remonstrance" right) by registered
voters as part of the structure of annexation decisions is not new
for North Carolina,2 6 the recent case posed different questions

257. Id. at 11-20.
258. Id. at 20-23.
259. N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 11 ("As political rights and privileges are not dependent

upon or modified by property, no property qualification shall affect the right to vote
or hold office.").
260. Id. § 19 ("No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws...."),
261. Id. § 32 ("No person or set of persons is entitled to exclusive or separate
emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public
services.").

262. Id. art. VII, § 1 ("The General Assembly shall provide for the organization
and government and the fixing of boundaries of counties, cities and towns, and other
governmental subdivisions, and, except as otherwise prohibited by this Constitution,
may give such powers and duties to counties, cities and towns, and other

governmental subdivisions as it may deem advisable.").
263. See Verified Complaint, supra note 256, at 22-23.
264. See generally Intervenor-Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, City of Goldsboro v. State, No. 11CVS 18230, 2012 WL 1440446 (Wake Cnty. Super. Ct. Nov. 28, 2011) (attacking each
of the claims put forward by Plaintiffs to challenge the legislation).
265. See Wood v. City of Fayetteville, 43 N.C. App. 410, 412, 259 S.E.2d 581, 582
(1979). The case involved a challenge against veto-petition provisions brought by the
City of Fayetteville and city taxpayers who claimed that veto-petition by non-resident
voters opposing annexation was invalid, Id. at 412, 259 S.E.2d at 583. The petitionveto provision differed from the one in the 2011 annexation legislation because it
allowed registered voters to petition and block annexation in certain parts of the
state. Id. at 411, 259 S.E.2d at 582. The City and certain taxpayers challenged the

veto-petition provision on grounds of improper delegation of legislative authority,
exclusive emoluments, and inappropriate local legislation regarding health and
sanitation. Id. at 412, 259 S.E.2d at 582. The court of appeals concluded that the veto-
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because of the 2011 legislation's limitation of petitioning rights to
property owners and because of the substantial sunk costs
imposed upon municipalities that were already well along in the
process of annexation when the 2011 session laws regarding
petition-vetoes about pending annexations took effect. In March
2012, the Wake County Superior Court concluded that cities'
challenges should be sustained 6 6 and the matter was expected to
be appealed.26 7 The trial court's order did not explain its rationale,
but it was clear that the court's conclusion cast into doubt not
only the "roll-back" provisions affecting municipalities that were
already far along with the process of annexation, but also the
general contours of the annexation petition-veto process for other
cities going forward. 2
The litigation raised several important questions regarding
the application of the state constitutional provisions just
mentioned. It is clear that there is no constitutional right to vote
on annexation decisions.269 Moreover, the North Carolina Court
of Appeals has held that annexation statutes that afford a vote to
resident individuals but not to corporations located in an area
being annexed are permissible.270 On the other hand, the courts
have invalidated statutes that differentiated voting rights of
petition provision could not be challenged because of lack of standing. Id. at 415, 259
S.E.2d at 584.
266. See City of Goldsboro v. State, No. 11-CVS 18230, 2012 WL 1440446 (Wake
Cnty. Super. Ct. Mar. 27, 2012). A companion case was filed by the City of Rocky
Mount. See City of Rocky Mount v. State, No. 11-CVS 18288, 2012 WL 1440446
(Wake Cnty. Super. Ct. Mar. 27, 2012).
267. See Rob Christensen, Cities Win Case Against State Law, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 28, 2012, http://www.newsobserver.com/2012/03
/28/1963104/superior-court-judge-rules-that.html.
268. See City of Goldsboro, 2012 WL 1440446, at *1 (declaring new veto-petition
provisions codified at sections 160A-58.51(a)(1) and 160A-58.55(h)(5), (h)(7) and (i)
"ultra vires, void ab initio, and of no effect").
269. See Barefoot v. City of Wilmington, 306 F.3d 113, 121-23 (4th Cir. 2002)
(explaining that there is no substantive federal constitutional right to vote on
annexation and no equal protection violation if certain decisions such as
incorporation are put to referendum but others such as annexation are not). See
generally 2 MCQUILLIN, supra note 39, § 7:22, at nn. 18-19 (collecting cases from
other jurisdictions regarding the right to vote in annexation decisions).
270. See Texfi Indus., Inc. v. City of Fayetteville, 44 N.C. App. 268, 273, 261
S.E.2d 21, 25 (N.C. App. 1979) (rejecting a claim by a corporate lessee in area to be
annexed that it should have had right to vote and to receive notice in connection with
annexation action; relying on text of article I, section 11 of the Constitution of North
Carolina, which states that "[als political rights and privileges are not dependent
upon or modified by property, no property qualification shall affect the right to vote
or hold office," as basis for rejecting lessee's claim).
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property owners and residents if suspect classifications were
involved or if there was an infringement on fundamental rights.27 1
In an earlier case arising from South Carolina's practice of
allowing only property owners to vote on annexation decisions,
the Fourth Circuit found the practice to be unconstitutional since
it differentiated between property owners and residents as to a
matter that was of general interest. 272
The state constitutional provision that specifies that "no
property qualification shall affect the right to vote" raised slightly
more complex questions. This provision was adopted in the
aftermath of the Civil War,273 and there is relatively limited
precedent interpreting the meaning of this or comparable
provisions elsewhere. 274 A crucial issue under this provision was
whether the 2011 annexation law's petition-veto provision should
be treated as a "right to vote" for purposes of this constitutional
271. See Barefoot, 306 F.3d at 121-22 ("Later decisions, however, have qualified
the state's power to some degree, subjecting annexations to some scrutiny under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Where the exercise of a state's discretion in ordering its
political subdivisions involves the creation of suspect classifications or infringes on
fundamental rights, the state action will be upheld only if it furthers a compelling
state interest." (citing Hayward v. Clay, 573 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 1978) and Muller v.
Curran, 889 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1989)).
272. See Hayward v. Clay, 573 F.2d 187, 187 (4th Cir. 1978). Later Fourth Circuit
cases raised related but distinct issues. In Berry v. Bourne, 588 F.2d 422, 425 (4th Cir.
1978), the court upheld a South Carolina annexation provision that allowed seventyfive percent of property owners to petition for annexation, before action would be
taken by the governing body, reasoning that there was no vote by property owners or
anyone other than the governing board. In Muller v. Curran, 889 F.2d 54, 57 (4th Cir.
1989), the court found Maryland's arrangements for incorporation to be
unconstitutional in the absence of a compelling state interest, where a petition of
twenty percent of residents as well as of property owners with twenty-five percent of
the assessed property value in the area had to be received before the county council
could decide to submit the issue of incorporation to an election involving all
registered voters. For a similar conclusion reached by the Missouri Supreme Court,
see In re Extension of Boundaries of Glaize Creek Sewer Dist., 574 S.W.2d 357, 364
(Mo. 1978) (en banc) (finding an equal protection violation in connection with
statutory provisions relating to sewer district boundary extension that accorded only
property owners in the area to be annexed and in the existing district right to vote).
273. This provision had its genesis in the North Carolina Constitution of 1868,
which included a provision that stated: "As political rights and privileges are not
dependent upon or modified by property, therefore no property qualification ought
to affect the right to vote or hold office." N.C. CONST. art I, § 22 (1868).
274. Other states with constitutional provisions regarding property qualifications
and voting include California and Idaho. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 22 ("The right to
vote or hold office may not be conditioned by a property qualification."); IDAHO
CONST. art. I, § 20 ("No property qualifications shall ever be required for any person
to vote or hold office except in school elections, or elections creating indebtedness, or
in irrigation district elections .... ").
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provision. The General Assembly referred to the mechanism
chosen as a "petition," a term used elsewhere in the annexation
statute to refer to requests to city councils for voluntary
annexation. 275 In the context of the petition-veto provision,
however, petitions were to be lodged with local county boards of
elections, and the statute contemplated that if a sufficient number
of petitions were filed, the annexation would be blocked and
could not be reinstituted for three years.7 The mechanism
imposed thus differed from other instances in which courts have
held that petitions do not constitute votes because ultimate
decisions remain lodged with elected decision makers. 277 Perhaps
the most analogous case law concerns petitions by landowners
that in effect block consideration of incorporation proposals by
elected decision-makers and, as a result, curtail the right of
residents in an area proposed for incorporation to vote upon such
proposals. 278 Because there was no otherwise applicable right to
vote on annexation decisions in North Carolina, however, the
appellate courts might well have had to determine whether the
petition-veto system in fact created a right to vote only for
property owners (triggering automatic results once petitions are
filed with local boards of elections), and whether the 2011
annexation reforms raised questions under the equal protection
provisions of the state constitution.2 79

275. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-31 (2011) (relating to voluntary annexation).
276. See Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, § 9, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649, 1657
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.55(i) (2011)).
277. See, e.g., Carlyn v. City of Akron, 726 F.2d 287, 290 (6th Cir. 1984)
(upholding an Ohio structure that allowed property-owner petition to elected board
as a means of annexation, where elected board of county commissioners had final say
in reaching annexation decision).
278. See, e.g., Curtis v. Bd. of Supervisors, 501 P.2d 537, 546 (Cal. 1972) (holding
that strict scrutiny applied under these circumstances); City of Seattle v. State, 694
P.2d 641, 647, 650 (Wash. 1985) (invalidating provision that allowed property owners
to block annexation election on state and federal equal protection grounds, and
invalidating provision requiring a reasonable relationship between taxes and services
that applied only to some cities based on state "special legislation" provisions).
279. The other focal provision of the state constitution, the "exclusive
emoluments" clause, has proved difficult to interpret. North Carolina courts have
stated that the goal of the "exclusive emoluments" clause "is to prevent the
community from surrendering its power to another person or set of persons by grant
of exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges unless they are granted in
consideration of public services." City of Asheville v. State, 192 N.C. App. 1, 46, 665
S.E.2d 103, 134 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The North Carolina courts
have also been clear that the touchstone in interpreting the exclusive emoluments
provision relates to whether the general welfare or individual welfare is advanced
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Act III in this grand drama occurred in May and June of
2012, when the General Assembly took further steps to roll back
pending involuntary annexations 2 o and replaced the 2011
petition-veto provisions with a referendum system that effectively
undercut most legal claims presented in Act II. More specifically,
the legislature eliminated the petition-veto system and substituted
a mandatory referendum system that allowed registered voters in
an area proposed for involuntary annexation (without regard to
whether they owned property) to block the proposed annexation
by majority vote. 281
The General Assembly has considerable constitutionally
afforded discretion regarding "fixing of boundaries" of cities and
towns.282 Precedent from elsewhere also suggests that courts
generally accord state legislatures considerable discretion in
determining the process of annexation.2 83 It would thus appear
that North Carolina has joined the ranks of states that make
involuntary annexation extremely difficult. It also appears that
individual citizens' preferences have been given much more
weight than the judgments of elected city leaders with regard to
most municipal boundary setting decisions.
4. Summary
Although a myriad of possible changes were posed as part of
the debate leading up to the recent statutory changes to North
Carolina's annexation laws, in the end changes were relatively few
and whether there is a reasonable basis for legislative action. See Town of Emerald
Isle ex rel. Smith v. State, 320 N.C. 640, 654, 360 S.E.2d 756, 764 (1987).
280. See Act of May 30, 2012, ch. 3, §§ 1, 4, 2012-1 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 5, 5
(LexisNexis) (legislatively de-annexing areas that had been subject to litigation).
281. See Act of May 30, 2012, ch. 11, §§ 1-2, 2012-1 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 25, 25,
28-29 (LexisNexis) (adding referendum requirement and eliminating petition-veto
provision introduced in 2012).
282. See N.C. CONsT. art. VII, § 1 ("The General Assembly shall provide for the
organization and government and the fixing of boundaries of counties, cities and
towns, and other governmental subdivisions, and, except as otherwise prohibited by
this Constitution, may give such powers and duties to counties, cities and towns, and
other governmental subdivisions as it may deem advisable.").
283. See 2 McQUILLIN, supra note 39, § 7:19 (collecting cases regarding voting on
annexation); id. § 7:18 at 569-71 ("Since compulsory incorporation of governmental
areas is not favored in this country, the question of annexation of territory to
municipal corporations is usually referred to the inhabitants. This is true in many
cases where the municipal corporation to which an area is to be annexed is a 'home
rule' or constitutional charter city or municipality. Statutes frequently require that
municipal boundaries shall be extended only upon the consent of a majority of the
inhabitants of the district sought to be annexed." (footnotes omitted)).
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but very fundamental. Earlier skirmishes evident in the past
decade's annexation litigation had shown opponents of existing
law that technical fixes would be insufficient to allay their
concerns about self-determination, property rights, and costs.
Two fundamental shifts in the involuntary annexation provisions
raise the specter that in many locales, involuntary annexation can
no longer be afforded by municipalities (which have to carry
many more costs in extending water and sewer services than had
been true previously) and extensive preparations and planning
will henceforth be subject to referendum vote and possible veto
by property owners in annexation areas. The situation facing
economically disadvantaged areas was improved, since petitions
by a substantial proportion of (but not all) property owners can
force municipal annexation along with absorption of associated
costs, and also provides residents (who are not property owners)
the opportunity to seek annexation at a municipality's discretion.
The legislature also rolled back involuntary annexation
ordinances in a number of locales and, in 2012, gave residents of
areas proposed for involuntary annexation even more power to
block such proposals by virtue of required annexation referenda
(not just petition-vetoes). All and all, it appears that the state's
municipalities lost the recent annexation wars and must now
prepare to face new realities. The remainder of this Article
employs empirical evidence along with legal analysis to shed light
on the likely future in the wake of the recent statutory reforms,
focusing in particular on issues relating to infrastructure
provision, land use planning and growth management, and local
government fragmentation.
III. WHAT NEXT?
This Part considers three major types of questions that are
likely to arise in the aftermath of the recent changes to North
Carolina's annexation policies: those relating to water and sewer
infrastructure, those relating to municipal regulatory authority,
and those relating to intergovernmental relationships. It focuses
on the three most significant policy impacts of annexation:
infrastructure extension, land use planning and growth
management, and government fragmentation, considering each in
turn. This Part argues that water and sewer extensions will likely
be tied to agreements for voluntary annexation in the future. It
also recommends closer linkage between extraterritorial planning
jurisdiction, annexation, and growth management policies. Finally
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this Part argues for a more comprehensive re-envisioning of the
duties and relationships between cities, counties, special districts,
and gated communities in order to avoid fragmentation and
unintended adverse consequences that might otherwise stem from
North Carolina's recent annexation wars.
A.

Infrastructure
As discussed earlier, the new referendum mechanism
imposed on involuntary annexations in 2012 is likely to
substantially hinder municipalities' ability to engage in
involuntary annexation. As municipalities face hard choices
relating to water and sewer infrastructure extension, it appears
that they have at least three choices.
1. Proceeding with Involuntary Annexations
The new legislation is very explicit in describing the
obligations regarding water and sewer infrastructure of
municipalities that choose to proceed with involuntary annexation
(subject to a potential referendum override). 21 There is no
obligation to extend water and sewer services if a majority of
property owners do not request them. If a majority requests these
services, the municipality must provide the requesting property
owners with water and sewer service within three and a half years
"at no cost other than periodic user fees." 285 Other property
owners may request hook-ups for a period of up to five years at
reduced connection rates. 286 Only after a period of five years can a
municipality charge connection fees as provided under its general

284. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.56 (2011); discussion supra Part II.C.l.a.
285. See § 160A-58.56(a)-(b). If owners of a majority of the affected parcels do
not request water and sewer, the municipality may proceed with the annexation
without extending water and sewer to any property owners in the area to be annexed
and may impose prorated charges on property owners requesting services. Id.
§ 160A-58.56(b)(4), (d).
286. Id. § 160A-58.56(d). Prorated rates range from fifty percent of the "average
cost of the installation of water and sewer for a residential lot" in the first year after
annexation to ninety percent of the average cost in the fourth year after annexation.
Id. Average cost is defined as "the cost for residential installations from curb to
residence, including connection and tap fees, in the area described in the annexation
ordinance." Id. § 160A-58.56(h)(2). The right to request water and sewer service
extends to "property owners" of "parcels," id. § 160A-58.56(b)(1), indicating
inclusion of commercial parcels even though the permitted installation charges are
benchmarked against residential costs.
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policies.287 In the interim, it cannot charge property owners in the
annexed area any other fee (such as "availability fees" that have
often been charged) unless the property owner requests service. 88
Several specific questions are posed by these provisions.
a. Likelihood of Proceeding?
How likely is it that North Carolina's cities and towns will
proceed with involuntary annexations in the face of statutory
changes? What will be the implications of these decisions for the
state of water and sewer infrastructure? It is by no means easy to
answer these questions. To a significant degree, decisions will
depend upon the financial realities facing individual
municipalities, and the structural arrangements they use to help
residents access water and sewer services. The fiscal note
prepared by the fiscal research staff of the North Carolina
General Assembly concluded that it was impossible to say with
any certainty what the fiscal impact of 2011 annexation changes
might be. 8
The likelihood and method of proceeding would seem to
depend on the water and sewer infrastructure, its capacity, the
fiscal health of their water and sewer program, and the costs
associated with expanding main trunk lines and establishing
individual lot hook-ups. Infrastructure capacity clearly varies
from system to system, with added complexities associated with
topography in extending lines. It is, however, possible to gain
some insight into fiscal health and possible incremental costs of
lot hook-ups.
Data on municipalities in the state collected and published by
the North Carolina State Treasurer indicates that the situations of
municipalities vary significantly across at least two variables: the
role of individual cities in providing electrical power and city

287. Id. § 160A-58.56(b)(4) ("After five years, and only if connection is requested
by a property owner in accordance with subsection (e) of this section, the
municipality may charge for the connection according to the municipality's policy.").
288. Id. § 160A-58.56(e) ("Notwithstanding Article 16 of this Chapter [relating to
public enterprises and their charges], the municipality may not charge, for any
reason, any property owner within the area described in the annexation ordinance,
for the installation or use of the water or sewer system unless that property owner is,
or has requested to become, a customer of the water or sewer system.").
289. See Memorandum from Rick Shreve, Fiscal Research Div., to House Fin.
Comm. 2 (May 5, 2011), available at http://www.ncleg.net/documentsites/committees
/HouseFinance/Meeting%20Documents/5-5-2011/H845%2OFiscal%2OMemo.pdf.
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size. 2 90 Data for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2010, prior to
legislative changes, indicated that for cities with electrical systems,
those with populations over 2,500 tended to subsidize other funds
through their operation of water and sewer services.291 Those
under 2,500 in population tended to subsidize water and sewer
operations from other sources.292 For cities that did not provide
electric power directly, those with populations of more than
50,000 and those with populations between 2,500 and 9,999
tended to show modest transfers of water and sewer funds,
perhaps to pay indirect overhead costs, give municipalities an
acceptable rate of return, or subsidize the general fund. 2 93 Those
with populations of more than approximately 16,000 tended to
generate substantial cash flows from these operations, with the
largest cities generating the most substantial cash flows. 294
Significantly, municipalities with populations under 2,500 have
had the most problematic operating margins for water and sewer
systems and tended to be the most heavily subsidized by other
funding sources.295 In a 2011 report (for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 2010), the State Treasurer's Office advised jurisdictions
with negative operating margins that user fees were likely too low
or operating expenses were too high (or both) and that combining

290. See, e.g., Memorandum from Sharon Edmundson, Dir., Fiscal Mgmt. Section
to Officials of Mun. with Water & Sewer Syst. & Their Indep. Auditors 2 (May 11,
2011), https://www.nctreasurer.com/slg/Memos/2011-16.pdf [hereinafter Edmundson
Letter] (providing municipalities with financial data about water and sewer systems
across the state, segregated first by municipalities with and without electric systems
and then by population groups).
291. See id. The legislature recently set new limits on the extent to which revenues
from certain specified municipal electric systems could be used for other purposes.
See Act of June 28, 2012, ch. 181, § 2, 2012-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 158 (LexisNexis)
(to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159B-39(c)) ("The amount transferred [to other
funds of the municipality] may be less than the following, but in no event may the
amount transferred exceed the greater of the following: (1) Three percent (3%) of
the gross capital assets of the electric system at the end of the preceding fiscal year.
(2) Five percent (5%) of the gross annual revenues of the electric system for the
preceding fiscal year.").
292. See Edmundson Letter, supra note 290, at 5.
293. Id.; see also SHADI ESKAF ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL FIN. CTR., UNC SCH.
OF GOV'T, RESULTS OF THE 2010 NORTH CAROLINA WATER AND WASTEWATER
FINANCIAL PRACTICES AND POLICIES SURVEY 28 (2011), http://www.efc.unc.edu
/publications/2011/FinancialPracticesAndPoliciesSurveyResults.pdf
(indicating,
without referencing size of population served, that thirty-eight percent of respondent
water and wastewater systems paid indirect costs, two percent gave a rate of return,

and six percent subsidized general funds).
294. See Edmundson Letter, supra note 290, at Report 1, C-2.
295. See id. at 5.
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into regional systems might be advisable. 296 As of the 2011 report,
North Carolina had more than 200 jurisdictions with populations
below 2,500,297 many but not all of which had negative operating
margins.298
Data is also available regarding the costs historically charged
to property owners seeking water and wastewater hook-ups,
based on surveys conducted by the UNC School of Government's
Environmental Finance Center and the North Carolina League of
Municipalities. 299 A 2009 survey indicated that water tap and
wastewater (hook-up) fees reported by respondent utilities in the
state ranged from under $200 to over $3,000, with the bulk
clustered in the range of $400 to $1,000, and with approximately
two-thirds of systems charging the same tap fees to municipal and
non-municipal customers. 0o In addition, approximately one-third
of responding systems charge some sort of "system development
fee" for water and nearly half charge such fees for wastewater
connections, in amounts ranging from $300 to $4,000.301
Depending on the jurisdiction involved, the level of tap fees for
water and sewer, and the use of system development charges for
water and sewer, the subsidy for an individual lot hook-up might
run to more than $5,000. Depending on the number of parcels
being annexed, and those that seek water and sewer services, the
total costs of subsidizing hook-ups could be substantial.
296. Id.
297. See id. Twenty of these jurisdictions had municipal electric systems and 197
jurisdictions did not.
298. Of the 194 jurisdictions without electrical systems that reported data, 147
reported negative operating margins. See id. at Report 1, A-5 to A-12.
299. See North Carolina Water & Wastewater Rates and Rate Structures, UNC
ENVTL. FIN. CTR., http://www.efc.unc.edu/projects/NCWaterRates.htm (last visited
Nov. 16, 2012) (annual reports from 2005 to 2012); Publications,UNC ENVTL. FIN.
CENTER, http://www.efc.unc.edu/publications.html#waterwastewater (last visited
Nov. 16, 2012) (additional relevant publications and studies in the "Drinking Water
& Wastewater" section); Residential Tap Fees and System Development Charges
(Impact Fees) in NC, UNC ENVTL. FIN. CENTER, http://www.efc.unc.edu/projects
/tapimpactfee.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (information about tap fees and
impact fees).
300. See SHADI ESKAF & CHRIS NIDA, UNC ENVTL. FIN. CTR., TAP FEES AND
SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT CHARGES FOR RESIDENTIAL WATER AND WASTEWATER
CONNECTIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA AS OF JANUARY 2009, at 2 (2009), http://

www.efc.unc.edulpublications/2009/NCTapFeesandSDC Memo2009.pdf. A total of
287 water rate structures and 223 wastewater rate structures were represented in the
survey. Id.
301. See id. at 3-4. The water charges clustered in the range of $300 to $1,200, and
approximately half of respondents charged more than $1,200 for wastewater
connections. See id. at 4.
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These two data sets suggest that North Carolina
municipalities are not on an equal footing when it comes to
annexation and potential costs of extending water and sewer
services to newly annexed areas. As one might expect, it appears
that small towns (below 2,500 in population), whether or not they
have electric systems, will have less flexibility than large cities to
absorb newly mandated costs associated with individual lot
hook-ups. For the largest cities, where water and sewer may at
least to some extent function as a potential revenue source that
can subsidize other aspects of municipal budgets, involuntary
annexation may continue to be financially feasible (assuming such
annexations are not blocked by referenda) since there is at least
some margin to cover associated costs. For other cities of
intermediate size, situations may differ. Since it appears that
water and sewer systems in small towns are already in many
instances a source of financial concern, there may be an impetus
to follow the State Treasurer's advice and move toward
combining into regional systems, if the available infrastructure
can handle resulting changes and if there is adequate funding and
incentives to do so.
b. Implications for Hook-Up Fees Within the City?
In addition to the initial question (the financial feasibility of
extending water and sewer services to areas newly subject to
involuntary annexation), a second issue may arise if residents
within municipalities object to inequitable treatment arising when
those newly annexed receive substantial subsidies for new
hook-ups while those within existing municipal boundaries do
not.
The new statutory mandate to cover costs associated with
water and sewer hook-ups for property owners in involuntarily
annexed areas is very specific and addresses municipal obligations
as to newly annexed property, but not property that already falls
within municipal bounds. Historically, as previously explained,
municipalities have not been required to cover hook-up costs for
those connecting to water and sewer lines within the existing
jurisdictions.302 Indeed, on the advice of the North Carolina Local
Government Commission, most municipalities in North Carolina
have come to operate their utility systems as "public enterprises"
and manage related budgets on an enterprise fund basis
302. See supra notes 143-50 and accompanying text.
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(balancing payments by those receiving services with costs of
operation) rather than planning to pay related costs directly from
local tax funds.303 The question whether adjustments need be
made to existing practices regarding hook-ups within established
boundaries thus must be addressed against the backdrop of
established law that treats rate-setting for water and sewer
services as falling within common law utility rules and the Equal
Protection Clause.304
By statute, the following terms apply to municipal decisions
in setting fees and rates for public enterprises:
A city may establish and revise from time to time schedules
of rents, rates, fees, charges, and penalties for the use of or
the services furnished by any public enterprise. Schedules of
rents, rates, fees, charges, and penalties may vary according
to classes of service, and different schedules may be
adopted for services provided outside the corporate limits
of the city.30
This provision would seem to give a municipality considerable
discretion to set hook-up fees for residents within existing
boundaries."* A city might conclude that it would be fairer to
cover costs of hook-ups for existing residents or property owners
in future areas subject to voluntary annexation, because it is now
obliged to do so by the 2011 annexation legislation for
303. Kara A. Millonzi, Lawful Discrimination in Utility Ratemaking, LOC. FIN.
BULL., October 2006, at 2, www.sog.unc.edu/pubs/electronicversions/pdfs/1fb33.pdf.
Historically, property taxes and sales tax revenues were used, id. at 1, but cities are
legally authorized to use a variety of approaches to financing public enterprises
including water and sewer systems. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-313 (2011) ("Subject
to the restrictions, limitations, procedures, and regulations otherwise provided by
law, a city shall have full authority to finance the cost of any public enterprise by
levying taxes, borrowing money, and appropriating any other revenues therefor, and
by accepting and administering gifts and grants from any source on behalf thereof.").
304. See Millonzi, supra note 303, at 3.
305. N.C. GEN STAT. § 160A-314(a) (2011).
306. See South Shell Inv. v. Town of Wrightsville Beach, NC, 703 F. Supp. 1192,
1207 (E.D.N.C. 1988), aff'd, 900 F.2d 255 (4th Cir. 1990) (upholding against equal
protection challenge policies of city that imposed impact fee and higher charges on
new development than on other town residents); Davis v. Town of Southern Pines,
101 N.C. App. 570, 570, 400 S.E.2d 82, 82 (1991) (upholding substantially higher tap
fee for one homeowner where sewer line had been extended without other
assessments or connection charges). A recent decision by the Supreme Court of the
United States supports this view. See Armour v. Indianapolis, 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2077
(2012) (finding no equal protection violation when city employed differentiated
system of charges for sewer improvements, declining to give refunds to those who
had paid lump sums but forgiving future charges for those using staged payments).
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involuntarily annexed areas and might want to treat all residents
on a comparable basis."' On the other hand, it could view the
special obligations imposed by the new legislation as uniquely
addressing perceived inequities or burdens associated with
adjustments to new property tax burdens. This position seems
particularly warranted since the new legislation itself specifically
states that after five years those in involuntarily annexed areas
would again be subject to general municipal utility policies.
Existing case law, which recognizes that municipalities have
considerable discretion in setting utility rates and fees, would
seem to give municipalities substantial flexibility on this point.0 s
Implications for User Rates in Involuntarily Annexed
Areas in the Long Term?
As indicated above, the 2011 legislation limits municipalities'
power to impose costs associated with water and sewer extensions
to those property owners in involuntarily annexed areas unless
such owners have requested associated services. Accordingly,
availability fees may no longer be charged to those who do not
immediately seek connections within five years of annexation.3 09
c.

307. See, e.g., Fulghum v. Town of Selma, 238 N.C. 100, 105, 76 S.E.2d 368, 371
(1953) (upholding city's right to charge higher rates to non-residents but noting that
city had duty of equal service to those living within municipal boundaries).
308. See, e.g., Bogue Shores Homeowners Ass'n v. Town of Atlantic Beach, 109
N.C. App. 549, 555, 428 S.E.2d 258, 262 (1993) (upholding town's determination that
charges for residential condominiums should be set on the same basis as those for
single family residences, rather than those for motels).
309. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.56(b)(3) (2011) (requiring water and
sewer lines and connections to be provided at no cost other than periodic user fees),
and § 160A-58.56(d) (providing for prorated payments based on timing of application
for water and sewer services), and § 160A-58.56(e) ("Notwithstanding Article 16 of
this Chapter [relating to public enterprises and their charges], the municipality may
not charge, for any reason, any property owner within the area described in the
annexation ordinance, for the installation or use of the water or sewer system unless
that property owner is, or has requested to become, a customer of the water or sewer
system."), and § 160A-58.56(f) ("The initial installation of water or sewer connection
lines to property shall be completed without charge to the property owner. Title to
water or sewer connection lines shall vest in the property owner following completion
of the initial installation. The property owner shall be responsible for maintenance
and repair of water and sewer connection lines on the owner's property following the
initial installation."), and § 160A-58.56(h) ("For purposes of this section, the
following definitions apply: (1) 'At no cost other than periodic user fees.' The
municipality may not charge the property owner who responded favorably under
subdivision (b)(3) of this section for any costs associated with the installation of the
water or sewer system. The municipality may not charge a property owner who
applies to participate in the water and sewer system under subsection (d) of this
section prior to the first periodic user fee charge, and on that bill the owner may be
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In addition, the legislation very specifically requires annexing
municipalities to address and cover all or a proportion of costs
associated with extending services to the lot or parcel level, not
just to cover costs of trunk lines, for those who do seek
hook-ups. 10
Do these provisions requiring annexing municipalities to
cover immediate costs of hook-ups (and to forego "availability
charges") have implications for how rates for involuntarily
annexed areas can be set in the longer term? A reasonable
reading of the legislation and other existing statutes suggests not.
The 2011 legislation is very clear in focusing on "initial
installation costs"" and specifically carves out the right of
municipalities to set "periodic user fees" and to set connection
fees five years after the annexation in accordance with generally
applicable municipal policies (if a property owner seeks to
connect). 12 Moreover, North Carolina statutes specifically state
that noncontiguous areas subject to satellite annexation can be
designated as receiving "special classes of service" different from
areas within primary corporate boundaries. 313 It is possible that a
charged no more then as provided in subsection (d) of this section."), with id. § 160A317(a) ("A city may require an owner of developed property on which there are
situated one or more residential dwelling units or commercial establishments located
within the city limits and within a reasonable distance of any water line or sewer
connection line owned [by the municipality] ... to connect the owner's premises with
the water or sewer line or both, and may fix charges for the connections. In lieu of
requiring connection under this subsection and in order to avoid hardship, the city
may require payment of a periodic availability charge, not to exceed the minimum
periodic service charge for properties that are connected.").
310. See Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, § 9, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649, 1651
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.53(3) (2011)) (requiring annexing
municipalities to prepare a "statement setting forth the plans for ... feixtension of
water and sewer services to each lot or parcel").
311. See id. ("The initial installation of water or sewer connection lines to
property shall be completed without charge to the property owner. Title to water or
sewer connection lines shall vest in the property owner following completion of the
initial installation. The property owner shall be responsible for maintenance and
repair of water and sewer connection lines on the owner's property following the
initial installation.").
312. See id., 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1659 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A58.56(b)(4) (2011)) ("After five years, and only if connection is requested by a
property owner in accordance with subsection (e) of this section, the municipality
may charge for the connection according to the municipality's policy.").
313. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.5 (2011) (special rates for water, sewer and
other enterprises). This provision states:
For the purposes of G.S. 160A-314, provision of public enterprise services
within satellite corporate limits shall be considered provision of service for
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municipality might want to designate involuntarily annexed areas
as ones receiving "special classes of service" under the statutes,
but that approach seems inadvisable if the only basis for that
decision would be to recoup hook-up fees required to be covered
by the municipality under the 2011 legislation. If, however, there
are reasons other than these related to covering these costs (for
example, because of topography, service costs, or infrastructure
development costs relating to newer customers), such
differentiation may be permissible.3 14 At the same time, it seems
likely that water and sewer user charges would rise for all rate
payers since the costs of subsidizing hook-ups for involuntarily
annexed areas could be substantial.
Obligations if Alternative Providers are Responsible for
Water and Sewer Utilities?
In a number of jurisdictions across the state, water and sewer
services are provided by regional, private, or other providers.31
The 2011 annexation legislation addresses this situation in very
explicit terms, stating that, if
the residents in the existing city boundaries are served by a
public water or sewer system, or by a combination of a
public water or sewer system and one or more nonprofit
d.

special classes of service distinct from the classes of service provided within
the primary corporate limits of the city, and the city may fix and enforce
schedules of rents, rates, fees, charges and penalties in excess of those fixed
and enforced within the primary corporate limits. A city providing enterprise
services within satellite corporate limits shall annually review the cost
thereof, and shall take such steps as may be necessary to insure that the
current operating costs of such services, excluding debt service on bonds
issued to finance services within satellite corporate limits, does not exceed
revenues realized therefrom.
Id.
314. See Wall v. City of Durham, 41 N.C. App. 649, 659, 255 S.E.2d 739, 745
(1979); Millonzi, supra note 303, at 5.
315. A study published by the UNC School of Government's Environmental
Finance Center and the North Carolina League of Municipalities in March 2012
indicated that the pattern of water and sewer provision across the state was as follows
(based on 494 responses): 375 systems were municipally owned, fifty-nine systems
were county districts, seventeen were sanitary districts, eight were authorities, two
were metropolitan districts, thirty-one were not-for profits, and two were for-profits.
SHADI ESKAF, ENVTL. FIN. CTR., UNC SCH. OF GOV'T & CHRIS NIDA, N.C.
LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES, WATER AND WASTEWATER RATES AND RATE
STRUCTURES IN NORTH CAROLINA 1 (2012), http://www.efc.unc.edu/publications

12012/NCLMEFCAnnualW&WWRatesReport-2012.pdf
providers by type).

(summarizing

service
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entities providing service by contract with the public
system, (ii) the annexing municipality does not provide that
service within the existing city boundaries, (iii) the area to
be annexed is in an area served by the public water or sewer
system, and (iv) the municipality has no responsibility
through an agreement with the public water or sewer
system to pay for the extension of lines to areas annexed to
the city, the city shall have no financial responsibility for the
extension of water and sewer lines under this section.
Because of the substantial costs associated with funding hook-ups
for water and sewer services in involuntarily annexed areas, it will
be particularly important in the aftermath of the 2011 legislation
to determine when and how this exemption might apply.
On the face of the statute, municipalities are relieved from
obligations to fund water and sewer hook-ups if the area being
annexed is served by a public water and sewer system other than
the municipality itself, and if the municipality "has no
responsibility" 31 ' through an agreement with the associated water
and sewer system to pay for water and sewer extensions. As
indicated above, approximately two-thirds of the state's water and
sewer systems are currently operated by municipalities, with
approximately one-third made up of other providers.318 The
statutory text just quoted exempts municipalities from paying
associated hook-up costs if they currently have no contractual
obligation to "pay for the extension of lines"" to areas annexed.
Since the pre-2011 annexation law only required municipalities to
extend trunk or main lines as part of involuntary annexation
plans, this language appears to refer to contractual provisions
relating to whether the municipality or the water authority covers
trunk or main line costs under existing contracts.3 20 Moreover, as
discussed above, past contractual arrangements may have
assumed that system development fees (charged to property
owners along with tap fees by a substantial number of utilities)
may have been a part of the mix.
What is more vexing is determining what options are
available to municipalities going forward. Can those with
316.
at N.C.
317.
318.
319.
320.

Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, § 9, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649, 1659 (codified
GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.56(a) (2011)).
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.56(a)(iv) (2011).
See supra note 315.
§ 160A-58.56(a)(iv).
See supranotes 144-51 and accompanying text.
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associated utilities contractually shift responsibility for costs of
water and sewer extensions to the utility itself with associated
changes in costs for ratepayers? What happens if municipalities
(particularly those with very small and financially shaky water
and sewer systems) opt to create new regional entities or sell their
utilities to other providers in the face of substantial fiscal
pressures and declining property tax revenues, as suggested by the
North Carolina State Treasurer?32 1
Prior to the recent legislative amendments, a series of North
Carolina cases had dealt with provision of water and sewer
services by public water and sewer authorities distinct from
municipalities whose territories they serviced. In cases relating to
the Orange Water and Sewer Authority (serving Chapel Hill,
Carrboro, and parts of Orange County), the Supreme Court of
North Carolina explicitly stated that cities have no obligation to
provide duplicative services when independent water and sewer
authorities already provide such services.322 In addition, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals had indicated that municipalities may
delegate responsibilities for providing services to others but are
not relieved of their "primary duty" to provide services as a
result."' Municipalities were also obligated to provide equal
services to existing and new customers.324
North Carolina statutes previously explicitly limited the
extent to which larger municipalities could reduce financial
support for water and sewer services provided to areas newly
subject to involuntary annexation. 325 The relevant statutory
321. See supra notes 289-90 and accompanying text.
322. See Moody v. Town of Carrboro, 301 N.C. 318, 324-25, 271 S.E.2d 265, 270
(1980); see also In re Annexation Ordinance (Goldsboro), 296 N.C. 1, 16, 249 S.E.2d

698, 707 (1978) (holding that the city did not need to duplicate services provided by
Air Force base both before and after annexation). Professor David Lawrence has
also observed that cities may not duplicate services offered by existing county water
and sewer districts unless water lines fail to provide sufficient flow for fire protection.
See 3 LAWRENCE, supra note 104, § 6.02(i), at 6-15.
323. See Wallace v. Town of Chapel Hill, 93 N.C. App. 422, 429, 378 S.E.2d 225,
229 (1989).
324. See 3 LAWRENCE, supra note 104, § 6.02(i), at 6-15 to 6-16 (discussing cases
requiring comparable services in terms of quality and cost of services).
325. See Act of September 22, 1998, ch. 150, § 13, 1998 N.C. Sess. Laws 432, 446,
repealed by Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, § 7, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649, 1649 ("For
purposes of the extension of water and sewer services required under G.S. 160A-47,
no ordinance or policy substantially diminishing the financial participation of a
municipality in the construction of water or sewer facilities required under this
Article may apply to an area being annexed unless the ordinance or policy became
effective at least 180 days prior to the date of adoption by the municipality of the

2012]

NORTH CAROLINA'S ANNEXATION WARS

239

provision was not carried forward through the 2011 amendments,
so it seemingly no longer applies."' Instead, the focus under the
2011 statutory amendments rested solely on explicit affirmative
requirements to cover installation costs and to avoid imposing any
other financial obligations on property owners who had not
sought to receive services, except those associated with user fees
(rather than other dimensions of water and sewer finance).
The effect of these requirements is that North Carolina
municipalities probably cannot simply delegate responsibilities to
provide related services to other water and sewer utilities without
continuing to have some responsibility for assuring comparable
services within the city as between pre-existing and newly
annexed areas.32 7 The deterrent of added costs will likely mean
that all but the most financially solid cities will find it difficult to
continue to engage in involuntary annexation. For smaller cities,
particularly those with small service populations and financially
weak water and sewer programs, these realities will pose
significant challenges because it will likely prove impossible to
annex nearby areas so as to stabilize or strengthen their municipal
water and sewer funds. As water and sewer infrastructure grows
older and there is less money in municipal coffers to subsidize
upkeep, it is likely that water and sewer charges will climb and
that there will be little money to convert to larger, updated
regional systems with the kind of interconnectivity needed as the
state faces potential future droughts.
Another corollary is the financial challenges that will be
faced by municipalities which must address new petitions by
property owners and residents to extend public water and sewer
to relatively high-poverty areas. The statutory revisions mandate
that municipalities annex such areas if seventy-five percent of

resolution giving notice of intent to consider annexing the area under G.S.
160A-49(a)."). This provision had played an important part in the analysis in Capps
v. City of Kinston, _ N.C. App. -, -, 715 S.E.2d 520, 526 (upholding installation fee
requirement), discretionaryreview denied, 365 N.C. 362, 719 S.E.2d 22 (2011).

326. See Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, § 7, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649, 1649
(repealing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-41.1). No similar language occurs in section
160A-58.56, which now addresses provision of water and sewer services.
327. See 3 LAWRENCE, supra note 104, § 6.02(j), at 6-22 (discussing pre-2011 law)
("[I]f some other entity provides one or the other of these [water and sewer] utilities,
the city must work with that entity to determine whether any such major line
extension is necessary. If it is, and if the other entity is not willing to pay for the
extension, presumably the city must do so . .. according to the policies in effect in
such municipality." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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property owners petition, unless they receive an exemption from
the Local Government Commission as a result of problems with
debt limitations.3 2 To the degree that municipalities face added
costs for extending water and sewer into involuntarily annexed
areas and are precluded from charging newly annexed properties
in such areas with availability fees or tap fees, cities will likely
have to borrow more to extend such services, reducing their
capacity to address high-poverty areas at the same time. The
resulting dynamics may well cause additional challenges for highpoverty areas that have only recently found recourse to seek
water and sewer extensions as discussed above.329
2. Proceeding with Voluntary Annexations
Voluntary annexation of contiguous or satellite parcels is
likely to become more attractive to cities than it has been in the
past. In contrast to the newly revised involuntary annexation
statutes, those relating to voluntary annexation do not explicitly
state that water and sewer services must be provided in
connection with the annexation, other than for financially
distressed areas that must generally be annexed following a
proper petition.3 0 It has long been understood that cities are not
obligated to extend water and sewer services to all properties
within established city limits, since a multitude of factors typically
affect such decisions (costs, revenues, established and prospective
service patterns, or capacity to take on additional customers) and
discretion is required."3 ' In reaching voluntary annexation
decisions, however, petitioners and municipalities typically want
to be clear on whether such services will be included.
Can a municipality specify that those seeking voluntary
annexation must consent to hooking up to and paying associated
costs of public water and sewer services as a condition of
approval? Such action is expressly authorized by statute so long as
the property is within city limits (as it would be following
annexation), is within a "reasonable distance" of water and sewer
lines, and the property is developed with "one or more residential
dwelling units or commercial establishments." 3 2 The city is
328. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-31(d2) (2011).
329. See supra Part II.C.2.
330. See § 160A-31(bl).
331. See 2 LAWRENCE, supra note 104, § 6.02(b) (summarizing cases establishing
no municipal obligation to extend water and sewer services).
332. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-317(a) (2011).
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expressly authorized to "fix charges for the connections" and "in
order to avoid hardship, the city may require payment of a
periodic availability charge, not to exceed the minimum periodic
service charge for properties that are connected."" Alternatively,
can a municipality require those outside municipal boundaries to
seek voluntary annexation as a condition of securing public water
and sewer services? North Carolina courts have long recognized
that, although municipalities cannot require water and sewer
connections by property owners outside their boundaries,334 they
do have authority to extend public water and sewer systems by
voluntary contract to users outside the corporate limits, and to set
differing fees and charges for such services." They have also
clearly indicated that a city cannot compel those outside its
boundaries to hook up to municipal water and sewer lines in the
absence of authority to do so.3"
Courts in other jurisdictions have upheld municipal decisions
to condition extension of water and sewer services to
nonresidents upon agreements to be annexed. 3 7 The most
germane North Carolina case to date is Cunningham v. City of
Greensboro,338 which involved purported agreements from three
developers to accept extensions of water and sewer services in
return for commitments to seek voluntary annexation.339
Unfortunately, the record was unclear as to whether the City
actually conditioned extensions of water and sewer services upon
333. Id.
334. See Atl. Constr. Co. v. City of Raleigh, 230 N.C. 365, 368, 53 S.E.2d 165, 168
(1949).
335. See id. at 369, 53 S.E.2d at 168.
336. Id.
337. See Satrom v. City of Grand Forks, 163 N.W.2d 522, 525-26 (N.D. 1968)
(referencing an ordinance establishing grounds for termination of services if property
owners resist annexation); Williams Bros. Pine Line Co. v. City of Grand Forks, 163
N.W.2d 517, 521 (N.D. 1968) (holding that company's refusal to annex its property
was grounds for termination of contract for water services); Bakies v. City of
Perrysburg, 108 Ohio St. 3d 361, 2004-Ohio-5231, 843 N.E.2d 1182, 22 (Ohio 2006)
(upholding annexation agreement between city and subdivision residents as valid and
enforceable contract); Fairway Manor, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Summit Cnty., 521
N.E.2d 818, 823 (Ohio 1988) ("The municipality has the sole authority to decide
whether to sell its water to extraterritorial purchasers."); Andres v. City of
Perrysburg, 546 N.E.2d 1377, 1381 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (upholding ordinance
requiring property owners to sign annexation agreements in order to have sewer
service extended to their properties).
338. _ N.C. App. _, 711 S.E.2d 477 (2011); see also Honey Properties v. City of
Gastonia, 252 N.C. 567, 571, 114 S.E.2d 344, 347-48 (1960) (upholding agreement
between property owner and city regarding sewer connection and annexation).
339. Cunningham,- N.C. App. at -, 711 S.E.2d at 480.
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agreements to seek voluntary annexation. Property owners
subsequently sought to withdraw consent from the earlier
agreements regarding utility services and annexation.34 0 The court
of appeals rejected the City's claim that it had entered into
binding "annexation agreements" with the developers (since by
statute such agreements entailed agreements between
governmental entities rather than governments and private
parties).341 In addition, the court of appeals concluded that it was
permissible for affected private parties to withdraw consent to
voluntary annexations, in keeping with prior case law.342 Finally
the court of appeals stated that the public enterprise statutes
(including section 160A-314(a) of the General Statutes)3 43 did not
explicitly provide municipalities with the power to impose the
kinds of conditions at bar; however, it did not rest its decision on
this proposition, since it found that any such agreements did not
run with the land where they had not been recorded.'
It is unclear how a future North Carolina court would resolve
the important question of conditioning water and sewer service in
areas outside city boundaries on agreements to petition for
voluntary annexation. Although the authority cited by the court
in Cunningham addressed fee-setting power rather than explicit
authority to link water and sewer provisions with an agreement to

340. Id. at _, 711 S.E.2d at 480.

341. Id. at _,711 S.E.2d at 482.
342. Id. at_, 711 S.E.2d at 486.
343. Id. at._, 711 S.E.2d at 484.
344. Id. at _, 711 S.E.2d at 485-86. The court seemed skeptical of the city's
argument that it could require the annexation condition in light of the statutory
language of section 160A-314(a) of the North Carolina General Statutes, stating:
A city may establish and revise from time to time schedules of rents, rates,
fees, charges, and penalties for the use of or the services furnished by any
public enterprise. Schedules of rents, rates, fees, charges, and penalties may
vary according to classes of service, and different schedules may be adopted
for services provided outside the corporate limits of the city.
Id. The court noted that the North Carolina cases cited in support of the city's claim
related to "a municipality's right to establish rates for extraterritorial service and
make no reference to any right that a municipality may possess to condition the
provision of water and sewer service on a customer's consent to be voluntarily
annexed." Id. at -, 711 S.E.2d at 484. It concluded that "the record contains no
indication" that the city in fact imposed such a condition at the time that it connected
any individual customer residing in the affected developments to its water and sewer
facilities. Id. As a result, the Court concluded that none of the city's "arguments in
reliance upon various statutory provisions have merit." Id.
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annex, 345 analysis by Ohio's courts 346 is particularly persuasive. In
a number of decisions, the Ohio courts have concluded that a
municipality has no duty to supply water and sewer to external
users, that it has a duty to protect municipal customers by making
sound decisions regarding extending services, and that where
cities had authority to set the terms of extending water and sewer
externally they could condition such extensions on agreements for
annexation. 3 Although the statute referenced in Cunningham
expressly addresses rates, at least some North Carolina cases have
made clear that there is no obligation to extend such services and
that the municipality had discretion to do so. 3 48 As courts in Ohio
have concluded, parties to contracts of this sort generally are
capable of making reasonable bargains without the need for
excessive oversight from the courts.3 49 The Cunningham court's
narrow reading of the North Carolina statute is reminiscent of
prior case law that applied Dillon's Rule to limit statutory
authority for municipalities. 5 o Where such narrow readings have
been used, notwithstanding clear statutory language that directs
courts to take a broader view of local authority,"' it is often
because the courts are uneasy with municipalities imposing fees
without direct authorization. In this context, however, there is
clear authority for municipalities to impose differential fees, and
requiring consent to voluntary annexation simply provides
345. Id. (citing Fulghum v. Town of Selma, 238 N.C. 100, 104-05, 76 S.E.2d 368,
371 (1953), Atl. Constr. Co. v. City of Raleigh, 230 N.C. 365, 368-69, 53 S.E.2d 165,
168 (1949), and Town of Spring Hope v. Bissette, 53 N.C. App. 210, 212-13, 280
S.E.2d 490, 492 (1981), aff'd, 305 N.C. 248,287 S.E.2d 851 (1982)).
346. See Moody v. Town of Carrboro, 301 N.C. 318, 324-25, 271 S.E.2d 265, 270
(1980); see also In re Annexation Ordinance (Goldsboro), 296 N.C. 1, 16, 249 S.E.2d

698, 707 (1978).
347. See Bakies v. City of Perrysburg, 108 Ohio St. 3d 361, 2006-Ohio-1190, 843
N.E.2d 1182, 33; Fairway Manor, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Summit Cnty., 521
N.E.2d 818,821 (Ohio 1988); Andres v. City of Perrysburg, 546 N.E.2d 1377, 1380-81
(Ohio Ct. App. 1988); see also Morrison Homes Corp. v. City of Pleasanton, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 196, 202 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (upholding annexation agreement in absence of
explicit authority).
348. Cunningham addressed section 160A-314(a), which authorizes municipalities
to "establish and revise . . . schedules of rents, rates, fees, charges, and penalties" for
the use of or the services furnished by public enterprises.
349. See Andres, 546 N.E.2d at 1381 (finding no economic duress); Cunningham,
_

N.C. App. at

, 711 S.E.2d at 484.

350. See, e.g., Homebuilders Ass'n of Charlotte, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 336 N.C.
37, 43-44, 442 S.E.2d 45, 49-50 (1994) (discussing difference between Dillon's Rule
and current statutory interpretation).
351. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-4 (2011) (providing for broad interpretation of
municipal authority).
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property owners with an option: commit to joining the city and
receiving services, or find other means of acquiring water and
wastewater services (such as using wells and septic systems).
Two other statutory provisions may also provide some
modest support for adopting a view similar to Ohio's. North
Carolina has a relatively unique system for voluntary annexation
of satellite areas designed to integrate extension of water and
sewer services in such settings with becoming a formal part of the
municipality that is providing such services."' The very fact that
North Carolina couples a service provision to more distant areas
with annexation suggests a legislative view that service provision
and becoming part of the municipal provider of such services are
closely linked. The satellite annexation provisions specifically
state that special rates can be set for "public enterprise" services
to such locales, but goes further to direct cities engaging in such
annexation to review on a yearly basis revenues received and
operating costs to assure that they remain in balance (implicitly,
then, requiring the city to attend to the financial interests of those
receiving services within the primary corporate limits)."' Implicit
here is an assumption that more distant recipients of public
enterprise services should not receive such services if the greater
interests of the municipality would be compromised, but instead
need to pay their way. Since municipalities have no duty to extend
services to those outside municipal boundaries, they may
reasonably do so in the way contemplated by state statutes
(linking services with voluntary annexation), but not otherwise.
The 2011 annexation legislation also included new language
that was not in force when Cunningham was decided. In a new
provision relating to recording and reporting, the 2011
amendments state that "[tjo be enforceable, any written
agreement with a person having a freehold interest in real
352. See supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
353. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.5 (2011) ("For the purposes of G.S.
160A-314, provision of public enterprise services within satellite corporate limits shall
be considered provision of service for special classes of service distinct from the
classes of service provided within the primary corporate limits of the city, and the city
may fix and enforce schedules of Tents, rates, fees, charges and penalties in excess of
those fixed and enforced within the primary corporate limits. A city providing
enterprise services within satellite corporate limits shall annually review the cost
thereof, and shall take such steps as may be necessary to insure that the current
operating costs of such services, excluding debt service on bonds issued to finance
services within satellite corporate limits, does not exceed revenues realized
therefrom.").
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property regarding annexation shall be recorded in the county
register of deeds office in which the real property lies."354 As
discussed in Cunningham, state law has long provided for
"annexation agreements" between municipalities, whereby they
agree to delineate trajectories of further growth. 5 Thus, the new
statutory language seems to refer to other sorts of agreements,
since it refers to agreements "with a person having a freehold
interest in real property."356 While there are other references to
"agreements" in the newly revised statutes, they generally refer to
other service providers rather than to agreements with private
parties.5 ' Accordingly, it is quite plausible to view this new
provision as implicitly authorizing annexation agreements
between municipalities and private parties seeking voluntary
annexation.5 8
If the North Carolina courts ultimately conclude that
authority exists to allow municipalities and private parties to
enter into annexation agreements, what lessons might
municipalities in North Carolina wish to heed in using such an
approach? Initially, it will prove useful for North Carolina
municipalities to learn from the experience of those in other
states that explicitly authorize annexation agreements." In some

354. See Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, § 11, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649, 1670
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.90(b) (2011)) (governing recording of
annexation agreements).
355. See Cunningham, N.C. App. , _, 711 S.E.2d 477, 481-82 (2011) (citing
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-58.21 to -58.28 (2011)).
356. § 160A-58.90(b).
357. See, e.g., Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, § 9, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649, 1670
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.56 (2011)) (relating to provision of water and
sewer services by agreement).
358. See, e.g., 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-15.1-1, -2 (West 2005) (discussing
annexation agreements in Illinois and stating that such agreements may cover, among
other things, ordinances relating to zoning). Compare City of Louisville v. Fiscal
Court, 623 S.W.2d 219, 224-25 (Ky. 1981) (rejecting broad provisions of annexation
agreement relating to zoning, tax rates, and deannexation on the grounds that the
terms of the agreement were unlawfully taking on powers of the legislature) and
Mayor & Council of Rockville v. Rylyns Enter., 814 A.2d 469, 499-500, 506-07 (Md.
2002) (rejecting the requirements of an annexation agreement on the grounds that
the agreement incorporated unauthorized conditional zoning) with Town of
Brockway v. City of Black River Falls, 2005 WI App 174, 11 21-37, 285 Wis. 2d 708,
725-33, 702 N.W.2d 418, 427-43 (rejecting claims that annexation agreement
constituted improper contract away of police power).
359. See, e.g., 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-15.1-1 (West 2005) ("The corporate
authorities of any municipality may enter into annexation agreement with one or
more of the owners of record of land in unincorporated territory. That land may be
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jurisdictions, annexation agreements are treated as a particular
type of "development agreement" which typically addresses both
future zoning and infrastructure issues.360
North Carolina has accorded municipalities specific authority
to undertake development agreements, but only in certain
circumstances.361 Thus, local governments need to carefully parse
differences between "annexation agreements" (linking public
enterprise service provision with voluntary annexation, perhaps in
a range of settings that are more expansive than those that relate
to development agreements 362 ) and "development agreements"
(linking zoning, public facilities such as schools, land dedications,
and the duration of agreements 6 ). Accordingly, it will be
important for North Carolina municipalities to shape annexation
agreements in ways that are not inconsistent with statutory
constraints on broader types of development agreements.3 * In
addition, North Carolina has recently authorized cities to adopt
"conditional
zoning"
strategies that explicitly permit
implementation of tailored zoning districts tied to very specific
land use requirements embodied in special use permits. 65
Avoiding issues relating to "contract zoning" or inappropriate
conditional zoning are particularly important because local
governments may not "contract away" their police power
obligations.
3. Provision of Water and Sewer Services by Contract
A third option for municipalities is to forego either
involuntary annexation or voluntary annexation and instead
provide water and sewer services to outlying areas by contract.
There is considerable authority that suggests that municipalities
have wide discretion in setting costs for water and sewer services
annexed to the municipality in the manner provided in Article 7 at the time the land
is or becomes contiguous to the municipality.").
360. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-500.05 (2008) (describing Arizona
development agreements). For discussion of development agreements generally, see
JAMES A. KUSHNER, 2 SUBDIVISION LAW & GROWTH MANAGEMENT § 10:17 (2d

ed. 2011).
361. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-400.20 to .32 (2011) (development agreements
authorized for projects involving twenty-five acres or more).
362. See Id. H§ 160A-58.21-58.28 (2011) (relating to annexation agreements).
363. See §§ 160A-400.20-.32 (relating to development agreements).
364. See, e.g., City of Louisville v. Fiscal Court, 623 S.W.2d 219, 224-25 (Ky. 1981)
(city may not agree to cooperate fully in securing zoning, preferable taxation, and
deannexation).
365. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-382 (2011).
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outside municipal boundaries. 66 Costs of water and sewer
services for customers outside municipal boundaries tend to run
as much as twice the rates applicable to customers within
municipal boundaries. 67 In the view of at least some observers,
there is no significant constraint on the extent to which
municipalities may raise rates for those outside municipal
boundaries. Decisions to this effect are found not only in North
Carolina but also in Arizona and Ohio. 369
The Supreme Court of North Carolina's decision in Atlantic
Construction Co. v. City of Raleigh37 0 very clearly confirmed the
authority of municipalities to set rates as they saw fit for
customers outside municipal boundaries, particularly since
municipalities had no formal responsibility to serve such
customers.371 Arguably, under Atlantic ConstructionCo., there is a
very limited basis for judicial review of such contracts.3 72
Moreover, state court decisions have concluded that contractual
agreements regarding annexation and service provision are
binding on associated parties.3 3 At least some observers believe
that Atlantic Construction Co. limits judicial review of decisions
by municipalities to set particular rates for extraterritorial
contracts for water and sewer services.374

366. See, e.g., Town of Spring Hope v. Bissette, 53 N.C. App. 210, 212-13, 280
S.E.2d 490, 492 (1981) ("[Tlhe setting of such rates and charges is a matter for the
judgment and discretion of municipal authorities, not to be invalidated by the courts
absent some showing of arbitrary or discriminatory action. The great weight of
authority is to the effect that in the setting of such rates and charges, a municipal
body may include not only operating expenses and depreciation, but also capital cost
associated with actual or anticipated growth or improvement of the facilities required
for the furnishing of such services."), aff'd 305 N.C. 248, 287 S.E.2d 851 (1981). See
generally Kara Millonzi, Lawful Discriminationin Utility Ratemaking: Classifying
Extraterritorial Customers, Loc. FIN. BULL, Oct. 2006, at 1 (discussing utility
ratemaking for extraterritorial customers).
367. ESKAF & NIDA, supra note 315, at 14 (providing data on water and sewer
rates which suggests that water rate for outside customers is 1.88 times the rate for
inside customers, and sewer rate for outside customers is 1.95 of the rate for inside
customers).
368. See Millonzi, supra note 366, at 4.
369. See id. at 5-6 (citing cases).
370. 230 N.C. 365,53 S.E.2d 165 (1949).
371. Id. at 368-69, 53 S.E.2d at 168.
372. See Millonzi, supra note 366, at 4.
373. See id. at 5-6 (citing relevant authorities).
374. See id. at 4.
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4. Summary
This Section has focused on a number of vexing questions
that remain for municipalities inclined to pursue annexation in
the aftermath of recent legislative amendments. All but the
largest municipalities are unlikely to continue to pursue
involuntary annexation because of the financial obligations
involved. Instead, the extension of needed water and sewer
infrastructure is likely to depend on voluntary annexation
agreements and contractual arrangements that impose related
costs on those being served.
B. Regulatory Authority, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction,and
Growth Management
As was just discussed, the provision of core water and sewer
infrastructure has increasingly become the first and foremost
rationale for annexation in the minds of many citizens and state
legislators. A second major rationale for annexation concerns the
needs of cities and towns to regulate nearby areas in order to
facilitate a smooth transition when such areas ultimately come
within corporate boundaries and in order to reduce nuisance-like
adverse impacts during the interim. This rationale is closely linked
to land use considerations, since activities on nearby land (not yet
within municipal boundaries) may well affect property owners
and residents of the municipality. Moreover, advance planning is
often important to assure that when (at a future date) nearby
property is absorbed within municipal boundaries, the standards
applicable to property development will mesh smoothly with
municipal requirements going forward. An associated, but often
understated, concern relates to how municipalities can regulate
growth and address growth management.
1. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Systems of extraterritorial jurisdiction ("ETJ") reflect
legislative willingness to allow cities to deal with such transition
issues. Cities are given regulatory authority over nearby areas just
outside the corporate boundaries, and residents of such areas are
involved at least to some extent in land use planning decisions as
explained above. Significantly, North Carolina statutes allow
municipalities to work with counties in shaping designated areas
375. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-360(a), -362 (2011).
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of growth as part of the process of delineating ETJ areas that
exceed the statutory minimum available. 7
The relationship of ETJ designations to annexation and
growth management policies received little attention during the
2011 legislative debate on annexation reform, most probably
because the financial implications of annexation for taxpayers and
related infrastructure issues held center stage. Moreover, courts in
North Carolina and elsewhere have concluded that constitutional
problems are generally not posed when property owners and
others in areas subject to extraterritorial jurisdiction are not given
voting rights in municipal elections or municipal decision making
generally." Accordingly, there has generally been limited
litigation regarding ETJ areas and associated municipal
authority,378 and the current statutory structure seems quite
settled and accepted. It is conceivable that the concerns for selfdetermination that animated the recent changes in involuntary
annexation law might re-emerge in this context, notwithstanding
the settled law. The stakes are different, however, insofar as only
limited regulation is involved and major costs such as those
relating to water and sewer service and responsibility for
municipal property tax liability are not involved. Representation
is provided on planning boards and boards of adjustment.7 9 The
recent amendments have given added protection to the operation
of bona fide farms.so While, under prior law, such farms could be
involuntarily annexed and were taxed at current use value, they
now cannot be annexed without written consent of the property
owner.38' They are also explicitly removed from municipalities'

376. See Id. § 160A-360(a); see also OWENS, ETJ, supra note 66, at 12-13
(discussing interactions between cities and counties regarding extraterritorial
jurisdiction).
377. See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 70-75 (1978); City of
Raleigh v. Morand, 247 N.C. 363, 366-67, 100 S.E.2d 870, 873 (1957); State v. Rice,
158 N.C. 635, 638-39, 74 S.E. 582, 583 (1912); see also 5 MCQUILLIN, supra note 39,
§ 15:28 (discussing territorial operation). See generally Recent Case, The Supreme
Court, 1978 Term: Voting Rights of Nonresidents Subject to Municipal Powers, 93
HARV. L. REV. 141 (1979) (discussing the Holt Civic Club decision and the possible
consequences of the ruling).
378. See 3 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR., RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND
PLANNING § 35.7 (4th ed. 2012).
379. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-362 (2011).
380. Act of June 27, 2011, ch. 363, § 1, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1504, 1504 (codified
at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153A-340(b)(2), 160A-36, -48, -58.54, -360 (2011)).
381. Id. § 3.1, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1505 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A58.54 (2011)).
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extraterritorial jurisdiction so long as bona fide farming
continues."'
Except for this connection regarding the treatment of bona
fide farms, North Carolina's statutes have not historically treated
extraterritorial jurisdiction as directly linked to annexation policy.
Nonetheless, logic and evidence drawn from planning practice
and local legislation suggests that it might be advisable to do so
more directly and that such an approach might reduce the kinds
of friction that led to North Carolina's recent annexation wars.
Logically, there is a close linkage between ETJ designations
and both voluntary and involuntary annexation decisions. Both
relate in large part to land that is contiguous or in the
development path of city growth and both require clear, officiallydeveloped plans (on the one hand relating to development
patterns and on the other evidencing the existence of
development and the potential to extend municipal services to
developed areas). Moreover, in ETJ areas, property owners are
on notice that their area is one in which the nearby city has a
significant interest." They also have at least modest direct
representation in the process of planning through county
appointees on the city planning board and board of adjustment.3 8 4
Logically, ETJ areas should be those whose residents may work in
and benefit most from being adjacent to the city. In addition, it
would seem fairest to extend those subject to city regulation full
membership in the city (as voters and taxpayers) within a
reasonably foreseeable period of time. The UNC School of
Government's 2005 survey of planners indicated that at least twothirds of responding municipalities regarded ETJ areas as likely
to be annexed (nine percent reporting likely annexation in the
next decade with the balance believing that annexation would

382. Id. § 4, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1505 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.

§ 160A-360 (2011)) ("Property that is located in the geographic area of a
municipality's extraterritorial jurisdiction and that is used for bona fide farm
purposes is exempt from exercise of the municipality's extraterritorial jurisdiction
under this Article. Property that is located in the geographic area of a municipality's
extraterritorial jurisdiction and that ceases to be used for bona fide farm purposes
shall become subject to exercise of the municipality's extraterritorial jurisdiction
under this Article.").
383. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-360(al) (2011) ("Any municipality planning to
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction under this Article shall notify the owners of all
parcels of land proposed for addition to the area of extraterritorial jurisdiction, as
shown on the county tax records.").
384. See id. § 160A-362.
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likely result at some yet-to-be-determined date).3 15 Anecdotal
evidence presented in the course of legislative debate regarding
the plight of economically distressed areas that had often been
left behind without annexation also indicated that many such
communities fell within municipal ETJ areas but until the recent
statutory changes had difficulty qualifying for annexation under
prior law. 8
At least some areas of the state have adopted local strategies
that link policy regarding ETJ areas, annexation plans, and
anticipated future growth. For example, municipalities in the
Charlotte-Mecklenburg area began using annexation agreements
pursuant to local legislation in 1984.

In 1991, and on several

later occasions, Charlotte and other nearby cities were specially
authorized to link annexation agreements with a system of
designated "spheres of influence" to guide future extension of
extraterritorial jurisdiction, land use planning, annexation, and
service provision."' Likewise, in 1987, Orange County and the
towns of Chapel Hill and Carrboro developed a "joint planning
agreement" that included shared commitments to observe
designated "transition" and "rural buffer" areas, engage in
''courtesy" review of each other's land use decisions in transition
areas, set parameters for density of development, and limit
extension of water and sewer services through the Orange Water
and Sewer Authority to areas flagged for transition.
Approaches developed in other states could assist North
Carolina in the future to more closely link and align the legal
frameworks employed as means to bring about coordinated land
use planning, transitional development in areas near cities,
provision of services, and ultimately boundary changes. One
385. OWENS, ETJ, supra note 66, at 9-10.
386. See UNC CTR. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 247, at 13-21.
387. See Act of June 22, 1984, ch. 953, 1984 N.C. Sess. Laws 35; OWENS, LAND
USE, supra note 66, at 31 & n.50 (discussing timeline of legislative acts regarding
Mecklenburg County and extraterritorial jurisdiction).
388. See Act of May 29, 1991, ch. 161, 1991 N.C. Sess. Laws 292 (granting
extraterritorial powers to the following municipalities in Mecklenburg County:
Matthews, Mint Hill, Pineville, and Charlotte); Act of June 30, 1994, ch. 590, 1994
N.C. Sess. Laws 226 (revising Act of May 29, 1991); Act of June 21, 2001, ch. 228,
2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 586 (allowing Charlotte to exercise extraterritorial powers
granted in Chapter 160A, Article 19 of the North Carolina General Statutes over
named towns in its "Sphere of Influence").
389. See Act of May 22, 1987, ch. 233, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 310 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-58.20, -360.1 (2011)); Richard D. Ducker, The Orange County
Joint PlanningAgreement, POPULAR GOV'T, Winter 1988, at 47.
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interesting model is that provided by California, whose approach
apparently influenced the strategy adopted in Mecklenburg
County.3 90 California has authorized the creation of county-wide
boundary review commissions ("Local Agency Formation
Commissions") which can designate "spheres of influence" for
local governments within a county, taking into account a variety
of factors including present and planned land uses, present and
probable needs for public facilities and services, and adequacy of
public facilities and services and the existence of social or
economic interest. 9 ' Another approach might be to formalize and
expand the process by which cities and counties can reach
intergovernmental agreements regarding projected land use
regulation, service delivery, and annexation, perhaps using an
expanded model similar to the one which currently allows
municipalities to enter into annexation agreements3 9 or some
more generalized model similar to that adopted locally in Orange
County in 1987.111
2. Growth Management and Annexation
In many other states, annexation issues are framed in terms
of growth management, although that phrase does not necessarily
clearly convey what is intended.394 On the one hand, annexation
may be justified in terms of the need to accommodate municipal
growth (for example by adding territory where existing urban
areas cannot adequately absorb a growing population).3 95 On the
other hand, "growth" may refer to growth in municipal tax base
or revenues that is needed to maintain a balanced budget during a

390. See OWENS, LAND USE, supra note 66, at 32 n.50 (stating that the strategies
adopted in Mecklenburg County are "similar to the 'spheres of influence' used in
California local government law (where each county has a Local Agency Formation
Commission that sets 'spheres of influence'-areas of future municipal jurisdiction to
be used in mandatory land use plans, service areas, annexations, and municipal
'prezoning' of unincorporated areas)").
391. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 56425(e) (West 2010 & Supp. 2012).
392. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-58.21 to -58.28 (2011).
393. See supra note 389 and accompanying text.
394. See, e.g., City of Harriman v. Roane Cnty. Election Comm'n, 354 S.W.3d 685,
690-91 (Tenn. 2011) (invalidating annexation outside of city's urban growth
boundaries).
395. See Enlarging, Extending and Defining the Corporate Boundaries of the City
of Horn Lake, Desoto Cnty. v. Town of Walls, 57 So. 3d 1253, 1259 (Miss. 2011)
(applying state standards to determine if expansion is necessary using factors such as
city's internal growth, city's population growth, need to expand city tax base,
remaining vacant land within the municipality, and other factors).
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time of increasing demands."' "Growth" is not, as such, a factor
under North Carolina's annexation law.
a. Prior Experience in North Carolina
Empirical research demonstrates, however, that growth and
annexation are directly linked, either because annexation serves
as a tool to capture growth (and increase revenues) for existing
cities or as a factor that precipitates alternative responses
(municipal incorporation that recognizes small new pockets of
growth as independent cities, or creation of gated communities
that seek to manage their infrastructure and governance through
private mechanisms of their own). Different forms of annexation
also typically reflect differences in growth patterns, with
voluntary annexation often used to capture the creation of new
subdivisions upon the request of developers, and involuntary
annexation more commonly used to capture growth that has
already taken place through development at the urban fringe.
Important recent work by Professor Russell Smith offers
significant evidence about such patterns, drawing upon a close
review of twenty years of data on municipal incorporations and
annexations drawn from the North Carolina Secretary of State's
records."'
i. Annexation Patterns

In these important studies, Professor Smith focused on the
incidence of annexation, population and land area added, and
geographic patterns.398 During the study period, nearly threefourths of North Carolina municipalities engaged in some sort of
396. See Bakies v. City of Perrysburg, 108 Ohio St. 3d 361, 2006-Ohio-1190, 843
N.E.2d 1182, $ 33 (upholding annexation based in part on need for increased tax
revenue and financial growth).
397. See generally Russell M. Smith, City Limits? The Impact of Annexation on the
Frequency of Municipal Incorporation in North Carolina, 51 SOUTHEASTERN
GEOGRAPHER 422 (2011) [hereinafter Smith, City Limits] (focusing on patterns
relating to incorporation and annexation, including frequency of annexation and the
land and population annexed as potential factors that may explain these patterns); see
also Russell M. Smith, An Examination of Municipal Annexation Methods in North
Carolina, 52 SOUTHEASTERN GEOGRAPHER 164 (2012) [hereinafter Smith, An
Examination] (focusing more specifically on the types of annexation employed in
North Carolina during the period 1990-2009 and the differences between the periods
1990-1999 and 2000-2009).
398. Smith, An Examination, supra note 397, at 169 (analyzing data relating to
more than 14,000 annexation ordinances that involved more than 400 municipalities
in the study period).
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annexation, resulting in a total of 1,755 square miles of land being
added to the state's municipal areas. 3 9 The state's most urban
areas (Wake, Mecklenburg, and Guilford Counties) had the
highest levels of annexation in terms of increased land area,
perhaps in part because these counties had developed systematic
approaches to annexation that helped them proceed over the
years to bring fringe areas within municipal boundaries.4 00 Even
within these counties, municipalities differed substantially in the
frequency (number) of annexations."0 ' Annexation activity also
varied by region, with the most significant rate of annexation
occurring in areas with substantial population and economic
growth.402
The available types of annexation were employed
disproportionately, with voluntary annexations (by petition of
contiguous or satellite landowners) being by far the most
generally used approach, accounting for about ninety percent of
the total annexations during the study period. 403 That left only
9.3% of annexations over a twenty-year period that resulted from
municipally initiated "involuntary" annexation, with use of
voluntary annexation increasing significantly from the 1990-1999
period and involuntary annexations decreasing during the

399. Id.; Smith, City Limits, supra note 397, at 435.
400. See Smith, City Limits, supra note 397, at 434-36.

401. For example, sixty municipalities conducted only one annexation in a twentyyear period, while the state's capital (Raleigh) conducted 832. See Smith, An
Examination, supra note 397, at 169. Raleigh had 780 voluntary annexations
(contiguous or satellite) with only fifty-two involuntary annexations over twenty
years. Id. at 173, 175.

402. See id. at 171. The highest rates of annexation were found in the Piedmont
crescent, composed of the Charlotte area, the Triad (Greensboro, Winston-Salem
and High Point) and the Research Triangle (Wake, Durham and Orange Counties).
Id. This combined area saw 8,541 total annexations or sixty percent of the
annexations in the state during the twenty-year period of Smith's study. Id. (including
all forms of annexation, such as voluntary contiguous, voluntary satellite, legislative,
and involuntary). The coastal region had 28.7% of the total annexations during this
period, and the mountains had 10.9%. Id.
403. Smith, An Examination, supra note 397, at 169-71. Nearly two-thirds of the
annexations across the state involved voluntary annexation of property contiguous to
municipal boundaries (annexations requested by those with land just outside existing
municipal boundaries, often sought by developers in order to secure access to
municipal public utilities). See id. at 169-70. An additional 23.8% of annexations (a
total of 3,368 annexations) involved "satellite annexation" (annexation of areas that
were not contiguous, where property owners voluntarily petition for annexation).
Only 1.1% of annexations were handled by the state legislature. Id. at 170.
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following decade. 404 Use of various types of annexation also
varied by region.405
Professor Smith's findings thus confirm that annexation is
closely tied to growth, but also illustrate apparent differences in
development patterns, tendencies of developers and other
landowners to seek voluntary annexation, and municipal capacity
to engage in involuntary annexation (with associated financial and
infrastructure study requirements).
ii. Annexation and Incorporation

Professor Smith's work also sheds important light on the
relationship between annexation and municipal incorporation
patterns in North Carolina. Population growth in an area can
either be accommodated by bringing areas within municipal
boundaries, or can become more dispersed if new municipalities
are incorporated or growth is concentrated in isolated gated
communities that prefer to operate privately or seek targeted
services from the counties in which they are located.406
Professor Smith found that forty-six municipalities had been
incorporated in North Carolina in the 1990-2008 period (second
only to the number incorporated in Texas, another high-growth
state, during this time).407 Several important trends emerged from
404. See id. at 170 (showing that a total of 738 involuntary annexations occurred
during the period of 1990-1999 (constituting 11.8% of all annexations) while there
were only 583 involuntary annexations during the period of 2000-2009 (constituting
7.4% of all annexations)).
405. In the Piedmont area, 177 municipalities engaged in some form of
annexation, with a mean of 48.5 annexations per municipality in the region during the
twenty-year study period. Id. at 171. Approximately two-thirds of annexations in this
region involved voluntary annexations of contiguous land. Id. The coastal region had
about half of the number of annexations as did the Piedmont with only 62% of
coastal region's municipalities engaged in annexation (158 out of 254 municipalities)
over the study period. Id. at 171-72. Nearly 90% of the annexations in the coastal
area were voluntary (contiguous or satellite), but the coast had a higher proportion of
legislative annexations than other parts of the state-1.6% in the coastal region
versus 1.2% in the mountains and 0.9% in the Piedmont. Id. The mountain region
had the lowest regional proportion of annexations (approximately 11%), the highest
proportion of municipalities that engaged in some type annexation during the period
(84.5%), and the highest proportion of involuntary and satellite annexations. Id. at
172.
406. See Smith, City Limits, supra note 397, at 423, 431 (recognizing that growth
and development at the fringes of urban areas are fertile grounds for voluntary and
involuntary annexation proceedings and summarizing scholarly research that
incorporation of new cities is meant to provide new services and to prevent
annexation by nearby cities).
407. Id. at 430.
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his analysis. Professor Smith's review of county-level data
suggested that, at least to some degree, perceived threats of
annexation stimulated efforts to incorporate.4 8 Because
incorporation is a legislative process in North Carolina, those
seeking to incorporate must typically convince their legislative
delegations that they should proceed, and have a lesser likelihood
of proceeding if existing municipalities object.409 Professor Smith
found that the three largest and most urban counties in the state
(Wake, Mecklenburg, and Durham) had not experienced any
municipal incorporations during the study period, which in his
view reflected a longer history of urbanization and shared
political understandings that establishment of new municipalities
was inadvisable.410 On the other hand, the forty-six incorporations
that did occur during his study period were clustered in counties
just outside those that were home to major cities.411
Professor Smith's research suggests that cities in highly
urbanized counties are likely to face relatively few new
incorporations, perhaps because they have already passed the
tipping point and become urban enough that relatively few new
growth nodes try to stand in the way of extending urban
boundaries. 4 12 Those engaged in development in these areas often
desire to receive urban services such as access to public water and
sewer systems. 413 Alternatively, annexation may add to property
values simply by allowing developers to identify property for sale
with a favored zip code and mailing address. On the other hand,
these data suggest that North Carolina has witnessed the growing
development of "exurbs" beyond the ring of suburban
408. Id. at 437-39 (concluding that "the magnitude of annexation [the Population
Annexed and Land Area Annexed] does have a statistically significant connection to
municipal incorporation activity in North Carolina at the county level").
409. See id at 428 (explaining that no area may incorporate without the approval
of the North Carolina General Assembly and that this decision is typically made by
the Joint Legislative Commission on Municipal Incorporation).
410. Id. at 431-35.
411. See id. at 431-32 (observing that the incorporations occurred in twenty-four
counties, including Union and Stanley Counties (seven municipalities in Union
County, three in Stanly County, both near Mecklenburg), Forsyth, Guilford, and
Alamance Counties (the area near the "Triad" which includes Greensboro, WinstonSalem, and High Point; with three new municipalities in Forsyth, five new
municipalities in Guilford and five in Alamance), and Brunswick County (five new
municipalities located near the coastal city of Wilmington, which is situated in
adjacent New Hanover County)).
412. Id. at 431, 435 (hypothesizing that the presence of existing cities accounted
for the lack of incorporations in the most urban counties of North Carolina).
413. Id. at 423.
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development absorbed by or closely associated with major urban
centers. 4 14 There is a long-term potential that exurbs will reduce
the "elasticity" of the state's major cities in future decades, if
attention is not paid to forging shared understandings regarding
growth trajectories and cost-efficient service delivery strategies
with the major cities and urbanizing counties that they
surround.415
b. Future Considerations
Managing growth is likely to become ever more important in
North Carolina. Census data for 2010 indicates that the state grew
by nearly double the rate of growth in the United States as a
whole between the 2000 and 2010 census.416 It was the sixth-

414. "Exurb" has no universally accepted definition, but it is a term that has been
used for the last few decades by urban planners to describe the following kinds of
areas:
Exurban counties surround all metropolitan areas, extending outward about
60 to 70 miles from circumferential highways. Exurban counties include some
low-density, metropolitan counties that have been added to larger
metropolitan areas since 1960; many adjacent, nonmetropolitan counties; and
some nonadjacent, nonmetropolitan counties.
Judy S. Davis, Arthur C. Nelson & Kenneth J. Dueker, The New 'Burbs: The Exurbs
and Their Implicationsfor PlanningPolicy, 60 J. AM. PLANNING AsS'N 45, 46 (1994).
See generally Laura Taylor, No Boundaries: Exurbia and the Study of Contemporary
Urban Dispersion,76 GEOJOURNAL 323 (2011) (providing a more recent review of
the literature on exurbia). Commentators on recent census data have suggested that
"exurbs are history," and that 2010 census data suggests greater growth in cities and
more dense suburbs. See William Frey, The DemographicLull Continues, Particularly
in Exurbia, BROOKINGS: UP FRONT (April 6, 2012, 1:23 pm), http://
(observing that
www.brookings.edulup-front/posts/2012/04/06-census-exurbs-frey
outer suburban counties, including outer suburbs and exurbs, have been in a slower
growth trajectory since the late 2000s).
415. See Smith, City Limits, supra note 397, at 426 ("[M]unicipalities that are able
to grow (elastic) their city limits will be better able to capture fleeing tax revenues.
Inelastic municipalities will not have as great a chance to grow their population or tax
revenues due to suburbanization and growth on the fringes of cities.").
416. Compare State & County Quickfacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/37000.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2012), with North
Carolina:2000, Census 2000 Profile, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov
/prod/2002pubs/c2kprof00-nc.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (showing that North
Carolina's population grew by 18.5% from 8,049,313 to 9,535,483), and Fast Facts:
http://www.census.gov/history/www
BUREAU,
CENSUS
2010,
U.S.
/through-the-decades/fastfacts/2010_fast facts.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2012)
(showing that the population of the United States as a whole grew by only 9.7%,
from 281,421,906 to 308,745,538).
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fastest-growing state in the country. 417 Growth has occurred in
very different ways in different parts of the state. 1 8 There are
three major and two smaller areas of high growth that
experienced more than twenty-five percent growth during the
2000-2010 period: near Charlotte, near the Research Triangle
Park, near East Carolina University in Pitt County, near Virginia
on the coast, and on the coast near Wilmington. 419 Although the
percentage rate of growth may shift slightly as areas are built out,
these or nearby areas are likewise projected to realize the state's
most substantial population growth during the 2010-2020
period. 42 0 At the same time, other more rural parts of the state
have experienced low or negative growth over the past decade
and are expected to have a similar experience in the decade to

come. 421
The 2011 annexation legislation on its face applies to all
municipalities, but it needs to be viewed against this real-world
417. See PAUL MACKUN & STEVEN WILSON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND CHANGE: 2000-2010, at 2 (2011), http://
www.census.gov/prod/cen2OlO/briefs/c2OlObr-Ol.pdf.
418. See N.C. OFFICE OF STATE BUDGET AND MGMT., County/State
PopulationProjections,
http://www.osbm.state.nc.us/ncosbm/facts and_figures
/socioeconomic-data/population-estimates/county-projections.shtm (last visited Nov.
16, 2012) (providing links to detailed projections for population totals in North
Carolina).
419. See N.C. OFFICE OF STATE BUDGET AND MGMT., Population Growth: 20002010,
http://www.osbm.state.nc.us/ncosbm/facts-and-figures/socioeconomic data
/population-estimates/demog/20002010growthmig.pdf
(indicating high growth
counties on North Carolina map, including Iredell, Mecklenburg, Cabarrus and
Union Counties (near Charlotte); Wake, Franklin, Johnston, Harnett, and Hoke
(near Raleigh); New Hanover, Pender, and Brunswick Counties (near Wilmington);
Pitt County (near Greenville), and Pasquotank and Currituck Counties (near
Virginia Beach and Norfolk)).
420. See N.C. OFFICE OF STATE BUDGET AND MGMT., Projected Population
Growth:
2010-2020,
http://www.osbm.state.nc.us/ncosbm/facts.-and-figures
/socioeconomic data/population-estimates/demog/20102020growthmig.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 16,2012).
421. See County Estimates, N.C. OFF. OF STATE BUDGET AND MGMT.,
http://www.osbm.state.nc.us/ncosbm/facts-and__figures/socioeconomic-data/populatio
n_estimates/countyestimates.shtm (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (providing links to
detailed data). Compare NORTH CAROLINA OFFICE OF STATE BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, Population Growth: A2010-J2011, http://www.osbm.state.nc.us
incosbm/factsandfigures/socioeconomic-data/populationestimates/demog/2011pro
vgrowthmig.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (displaying 2011 population data), with
NORTH CAROLINA OFFICE OF STATE BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Projected
Population
Growth:
2010-2020,
http://www.osbm.state.nc.us/ncosbm
/facts-and-figures/socioeconomicdata/population-estimates/demog/20102020growth
mig.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (displaying projections for population change
between 2010 and 2020). See discussion supra Part II.C.2.c.
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context. As discussed above, cities in areas that are growing
economically and are experiencing population growth are the
most likely to be able to continue to annex. This dynamic is
related to their ability to receive petitions for voluntary
annexation, tie extension of strong water and sewer systems to
voluntary annexation, fund their water and sewer systems so as to
extend such services in a way that covers associated costs, or grow
and develop in ways that meet involuntary annexation standards
and create strong enough financial structures that they will be
able to extend water and sewer services while bearing costs now
imposed under the new involuntary annexation provisions. On
the other hand, cities in less economically dynamic areas are
generally smaller and less economically robust, less likely to be
desirable locales for seeking voluntary annexation or extension of
water and sewer services (since in more rural areas use of well
and septic systems are more common), and less able to buffer
water and sewer expenditures because of more limited tax bases.
An inevitable question is therefore posed: does it make sense
to adopt a uniform annexation policy that applies statewide given
the significantly different situations facing municipalities that are
in the path of population growth and those in low- or modestgrowth areas that may regard annexation as a financial lifeline?
The 2011 legislative changes abolished differences in involuntary
annexation standards based on city population, giving all cities the
opportunity to annex based on the same "urban character"
criteria.4 22 Despite pleas from the League of Municipalities and
others to consider the implications of annexation reform for the
financial welfare of cities, 423 little attention was devoted to such
concerns. In the aftermath of legislative reform, it is worth posing
related questions for ongoing attention and research.
There appears to be a significant risk that cities in areas with
modest growth will be less able to expand corporate boundaries
and tax bases in the future. The General Assembly and state
422. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.c.
423. See Annexation Keeps North Carolina Moving Forward, Fairly, supra note 8

(arguing that annexation has many benefits and characterizing proposed reforms to
make annexation policies more rigorous as allowing "a few to veto success for
many"); Thomas W. Bradshaw, Jr. & Richard A. Vinroot, Op-Ed, A Tool that Built
N.C's Cities, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 9, 2009, at 9A (op-ed by
former mayor of Raleigh and former mayor of Charlotte advocating for reasonable
annexation reform, extolling the benefits of annexation for North Carolina citizens
and municipalities, and arguing that requiring a vote of citizens before annexation
occurs weakens municipalities).
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agencies such as the Department of the State Treasurer and the
Local Government Commission will therefore need to pay closer
attention to the financial viability of such municipalities,
particularly when such municipalities have municipally operated
water and sewer systems that show signs of stress. For example,
the State Treasurer has reported that many very small municipal
water and sewer systems are underfunded and should consider
regional systems as alternatives.4 24 It seems unlikely that small
systems with aging infrastructure are positioned to expand to
regional systems and update needed infrastructure without state
support. Accordingly, it may be necessary to find means to
supplement funding for small local governments in rural settings
when annexation is no longer a viable option that can foster
financial health.425
On the other hand, different issues may face municipalities in
high-growth areas. They must address greater needs for
coordination of decisions regarding land use planning, regulation,
annexation and service provision. They may also face greater
pressure from "gated communities" or other concentrated
populations to incorporate "paper cities" that serve to block
annexation and property tax obligations to other nearby
communities, while providing minimal services.426 It is accordingly
worth considering whether parts of North Carolina that are in
that particular trajectory of growth might need additional
authority to deal with related issues. The General Assembly
might also need to tailor its approach to approving proposed
municipal incorporations with related issues in mind.427
424. Memorandum from Sharon Edmundson, Dir., Fiscal Mgmt. Section, to
Officials of Municipalities with Water & Sewer Syst. & Their Indep. Auditors 5 (May
2,2012), https://www.nctreasurer.com/sig/Memos/2012-17.pdf.
425. One such alternative may be Tax Increment Financing (known as "Project
Development Financing" in North Carolina), although its use in North Carolina has
been sparse to this point. See Adam C. Parker, Comment, Still as Moonlight: Why
Tax Increment Financing Stalled in North Carolina, 91 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming
2013) (comparing the elements of North Carolina's tax increment financing statute
against other states' statutes and concluding that the availability of other public
finance substitutes, ancillary factors, and the complexity of North Carolina's statute
have discouraged use of Tax Increment Financing in North Carolina).
426. See supra Part II.C.1.b.
427. In the waning days of the 2012 legislative session, the General Assembly
considered legislation calling for a study of incorporation, extraterritorial jurisdiction
and municipal services. See S.B. 231, 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (Version 5) (N.C. 2012)
(Senate version calling for a study committee relating to incorporation and ETJ),
http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/Sessions/2011/Bills/Senate/PDF/S231v5.pdf. The House
had added coverage of municipal services to the agenda for the study and the Senate
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planning, growth
The close connection between
management, ETJ boundaries and infrastructure was evidenced
quite dramatically in the final days of the 2012 North Carolina
legislative session. Legislation requiring municipalities to extend
water and sewer infrastructure into areas within their urban
growth boundaries (that is, territory generally designated as
falling within their ETJ areas)428 was introduced and passed the
did not concur as of June 28, 2012. S.B. 231, 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2012), Bill
History, available at http://www.ncleg.net/gascripts/BillLookUp/BillLookUp.pl
?Session=2011&BilllD=S231. Version 3 of the Senate bill had proposed to set more
specific standards for municipal incorporation (including provision of specified water
and sewer services, a minimum property tax rate, and minimum population densities
tied to proximity to existing municipalities). See S.B. 231, 2011-2012 Reg. Sess.
at
http://
available
2012),
3)
(N.C.
(Version
www.nega.state.nc.us/Sessions/2011/Bills/Senate/PDF/S231v3.pdf. It had also limited
extensions of public water and sewer services by public providers other than the
municipality in question into areas with close proximity to municipal limits. Id. The
fourth version eliminated the provisions regarding water and sewer extensions.
Compare S.B. 231 § 4, (Version 4) (N.C. 2012) (indicating that § 4 of this version only
pertains to the date of enactment), available at http://www.ncga.state.nc.us
/Sessions/2011/Bills/Senate/PDFS231v4.pdf, with S.B. 231 § 3, 2011-2012 Reg. Sess.
(Version 4) (N.C. 2012) (attempting to restrict other public entities providing water
and sewer services near municipalities). In the end this legislation did not pass.
428. Section 160A-360 of the General Statutes of North Carolina, which governs
territorial jurisdiction for land use planning, reads in pertinent part:
(a) All of the powers granted by this Article may be exercised by any city
within its corporate limits. In addition, any city may exercise these powers
within a defined area extending not more than one mile beyond its limits.
With the approval of the board or boards of county commissioners with
jurisdiction over the area, a city of 10,000 or more population but less than
25,000 may exercise these powers over an area extending not more than two
miles beyond its limits and a city of 25,000 or more population may exercise
these powers over an area extending not more than three miles beyond its
limits. The boundaries of the city's extraterritorial jurisdiction shall be the
same for all powers conferred in this Article. No city may exercise
extraterritorially any power conferred by this Article that it is not exercising
within its corporate limits . .. .
(b) Any council wishing to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction under this
Article shall adopt, and may amend from time to time, an ordinance
specifying the areas to be included based upon existing or projected urban
development and areas of critical concern to the city, as evidenced by
officially adopted plans for its development. Boundaries shall be defined, to
the extent feasible, in terms of geographical features identifiable on the
ground. A council may, in its discretion, exclude from its extraterritorial
jurisdiction areas lying in another county, areas separated from the city by
barriers to urban growth, or areas whose projected development will have
minimal impact on the city ....

(d) If a city fails to adopt an ordinance specifying the boundaries of its
extraterritorial jurisdiction. the county of which it is a part shall be authorized
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House.4 2 9 More specifically, the initial House version of the
legislation provided as follows:
A city that extends water and sewer service to a designated
urban growth area outside its corporate limits may not deny
water and sewer service to a property owner that the city
includes in that urban growth area for reasons not applied
equally to property owners within the corporate limits. The
city may charge the property owner in the urban growth
area up to twice the rate for water and sewer services that
the city charges property owners within the corporate limits
and may charge the property owner in the urban growth
area for the cost of infrastructure improvements necessary
to provide the water and sewer services outside the
corporate limits. If the city subsequently annexes some or
all of the urban growth area to which the city has provided
water and sewer services, then the city may no longer
to exercise the powers granted by this Article in any area beyond the city's
corporate limits ....
(e) No city may hereafter extend its extraterritorial powers under this Article
into any area for which the county at that time has adopted and is enforcing a
zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations and within which it is enforcing
the State Building Code. However, the city may do so where the county is not
exercising all three of these powers, or when the city and the county have
agreed upon the area within which each will exercise the powers conferred by
this Article.

(g) When a local government is granted powers by this section subject to the
request, approval, or agreement of another local government, the request,
approval, or agreement shall be evidenced by a formally adopted resolution
of that government's legislative body. Any such request, approval, or
agreement can be rescinded upon two years' written notice to the other
legislative bodies concerned by repealing the resolution. The resolution may
be modified at any time by mutual agreement of the legislative bodies
concerned.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-360 (2011).
429. News accounts reported that the bill was designed to force Durham city
officials to extend water and sewer service to a major proposed development in their
urban growth area, something they had previously declined to do because of
substantial related costs. See Jim Wise, Bill Could Require City Water and Sewer
Service for 751 South, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 27, 2012, at 3B.
Efforts by local representatives to derail the bill in the house failed, and it passed and
was sent to the Senate. See Ray Gronberg, Pro-751 bill goes to Senate, HERALD-SUN
(Durham, N.C.), June 28, 2012, at Al. The Senate took up the bill on June 28, 2012
but declined to endorse it. Ray Gronberg, Senate Turns Down 751 Bill, for the
Moment, HERALD-SUN (Durham, N.C.), June 29, 2012, at Al. It was sent to
conference committee. See id.
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charge a different rate for the provision of the water and
sewer services for those annexed areas.3 o
Passage of this or similar legislation would put municipalities
with ETJ areas designed to manage growth in some difficult
positions, particularly given its ambiguous terms. On its face, the
proposal appears designed to require municipalities that have
asserted extraterritorial jurisdiction to extend water and sewer
infrastructures to ETJ residents (who are not taxpayers) using the
same criteria applied within the existing corporate limits. 431
Seemingly, then, if in-town residential users can receive water and
sewer services upon request, so too could those in the ETJ area,
even though the ETJ area may have very different development
patterns, with higher costs of service delivery resulting from lower
density, for example. If residential and some commercial users intown are eligible for public water and sewer, does the proposed
statute mean that any type of commercial users located in the ETJ
area, requesting any volume of water and sewer services, must be
provided it, even if providing such services would exhaust the
availability of water for in-town residential users? It is also not
clear whether municipalities might develop policies that set
density or topography or similar criteria as bases for extending
service either in- or out-of-town. The proposed legislation also
does not address how promptly such service might need to be
delivered, since there are no set time limits for extension as there
are in the annexation statutes.
Financial considerations likewise seem ill-posed. The
property owner requesting services can be charged the cost of
infrastructure outside the corporate limits, but what would the
property owner's responsibilities be if the extension necessitates
substantial improvements in the system as a whole, or if
substantial costs are incurred to develop capacity that property
owners in the ETJ area have not yet requested? Would affected
cities be required to take on and carry debt to meet such
uncertain demands? Would existing ratepayers be required to

430. See S.B. 382, 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. § 1 (Version 4) (N.C. 2012) (Senate bill
requiring water and sewer service in a designated urban growth area), available at
http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/Sessions/2011/Bills/Senate/PDF/S382v4pdf.
431. See id (forbidding denial of water and sewer services to property owners in
the urban growth area "for reasons not applied equally to property owners within the
corporate limits").
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carry associated costs until such time as others in the ETJ area
requested services? 43 2
Legislative proposals such as this one leave municipalities in
a difficult quandary, one that legislators may fail to fully
understand. Authority to engage in planning and guide
development is essential to crafting meaningful strategies for costefficient provision of infrastructure.43 3 Policies that assume it is
possible to deliver "utilities on demand" focus on individual
property owners' interests but do not take adequate account of
the complexities and costs of serving a population as a whole. The
medical establishment has come to understand that it is
shortsighted to focus only on individual patients' immediate
treatment needs, rather than using the lens of public health
analysis to track population-based patterns of illness and identify
means of avoiding it. Similarly, public policy makers need to
consider a system's overall structure in order to provide public
goods and manage the pace at which they can be paid for and
delivered.
A number of states facing significant growth pressures have,
in the last few decades, adopted statewide land use planning
protocols which mandate more intensive regional planning
processes.43 For example, Oregon has been a leader in such
strategies, establishing a statewide commission to review land use
goals and requiring counties and municipalities to develop
comprehensive plans and associated regulations consistent with

432. Ultimately, a conference committee developed a revised version of the
proposed legislation that would purportedly have applied only to the City of
Durham. In the waning hours of the 2012 legislative session, this legislation passed
the House, was calendared in the Senate, was pulled from consideration in the
Senate, and was defeated by one vote. See Editorial, Ray Gronberg, Senate Defeats
751 Bill-By One Vote, HERALD-SUN (Durham, N.C.), July 4, 2012, at Al; see also
Ray Gronberg, Good Riddance to 751 Measure, HERALD-SUN (Durham, N.C.), July
5, 2012, at A8 (providing an editorial opinion on the negative aspects of this bill).
433. See, e.g., Envtl. Fin. Cntr., UNC SCH. OF GoV'T, http://www.efc.unc.edu
lindex.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
434. See ZIEGLER, supra note 378, § 36.21 (4th ed. 2012); Rebecca Lewis &
Gerrit-Jan Knapp, Institutional Structures for State Growth Management: An
Examination of State Development Plans, 44 ST. & LOC. GOV'T REV. 33,37-39,41-43
(2012) (discussing experience in Connecticut, Rhode Island, Delaware, Florida,
Maryland, and New Jersey); Daniel R. Mandelker, Implementing State Growth
Management Programs: Alternatives and Recommendations, 45 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 307, 308-09, 315-16 (2012) (discussing program coverage and criteria for state
growth management programs).
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statewide objectives.435 Others have subsequently followed
Oregon's lead. 6
North Carolinians have traditionally preferred limited
government, 3' and it seems unlikely that statewide planning
processes will be adopted any time soon. On the other hand, the
state has agreed to specialized planning procedures for sensitive
areas such as its coast and mountains.3 A time may therefore
come when the General Assembly will realize that growth-related
issues are affecting different areas of the state differently, with the
result that legal structures may need to adapt. It might be
possible, for example, to develop an integrated approach to land
use planning, infrastructure development, service delivery,
funding of municipal and county services, extraterritorial
jurisdiction, annexation authority, and related issues. Climate
change that may exacerbate extreme weather, North Carolina's
changing demographics and rapid pace of growth, and sharply
constrained public funds will likely build pressure for a more
systematic approach to the interrelated challenges of providing
infrastructure, managing growth, and planning for the future.
Should that time come, the General Assembly might wish to
address these issues through a system that creates incentives and
responsibilities for county-city coordination and long-term
approaches to relevant decision-making, at least in high-growth
areas, along the lines employed in the vanguard of other states.
City, County, and Other Relationships:Local Government
Ecology Redux
The preceding Sections have considered how recent
legislative changes may affect public infrastructure, local land use
C.

435. See ZIEGLER, supra note 378, §36.21 (discussing OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.030065 (1994), the Oregon State Land Use Act of 1973, and other state statutes).
436. See id. (referencing regional or statewide planning requirements in Florida,
Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, and
Washington).
437. See Arch T. Allen, III, A Study in Separation of Powers: Executive Power in
North Carolina,77 N.C. L. REV. 2049, 2053-54, 2059 (1999) (discussing evolution of
the North Carolina Constitution and hesitancy among citizens and the General
Assembly to accord strong powers to the executive branch). For a more general
discussion of North Carolina's constitutional history and governance philosophy, see
generally, JOHN V. ORTH, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE (1993).
438. See Coastal Area Management Act of 1974, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-100 to
-134.3 (2011); Mountain Ridge Protection Act of 1983, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-205
to -214 (2011).
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regulation, and growth management practices in the future. These
important activities occur within the local government ecology
discussed earlier in this article.439 Additional lingering questions
concern how North Carolina's new annexation legislation may
change the ecology of local government itself, including the
dynamics between municipalities, counties, and public or private
service providers. This Article has contended that it is important
to consider annexation within the context of local government
ecology. Even though it may be difficult to predict resulting
developments with certainty, the Article concludes by considering
how important issues such as those just referenced are likely to be
affected by recent statutory changes.
This Section first describes in more detail three important
long-term questions that are likely to arise within North
Carolina's local government ecological system as a result of
recent annexation law reforms. In an attempt to discern how
these questions might be resolved, it then turns to relevant social
science research and the experience of other states with
annexation policies similar to those that have recently been
adopted in North Carolina.
1. Long-Term Questions About Local Government Ecology
Traditionally, annexation has been viewed as a means for
municipal boundary change."' This Article has taken a different
stance, and suggested that annexation should be viewed as one
dynamic within the context of the ecology of local governance.441
This Section outlines three significant questions that are likely to
arise in future years as a result of the recent changes in North
Carolina's annexation law. Although immediate changes in
provision of infrastructure and application of regulatory systems
will have more significant immediate impact, these longer-term
dilemmas are likely to result in more fundamental shifts in
governance at the local level in North Carolina. They accordingly
warrant at least preliminary review.
a. Old Towns, New Towns: Will Fragmentation Increase?
The North Carolina Constitution limits the extent to which
new municipalities can be incorporated in close proximity to
439. See supra Part I.B.2.
440. See supra Part I.A.
441. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
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those that already exist.442 Limitations on involuntary annexation
(both those related to referendum requirements and those
relating to provision of public water and sewer hook-ups at no
cost) have the effect of curtailing the geographic growth of
existing municipalities. Although state constitutional constraints
continue to limit new municipal incorporations within specified
distances from existing municipal boundaries, it is possible that
the new annexation requirements will allow a growing number of
new municipalities to be incorporated outside of existing
municipal limits (which will now be more significantly
constrained). On the other hand, the recent statutory changes
may reduce the pressure for "defensive annexation" and may
instead lead primarily to more intensive growth on the fringes of
existing municipalities, leading to a different type of
fragmentation (one that results in undifferentiated population
density without establishment of a separate government identity).
While North Carolina has yet to assess the implications of
more fragmented local governance, recent annexation reforms
raise the specter of added costs from establishing a larger number
of municipalities (rather than bringing urban growth within
existing municipalities) or unrecognized costs imposed on
municipalities as a result of urban growth outside their perimeters
(such as costs for traffic protection within municipal boundaries
that results from use of roads by those living beyond city limits).
County Versus Town: Can (Rural) Ranchers and
(Suburban) Farmers be Friends?" 3
Recent legislative deliberations regarding North Carolina's
annexation policy revealed significant schisms between county
and municipal interests that are likely to persist. In more rural
areas, property owners potentially subject to involuntary
annexation sought the support of county commissioners to fight
back against municipal efforts to bring them within local
boundaries." County representatives also expressed concern that
b.

442. See supra note 50.
443. See RICHARD RODGERS & OSCAR HAMMERSTEIN, OKLAHOMA! 85-90
(1943).
444. For summaries of local political activities by annexation opponents, see, for
example, Barbara Hunter, Annexation Is All About the Money-More for
Government, Less for Citizenry, STOPNCANNEXATION (Jan, 16, 2007, 12:15 AM),
http://www.stopncannexation.com/Annexaboutmoney.htm (originally printed in the
Ashville Citizen-Times); Joel Burgess, Jones: Annexation a Drain on Taxpayers,
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municipal annexation would shift the distribution of sales tax
revenues to the disadvantage of counties, particularly since such
revenues play a significant role in funding schools."
Recent census data also suggests that substantial differences
in rural-urban mix characterize various North Carolina
localities." 6 The increasing antipathy to urban interests evident
during recent legislative debates"7 suggests that North Carolina
can anticipate a growing disjunction between counties with
substantial urban populations and counties with much more
limited municipal populations. Moreover, over the last several
decades, counties have retained core state functions such as those
relating to public health and school support, but have increasingly
been afforded nearly all the powers available to municipalities."
At some point, fundamental questions regarding differences
between rural and urbanizing areas, the allocation of funding
sources, and the respective responsibilities of cities and counties
may need to be revisited in response to changing times.
General Versus Specialty Providers: Comprehensive
Governments or Services Ala Carte?
Recent annexation reforms change both the physical and
fiscal landscape for delivery of public water and sewer services,
and may result in significant shifts in delivery patterns and
providers as discussed above." 9 At a deeper level, however, these
changes have undercut the traditional model by which
c.

SToPNCANNEXATION (Jan. 9, 2007, 12:15 AM), http://www.stopncannexation.com
/AnnexaDrain.htm (originally printed in the Ashville Citizen Times); see also infra
note 445 (discussing the legislative position of the North Carolina Association of
County Commissioners).
445. See 2011-2012 Legislative Goals, N.C. ASS'N OF CNTY. COMM'RS,
http://www.ncacc.org/index.aspx?NID=151 (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (calling for
modernization of annexation laws requiring development of joint utility service plans
for urbanizing areas, requiring cities to reimburse counties for the loss of sales tax
due to an annexation, increasing the degrees of urbanization required to annex
property, allowing boards of county commissioners to request annexation referenda,
requiring the direct provision of municipal water and sewer services to customers
within three years of an annexation, providing that counties have the option of
continuing to provide utilities to annexed areas, setting the effective date for
involuntary annexations to be June 30 following the date of adoption or final
resolution of an approval, and prohibiting municipalities from annexing across county
boundaries without prior consent of the Board of Commissioners of affected county).
446. See supra notes 416-21 and accompanying text.
447. See supra note 229.
448. See supra Part II.B.2.a, b.
449. See supra Part II.C.1.a.
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municipalities serve as providers of public infrastructure, and
regulatory and other services, as a comprehensive package,
offering the same terms to those who are newly annexed as to
those who have long resided within municipal bounds.
This approach goes one step beyond the growing practice of
state and local governments of charging user fees for certain
services such as parks and recreation activities, rather than
treating such services as part of the overall menu of public goods
delivered to all and paid for through comprehensive tax schemes.
Instead, it gives private citizens new choices about whether to
affiliate with adjoining municipalities and share the benefits and
burdens of participation in the body politic, or instead to stand
apart and seek to secure desired services on an h la carte basis.
During North Carolina's recent annexation wars, the focus
has been on delivery of public water and sewer services.
Nonetheless, there would seem to be no theoretical reason why
such an approach might not extend to a variety of other offerings,
including access to parks and recreation programs, libraries, solid
waste management, and public safety assistance. Historically,
cooperation on such matters has often been arranged by contract
between municipalities, counties, special authorities, private solidwaste-removal entities and volunteer fire departments. 4s0 A key
question, however, is whether the recent annexation changes,
with resulting acrimony between counties and municipalities in
many locations will prove a tipping point. Instead of assuming
that there should be cooperation and cost-sharing, will these
changes usher in a new era in which municipalities, counties,
quasi-governmental entities, special districts, authorities, or even
homeowners' associations from large subdivisions begin to
compete to offer such services on a fee-for-service basis? Would
such developments be cost effective? Would the result be greater
privatization? What would be lost or gained?
2. The Lessons of Experience
While it is impossible to answer the fundamental questions
just described with any certainty, it is worth considering the
450. See Jeffery A. Hughes & David M. Lawrence, Article 38: Local Government
Water and Wastewater Enterprises, in COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT IN
NORTH CAROLINA 5, 5-7 (2007) (discussing how locales can provide wastewater
enterprises); Kara A. Millonzi, County Funding for Fire Services in North Carolina,
43 Loc. FIN. BULL., May 2011, at 1, 3, 10, 12 (covering local contracting options for
fire services).
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lessons of experience from other states in order to plan for future
consequences. Happily, both careful empirical studies comparing
southern cities (particularly those comparing cities in North and
South Carolina before the recent annexation changes) and
broader evidence from around the country serve as initial points
of reference for what may come. The evidence available does not
track directly with the questions just posed, but deserves
consideration on its own terms.
a. Comparative Studies of Southern Cities and States
Professors Olga Smirnova and Jerry Ingalls have recently
examined annexation and related practices in southern cities and
compared the experiences of North Carolina and South
Carolina. 45 1 Their work suggests that fragmentation will grow and
reliance on specialized providers will likely increase.
In an initial study involving eight southern states, the
researchers found that where referendum requirements were
employed to limit involuntary annexations, growth within
metropolitan statistical areas occurred primarily in suburbs rather
than in central cities that could not annex fringe areas without
popular support.452 This study also documented the growth in
special districts as related to annexation methods. Over the thirtyyear study period, jurisdictions employing referenda experienced
nearly four times the increase in special districts than was the case

451. Olga Smirnova & Jerry Ingalls, The Influence of State Annexation Laws on
the Growth of Selected Southern Cities, 47 SOUTHEASTERN GEOGRAPHER 71, 71
(2007) [hereinafter Smirnova & Ingalls, Southern Cities] (comparing data from
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina,
and Tennessee). In an initial study, they explored data from Metropolitan Statistical
Areas (MSAs) over the thirty-year period from 1970-2000, using information drawn
from U.S. Census data (covering population and government). Id. The researchers
used Sengstock's annexation framework to classify the respective states' principal
forms of annexation. Id. They then compared the median scores of MSAs and central
cities in these types of states in connection with several issues: overall population
growth, growth in number of municipalities, and growth of special districts. See
generally Olga Smirnova & Jerry Ingalls, Annexation, Incorporationand the Health of
Central Cities in North and South Carolina, 16 N.C. GEOGRAPHER 5 (2008)
[hereinafter Smirnova & Ingalls, North and South Carolina].
452. Smirnova & Ingalls, Southern Cities, supra note 451, at 78-80. In contrast, the
jurisdictions that employed municipal determination strategies had the lowest ratios
of growth in metropolitan statistical areas as a whole compared to central cities
(indicating that more people were absorbed into central cities when municipal
determinations were employed). Id. at 79-80.
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in jurisdictions that gave municipalities broad discretion to engage
in involuntary annexation.453
In a subsequent study, Smirnova and Ingalls focused more
explicitly on annexation, incorporation, and related issues
through an in-depth comparison of the effects of North Carolina
and South Carolina annexation policies on central cities.^4 The
researchers sought to determine whether there were important
differences in annexation and incorporation policies in the two
states (including impact of the policies on actual practice and
actual patterns that resulted); whether differences in annexation
statutes and related patterns of annexation and incorporation
influenced the growth of central cities; and whether annexation
and incorporation statutes affect patterns of growth of special
districts within metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs").455
The researchers observed that North Carolina law had
clearer standards and benchmarks for annexation, 456 allowed
involuntary annexation (at the time of the study), authorized
intergovernmental agreements, and required municipalities and
special districts to proceed under express statutory authority for
stated objectives.4 57 In contrast, South Carolina had less clear but
more constrained annexation practices (employing case-by case
review, voter referenda, and county review processes), gave
municipalities greater power through "home rule," did not
generally authorize intergovernmental agreements, and did not
limit the purpose of geographic scope for special districts."
The researchers' in-depth comparison of developments in
North and South Carolina is quite illuminating.4 9 They compared
453. In states using annexation referenda, special districts increased by 113% as
compared to states in which municipalities had more discretion (where the number
increased by only 30%). Id. at 81.
454. See Smirnova & Ingalls, North and South Carolina, supra note 451, at 7
(using four decades of data from the U.S. Census of Governments and Census of
Population for the 1962-2002 and 1960-2000 periods respectively and focusing on
twenty-four MSAs).
455. Id. at 7-8.
456. Id. at 8. In contrast to North Carolina, South Carolina statutes set a five-mile
perimeter around existing cities within which new incorporation is not permitted.
457. Id. at 9-10.
458. Id. at 8-10.
459. When comparing annexation activity, Smirnova and Ingalls cited North
Carolina as the state with the fifth highest number of annexations during the period
of 1970-1998. Id. at 11. It is difficult to determine the significance of this pattern for
present purposes since the data do not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary
annexation and reflect some patterns of action more than ten to forty years old. Id.
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growth patterns in the two states as a whole, growth in MSA
populations, growth in central cities population, growth in the
counties where central cities were located, and growth by MSA
outside of central cities.4 6
Dramatic differences were evident particularly as to resulting
distribution of population growth. In North Carolina, central city
population grew dramatically, while in South Carolina, central
city population growth was relatively stagnant." 1 Population
growth in MSAs outside central cities reflected the opposite
trend.4 2 Thus, South Carolina witnessed a significant increase in
population living in non-central city locations, while in North
Carolina the population living outside of central city locations
grew much more modestly. The researchers also looked
intensively at patterns affecting the major cities in the two states,
focusing on Columbia and Greenville, South Carolina and
Charlotte, North Carolina,463 and concluded that in North
Carolina "much of the metropolitan growth is being absorbed by
... central cities; [while] in South Carolina, central cities seem to
be stagnant or even declining" as growth occurs in
unincorporated places instead."#Smirnova's and Ingalls' work

Nonetheless, despite the limitations of this information, it is clear that North Carolina
absorbed substantial population and acreage within its municipalities through
annexation during this period.
460. Id. at 11-15.
461. In North Carolina, central city populations grew by 119% over the forty-year
period, while in South Carolina such population grew by only 15%. Id. Strikingly,
population growth in counties with central cities grew by 114% in North Carolina
over the study period but only by 61% in South Carolina, suggesting that growth was
being absorbed into North Carolina counties with urban centers, while that was less
the case in South Carolina. Id. at 13.
462. Id.
463. In focusing on these major cities, the researchers explored patterns of
annexation, incorporation and special districts. They found significant differences
between the North Carolina and South Carolina cities and MSAs. The Charlotte
MSA and the City of Charlotte had grown much more significantly, and had seen a
modest increase in the number of municipalities (which grew from thirty-three to
fourty-five) and special districts (which grew from nine to fourteen during this
period), during which its land area had grown from 76 to 242 square miles. The City
of Columbia had only a 19% increase in population (compared to Charlotte's 168%
growth), lost two of its municipalities, and had seen the number of special districts
grow from nine to twenty-seven, while its land area grew to only 125 square miles as a
result of annexation. The City of Greenville, South Carolina lost 15% of its
population, while its MSA grew by 85%, two municipalities were lost, special districts
grew from twenty-three to forty-six, and land area grew to only twenty-six square
miles. Id. at 16-18.
464. Id. at 15.
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also yielded important insights regarding patterns of
incorporation and establishment of special districts. North
Carolina had substantially more incorporations than did South
Carolina, with many of the incorporations taking place in the
1990s in the fast-growing Charlotte area.465 South Carolina
suburbs had limited opportunities to incorporate and even fewer
options to annex, fueling major growth in the number of special
districts particularly during the 1980s and 1990s. 4 66 In the
researchers' view, this mushrooming of special districts in South
Carolina may reflect efforts to arrange for service delivery and
local control that is harder to achieve given differing annexation,
incorporation, and intergovernmental agreement policies. 67
Finally, the researchers examined interrelated patterns of
annexation, incorporation and special districts in the same three
major cities and found significant differences between these cities
and associated MSAs. The Charlotte MSA and the City of
Charlotte had grown much more significantly, had seen a modest
increase in the number of municipalities (which grew from thirtythree to forty-five) and special districts, and had significant
growth in MSA land area."# One of the two South Carolina cities
had had only a modest increase in population, while the other had
lost population. Both cities lost municipalities, special districts
grew substantially, and land area grew quite modestly.469 Overall,
the researchers concluded that South Carolina's "cities may
ultimately act as a drag on economic growth," and traced these
risks at least in part to its annexation policies.4 7 0
North and South Carolina have very different histories and
economies, and their public policies on issues such as public
higher education and economic development have differed.
Notwithstanding such differences, the studies just summarized
suggest important hints about how the questions posed earlier in
this Section may be answered. Annexation will prove more
difficult to achieve and patterns of growth may shift to areas
outside center cities, even if such growth does not result in new
465. Id. (during the 1990s, twelve of thirty-five new incorporations occurred in
counties near Charlotte (an area experiencing particularly substantial growth)).
466. Id. at 16 (stating that, by 2002, special districts in South Carolina MSAs
totaled 197, while in North Carolina the number stood at 138).
467. Id.
468. See supra notes 455-67 and accompanying text.
469. See supra notes 455-67 and accompanying text.
470. Smirnova & Ingalls, North and South Carolina,supra note 451, at 19.
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incorporations (now that the threat of involuntary annexation has
largely been removed). Demands for special districts and other
forms of service provision seem likely to increase. The impact of
statutory changes to annexation law on the fiscal health of North
Carolina's major cities and relating growth patterns remains
uncertain, given the radical economic changes that have occurred
since the studies were completed.
b. Insights from Elsewhere
The empirical studies just described offer important insights
regarding two of the three key issues of local government ecology
addressed in this Section: the relationship between old and new
municipalities and the role of local governments and other
entities as providers of public services. Additional insights about
the question of municipal-county relationships and possible
developments involving alternative service providers can be
gleaned by considering developments from around the country.
The question of municipal-county relationships is perhaps
the most vexing of the issues enumerated here. Each state has a
distinctive history regarding the roles played by counties,
municipalities, and other forms of local government. 71 For
example, Professor Michelle Wilde Anderson has begun to
research and explain the unique dimensions of county
responsibilities and municipal obligations in California.472
Academic researchers have also proceeded apace to delineate the
challenges and tensions affecting such governmental entities and
their relationships. 47 The reality, however, is that such issues
must be taken under advisement in light of local circumstances.
Experience from around the country can also be brought to
bear in analyzing how "Ala carte" services should be provided to
areas potentially served by local governments. For example,
during the 2011 legislative session, the General Assembly
authorized the creation of "service districts" that could provide

471. See supra Parts II.A-B
472. See generally Michelle Wilde Anderson, Sprawl's Shepherd: The Rural
County, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 365 (2011) (showing that rural counties, at the least,
encouraged suburban development on undeveloped land).
473. See, e.g., Kathryn A. Foster, Exploring the Links Between PoliticalStructure
and Metropolitan Growth, 12 POL. GEOGRAPHY 526, 527-43 (1993); Christopher
Hoene, Mark Baldassare & Michael Shires, The Development of Counties as
Municipal Governments: A Case Study of Los Angeles County in the Twenty-First
Century, 37 URB. AFF. REV. 4,575-91 (2002).
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enhanced police and public safety protection in areas outside
municipalities in Wake and Mecklenburg Counties.474 The
imperative for experimentation may be particularly strong in
those areas, but the significance of such changes may be
underappreciated at this point. The question is likely soon to be
posed as to why provisions for special service areas should be
limited to these locales, and whether it makes sense to allow
cities, counties, and gated communities to enter into contractual
service arrangements on a broader basis.
The experience of other states suggests that it is ill-advised to
consider only the respective roles of counties and cities in
analyzing how governmental or quasi-governmental services are
provided. In many states, special districts have begun to assume
responsibilities for assuring delivery of public services such as
water and sewer.475 In some jurisdictions where homeowners'
associations have taken responsibility for providing important
water and sewer infrastructure, state legislatures have indicated
that it may be reasonable to require that "fall back" public service
districts with financial responsibilities be created as a contingency

plan. 476
At this juncture, it can only be stated that the relationship
between cities and counties has been significantly under-theorized
in North Carolina and elsewhere in recent decades. Although
significant attention has been accorded to practices of
municipalities, much less attention has been given to the role and
practices of counties.477 The growing importance of special
districts has been documented, and scholarship to date has
suggested that creating specialized entities to take responsibilities
for important functions such as water and sewer services can tend
to reduce public accountability and raise costs." Today, there is
474. Act of May 23, 2011, ch. 100, § 1, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 196 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 153A-301(a)(10) (2011)).
475. See MEGAN MULLIN, GOVERNING THE TAP: SPECIAL DISTRICT
GOVERNANCE AND THE NEW LOCAL POLITICS OF WATER 2-5 (2009).
476. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 190.046 (West 2000) (community development
districts of 1,000 acres or more); Julian Juergensmeyer, Infrastructure and the Law:
Florida's Past, Present, and Future, 23 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 441, 446 (2008)
(discussing community development districts).
477. But see generally Anderson, supra note 472 (considering California's
experience with rural development in counties).
478. See, e.g., Rebecca M. Hendrick, Benedict S. Jimenez & Kamna Lal, Does
Local Government FragmentationReduce Local Spending?, 47 URB. AFF. REV. 467,
467, 502 (2011) (reviewing 2002 data from 126 metropolitan regions and 538 counties
in the same regions and concluding that total spending by local governments is higher
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limited empirical scholarship regarding the role of gated
communities and homeowners' associations in providing critical
services, although there is a growing understanding that largescale homeowners' associations tend to function as quasigovernments with important issues regarding procedures and
fairness raised as a result.479
In the end, it is often expedient for municipalities, counties,
and special districts to avoid discussion or legal frameworks
guiding their respective relationships, in order to maximize their
flexibility and avoid confronting opposing political views. On the
other hand, for the greater good, it will likely become increasingly
important for the North Carolina General Assembly to establish
structures to shape such relationships in order to assure
appropriate accountability regarding financial considerations and
to coordinate policy positions regarding infrastructure, land use,
growth management, as well as financial and other issues. North
Carolina has historically been at the forefront of framing sound
approaches to such challenges. It is time for the state to reassert
that leadership by grappling with the politically charged questions
raised by relationships between counties, cities, special districts
and private parties engaged in providing infrastructure and
regulating its communities.
The General Assembly has in recent years conducted modest
studies about related questions, but has yet to step up to the
challenges presented by significant differences in the state's
regions, variations in governmental structures, growth and
infrastructure management, and government finance in
meaningful ways. 4 8 It is time for it to do so, perhaps by revisiting
in regions and counties with more single-purpose governments and in jurisdictions
where a greater percentage of spending is done by counties, but finding additional
nuances that need to be considered).
479. See Barbara Coyle McCabe, Homeowners Associations as Private
Governments: What We Know, What We Don't Know, and Why It Matters, 71 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 535, 535 (July/Aug. 2011); Barbara Coyle McCabe, The Rules Are
Different Here: An InstitutionalComparison of Cities and Homeowners Associations,
37 ADMIN. & Soc. 404,411 (2005).
480. See Studies Act of 2009, ch. 574, § 6.3, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1617 (continue
study of water allocation issues); id. § 6.7, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 1609, 1617 (study
sustainable growth through the year 2050, including what it means to be
"sustainable," and how economic development, transportation and water/sewer
infrastructure, natural resources and quality of life fit that definition); Studies Act of
2008, ch. 181, § 36.1, 2008 N.C. Sess. Laws 723, 742 (charging the Legislative Study
Committee "to determine what measures the General Assembly may take to foster
regional water resource and transportation planning, incentive-based local land use
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these issues. North Carolina needs to take lessons from other
states that have faced significant growth pressures in recent years
and position its counties and municipalities to take on related
challenges more effectively by looking them directly in the eye."'
While North Carolina's recent annexation wars have in some
ways impeded meaningful conversation due to the sharp
differences in world view, attention to the consequences that will
likely result from annexation changes should serve as a "wake-up
call" for all concerned to attend to related issues.
CONCLUSION

This Article has endeavored to position North Carolina's
recent annexation wars in the context of debates regarding
desirable local government ecology (the powers and
responsibilities of counties, municipalities, special districts and
quasi-public gated communities). It has contended that
annexation debates are best situated in this broader context,
rather than viewed as simply a limited choice between extending
municipal boundaries or not. The Article has provided a national
context for understanding annexation policies, but has also
focused specifically on North Carolina's experiences, tracking
historical practices, case law reflecting disputes in the last decade,
and recent statutory changes. It has then endeavored to assess the
implications of North Carolina's annexation wars and the ways
these wars have resolved policy debates regarding how water and
sewer infrastructure should be funded, land use planning and
growth management should proceed, and differing mixes of city,
county, and private authority should be approached in the future.
The Article has offered a number of significant observations,
based on its analysis of recent statutory changes:
*

*

Changes in involuntary annexation laws are likely to curtail
the extension of public water and sewer services in the state as
planning, engineering, and financial arrangements become
more difficult for municipalities.
Municipalities that provide public water and sewer services
will likely move more substantially toward providing such
services to those outside municipal limits by conditioning

planning, and more responsive and cost-effective planning to accommodate rapid
population growth in North Carolina's urban areas").
481. See supra notes 361-62.
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voluntary annexations on contracts for such public services or
through independent, higher-cost arrangements to deliver
such services to those outside municipal boundaries.
* Pressures will likely increase on small municipalities to
provide public water and sewer services through regional
providers.
* Annexation policy and extraterritorial planning jurisdiction
remain important tools for land use regulation and growth
management, but the apparent tendency of the General
Assembly to intervene in local decisions creates a risk of
making it more difficult to establish rational policies on a local
or statewide basis.
* North Carolina's recent annexation law amendments may
have significant implications for the local government ecology
within the state. If the experience of other states can be
applied, it is likely that the state will witness growth in special
districts, and that state law will need to be revised to address
associated issues.
* North Carolina is a substantially rural state, with a small
number of counties and cities with high-growth
characteristics. It will be important for the state to consider
whether uniform approaches to local government authority,
annexation policies, and more remain sound policies, or
whether more nuanced approaches should be adopted to take
into account the differences among localities.
* North Carolina has traditionally been a state characterized by
good and responsible government. Its recent "annexation
wars" have revealed important tensions in the realm of local
government ecology, particularly as to the relationships
between municipalities, counties, special districts and
homeowners' associations. These "wars" have also revealed
important strains (such as those relating to public finance and
overlapping authority) that may make collaboration between
local governments and quasi-governmental entities more
difficult. North Carolina should give considered attention in
coming years to "reinventing" the relationships between local
government and quasi-governmental entities in order to steer
a clear and appropriate course that assures effective delivery
of government services, in a fair, cost-effective, and
accountable fashion, in the twenty-first century.
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Because North Carolina has been an imaginative and farsighted leader in structuring local government responsibilities in
the past, it will be important for the state to recognize that its
recent annexation reforms are an initial step toward changing its
the local government ecology for years to come. This Article has
sought to identify key questions posed by its recent statutory
amendments in terms of the delivery of public water and sewer
services, land use regulation and growth management. It has also
sought to identify key pressure points that may lead to changes in
local government ecology in the future, and to offer insights from
comparative studies and practices in other jurisdictions that may
illuminate the way ahead. Although the recent statutory changes
have effectively undercut North Carolina's role as a jurisdiction
with progressive insights regarding annexation and related local
government boundary changes, the state's rich culture of good
local government may still yield fresh insights about a way
forward in the face of changing assumptions about the
appropriate balance between private preferences and local
governance for the greater good.

